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Personality Psychology and Economics
* 
 
This paper explores the power of personality traits both as predictors and as causes of 
academic and economic success, health, and criminal activity. Measured personality is 
interpreted as a construct derived from an economic model of preferences, constraints, and 
information. Evidence is reviewed about the “situational specificity” of personality traits and 
preferences. An extreme version of the situationist view claims that there are no stable 
personality traits or preference parameters that persons carry across different situations. 
Those who hold this view claim that personality psychology has little relevance for 
economics. The biological and evolutionary origins of personality traits are explored. 
Personality measurement systems and relationships among the measures used by 
psychologists are examined. The predictive power of personality measures is compared with 
the predictive power of measures of cognition captured by IQ and achievement tests. For 
many outcomes, personality measures are just as predictive as cognitive measures, even 
after controlling for family background and cognition. Moreover, standard measures of 
cognition are heavily influenced by personality traits and incentives. Measured personality 
traits are positively correlated over the life cycle. However, they are not fixed and can be 
altered by experience and investment. Intervention studies, along with studies in biology and 
neuroscience, establish a causal basis for the observed effect of personality traits on 
economic and social outcomes. Personality traits are more malleable over the life cycle 
compared to cognition, which becomes highly rank stable around age 10. Interventions that 
change personality are promising avenues for addressing poverty and disadvantage. 
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1.  Introduction 
The power of cognitive ability in predicting social and economic success is well documented.
2  
Economists, psychologists, and sociologists now actively examine determinants of social and 
economic success beyond those captured by cognitive ability.
3  However, there remains a 
substantial imbalance in the scholarly and policy literatures in the emphasis placed on cognitive 
ability compared to other traits.  This chapter aims to correct this imbalance.  It considers how 
personality psychology informs economics and how economics can inform personality 
psychology.   
A recent analysis of the Perry Preschool Program shows that traits other than those 
measured by IQ and achievement tests causally determine life outcomes.
4  This experimental 
intervention enriched the early social and emotional environments of disadvantaged children 
ages 3 and 4 with subnormal IQs.  It primarily focused on fostering the ability of participants to 
plan tasks, to execute their plans, and to review their work in social groups.
5  In addition, it 
taught reading and math skills, although this was not its main focus.  Both treatment and control 
group members were followed into their 40s.
6   
                                                 
2 See, e.g., the studies cited in Becker [1964] and the discussion of ability bias in Griliches [1977]. 
3 See Bowles, Gintis and Osborne [2001a] and Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman et al. [2008] for reviews of the 
literature in economics.  Marxist economists and sociologists (e.g., Bowles and Gintis [1976] and Mueser [1979], 
respectively) pioneered the analysis of the impact of personality on earnings.  Mueller and Plug [2006] estimate 
empirical relationships between personality traits and earnings, schooling and occupational attainment.  Hartog 
[1980; 2001] relates the Big Five personality factors to earnings.  van Praag [1985] draws on the psychology 
literature to analyze economic preferences.  van Praag and van Weeren [1988] and Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman 
et al. [2008] link economics with psychology. 
4 We draw on the research of Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010].  See Weikart, Epstein, Schweinhart et al. 
[1978], Sylva [1997], Schweinhart, Montie, Xiang et al. [2005] and Heckman, Moon, Pinto et al. [2010a] for 
descriptions of the Perry program. 
5 Sylva [1997] shows that the Perry Program has important features that are shared with programs designed to foster 
self-control in children, for example, Tools of the Mind (Bodrova and Leong [2001]). 
6 Plans are underway to follow the Perry sample through age 50.   Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Figure 1 shows that, by age ten, treatment group mean IQs were the same as control 
group mean IQs.  Many critics of early childhood programs seize on this and related evidence to 
dismiss the value of early intervention studies.
7  Yet on a variety of measures of socioeconomic 
achievement, the treatment group was far more successful than the control group.
8  The annual 
rate of return to the Perry Program was in the range 6-10% for boys and girls separately.
9  These 
rates of return are statistically significant and above the returns to the US stock market over the 
post-war period.
10  The intervention changed something other than IQ, and that something 
produced strong treatment effects.  Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010] show that the 
personality traits of the participants were beneficially improved in a lasting way.
11  This chapter 
is about those traits. 
                                                 
7 See the Westinghouse study of Head Start (Project Head Start [1969]). 
8 See Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010], and Heckman, Moon, Pinto et al. [2010a].  
9 See Heckman, Moon, Pinto et al. [2010b]. 
10 See DeLong and Magin [2009] for estimates of the return on equity. 
11 We discuss this evidence in Section 8.  The traits changed were related to self-control and social behavior.  
Participants of both genders had better “externalizing behavior” while girls also had improved “internalizing 
behavior.”  See Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010].  Duncan and Magnuson [2010b] offer a different 
interpretation of the traits changed by the Perry experiment, but both analyses agree that it was not a boost in IQ that 
improved the life outcomes of Perry treatment group members. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Figure 1. Perry Preschool Program: IQ, by Age and Treatment Group 
Notes: IQ measured on the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (Terman and Merrill [1960]).  Test was 
administered at program entry and each of the ages indicated.   
Source: Cunha, Heckman, Lochner et al. [2006] and Heckman and Masterov [2007] based on data 
provided by the High Scope Foundation. 
 
Personality psychologists mainly focus on empirical associations between their measures 
of personality traits and a variety of life outcomes.  Yet for policy purposes, it is important to 
know mechanisms of causation to explore the viability of alternative policies.
12  We use 
economic theory to formalize the insights of personality psychology and to craft models that are 
useful for exploring the causal mechanisms that are needed for policy analysis. 
We interpret personality as a strategy function for responding to life situations.  
Personality traits, along with other influences, produce measured personality as the output of 
personality strategy functions.  We discuss how psychologists use measurements of the 
performance of persons on tasks or in taking actions to identify personality traits and cognitive 
                                                 
12 See Heckman [2008a]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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traits.  We discuss fundamental identification problems that arise in applying their procedures to 
infer traits. 
Many economists, especially behavioral economists, are not convinced about the 
predictive validity, stability, or causal status of economic preference parameters or personality 
traits.  They believe, instead, that the constraints and incentives in situations almost entirely 
determine behavior.
13  This once popular, extreme situationist view is no longer generally 
accepted in psychology.  Most psychologists now accept the notion of a stable personality as 
defined in this chapter.
14  Measured personality exhibits both stability and variation across 
situations.
15  
Although personality traits are not merely situation-driven ephemera, they are also not set 
in stone.  We present evidence that both cognitive and personality traits evolve over the life 
cycle—but at different rates at different stages.  Recently developed economic models of 
parental and environmental investment in children help to explain the evolution of these traits. 
This chapter addresses the following specific questions, which we pose here and answer 
in the concluding section: 
(1) How can we fit psychological constructs of personality into an economic framework? Can 
conventional models of preferences in economics characterize the main theories in personality 
psychology? 
(2) What are the main measurement systems used in psychology for representing personality and 
personality traits, and how are they validated?  How are different systems related to each other?  
                                                 
13 For an example of this point of view see Thaler [2008]. 
14 See, e.g., Mischel and Shoda [1995; 2008]. 
15 McAdams [2006, p. XVIII], Funder [2009], Mischel [2009], Roberts [2007; 2009], and Revelle, Wilt and Condon 
[2010] discuss the stability question. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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What is the relationship between standard measures of personality and measures of 
psychopathology and child temperament? 
(3) What is the relationship between economic preference parameters and psychological 
measurements? 
(4) How stable across situations and over the life cycle are preference parameters and 
personality traits? 
(5) What is the evidence on the predictive power of cognitive and personality traits? 
(6) What is the evidence on the causal power of personality on behavioral outcomes? 
(7) Can personality be altered across the life cycle? Are interventions that change personality 
traits likely fruitful avenues for policy? 
(8) Do the findings from psychology suggest that conventional economic theory should be 
enriched? 
  The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 presents a definition of personality that 
captures central ideas in the literature on personality psychology.  It also presents a brief history 
of personality psychology and the person-situation debate that paralyzed the field for 20 years 
and that still influences behavioral economics.  Section 3 defines measured personality as a 
response function using an economic model of preferences, expectations, and constraints.  Our 
model distinguishes measured personality from personality traits.  We interpret personality as a 
response function mapping variables that characterize traits and situations to manifest 
(measured) personality.  Our definition formalizes various definitions of personality used in the 
literature on personality psychology and facilitates the analysis of personality using the tools of 
economics.  We also sketch a dynamic model of trait formation. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
11 
 
Section 4 discusses alternative criteria that psychologists use to define traits.  It examines 
the strengths and limitations of each approach.  We link our abstract definition to linear factor 
models that are commonly used to identify personality and cognitive traits.   
Section 5 presents the main systems used to measure personality and cognition and 
discusses the relationship among the systems.  We illustrate a nonidentification result developed 
in Section 3 by showing how scores on IQ tests are greatly affected by incentives and context.  
We present additional evidence showing that the scores on achievement tests depend on 
cognitive and personality measurements, with a substantial predictive role for personality 
measures.  Measures of “IQ” commonly used in economics and social science conflate measures 
of cognition and personality. 
Section 6 discusses economic preferences and examines the evidence relating economic 
preference parameters to psychological parameters.  Section 7 surveys the evidence on the 
predictive validity of personality measures for education, crime, health, and labor market 
outcomes.  The material presented in the main text summarizes a large and growing empirical 
literature.  A Web Appendix presents additional detail on the literature relating cognition and 
personality in each of these areas of economic and social life.
16   
Section 8 presents evidence on the causal impact of personality on outcomes, as well as 
evidence on the stability and malleability of personality traits and preferences.  We extend the 
theoretical framework for trait formation introduced in Section 3 and discuss a corresponding 
measurement system.  We discuss the evidence from intervention studies.  Section 9 concludes 
with provisional answers to the eight questions. 
 
                                                 
16 The Web Appendix can be found online at http://jenni.uchicago.edu/personality_economics/.  Amanda Agan and 
Pietro Biroli are authors of some of these surveys as noted in the appendix. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
12 
 
2.  Personality and Personality Traits:  Definitions and a Brief History of 
Personality Psychology 
Personality psychology attempts to describe the whole person.
17  It considers both universal traits 
and individual differences.  It examines the ways in which people are unique.  As a sign of its 
breadth, personality psychology considers cognitive functioning as one aspect of personality.   
In considering the content of personality psychology, it is helpful to distinguish 
personality traits, personality as a response function, and measured personality.  Personality 
is a response function that maps personality traits to measured (manifest) personality. 
One leading personality psychologist defines personality traits in the following way: 
“Personality traits are the relatively enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors that reflect the tendency to respond in certain ways under certain 
circumstances.”  (Roberts [2009, p. 140]) 
This definition, or closely related versions, are used throughout personality psychology.
18   We 
formalize these notions in Section 3. 
Roberts’ definition of personality traits refers to the stability of certain patterns of 
behavior—actions or responses to situations that people take, including patterns of thoughts or 
feelings.  Perceptions, expectations of future events and preferences may shape behavior, 
feelings and thoughts.  In this way, cognitive activities help to determine measured personality.  
                                                 
17 Cervone and Pervin [2009] provide a clear introduction to personality psychology. 
18 However, some personality psychologists use this or a very similar definition to define personality and not 
personality traits.  Thus Cervone and Pervin [2009] define personality as  
“psychological qualities that contribute to an individual’s enduring and distinctive patterns of 
thinking, feeling and behaving” (p. 8). 
Another definition in a graduate text on personality by McAdams emphasizes context more strongly:  
“Personality is a patterning of dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and integrative life 
stories set in culture and shaped by human nature” McAdams [2006]. 
In this chapter, we define personality as a property of a system of equations and measured personality is the 
output of those equations. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
13 
 
There are many different models of personality.
19  A prototypical model that captures 
many features of a wide class of models in personality psychology is one due to Roberts [2006].  
He presents the schematic displayed in Figure 2 to relate personality traits to behavior.
20  He 
distinguishes mental abilities from personality traits (the items in the boxes will be discussed in 
later sections of this chapter).  These, along with preferences (motives, interests, and values) and 
narratives (the stories people tell themselves in organizing their lives and making meanings of 
them), shape one’s identity and reputation, including the views of the person by others and the 
person’s perception of how others perceive him.  Identity and reputation in turn shape the roles 
of individuals in the economy and the society and the larger culture to which they belong.  
Personality is the system of relationships that map traits and other determinants of behavior into 
measured actions.   
In Roberts' vision of personality, feedback processes operate among all components of 
Figure 2.  Thus his broad conception of personality includes the possibility that identity shapes 
traits and abilities, perhaps through a mechanism such as epigenetics, in which environment 
affects gene expression.
21  Measured personality results from interactions among components of 
the system.  Personality traits are one determinant of personality and need to be carefully 
distinguished from the full expression of personality, which is generated by the traits interacting 
with other factors.  Personality is seen as a system of behaviors, thoughts, and feelings that 
emerge from the interacting components. 
 
                                                 
19 See the models in John, Robins and Pervin [2008]. 
20 Graphical models like Figure 2 are the rule in personality psychology.  Explicit formal models are rare.  Section 3 
presents a formal model. 
21 See, e.g., Rutter [2006a]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Figure 2. Roberts’s Model of Personality as the Output of a System 
 
Source: Roberts [2006]. 
 
  In Section 3, we formalize aspects of Roberts’ framework for personality within an 
economic model of production, choice, and information.  Figure 2 presages our discussion of a 
basic identification problem discussed in Section 3.  Measurements and behaviors that arise from 
responses to incentives and interactions with culture are used to infer personality traits and 
abilities.  Personality traits and cognitive abilities, along with the other “units of analysis” in 
Figure 2, produce the observed behaviors that are used to infer the generating traits.  To infer 
traits from behaviors requires “parsing out” or standardizing for all of the other contributing 
factors that produce the observed behavior—a challenging task.  The inability to parse and 
localize behaviors that depend on a single trait or ability gives rise to a fundamental Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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identification problem.  Behavior depends on incentives created by situations.  Accurately 
measuring personality traits requires standardizing for situation. 
2.A.  A Brief History of Personality Psychology
22 
Interest in how individual behavior differs in common situations is as old as human history.  The 
importance of personality traits for determining educational outcomes was recognized by the 
creators of the first IQ tests.  Alfred Binet, architect of the first modern intelligence test that 
became the Stanford-Binet IQ test, noted that performance in school 
“...admits of other things than intelligence; to succeed in his studies, one must have 
qualities which depend on attention, will, and character; for example a certain docility, a 
regularity of habits, and especially continuity of effort. A child, even if intelligent, will 
learn little in class if he never listens, if he spends his time in playing tricks, in giggling, 
is playing truant.” (Binet [1916, p. 254]) 
At about the same time that Binet was writing, Charles Spearman, best known for his 
work on “ g ”—a unitary factor that is claimed to capture the structure of intelligence—along 
with his student, Edward Webb, undertook studies of “character” because of “the urgency of its 
practical application to all the business of life” (Webb [1915, p. 1]). Spearman and Webb 
concluded that many positive aspects of character shared a relation to what modern personality 
psychologists term “Conscientiousness.”
23  This general factor, which Spearman and Webb 
chose to call “persistence of motives,” meaning “consistency of action resulting from deliberate 
volition, or will,” was distinct from a general intelligence factor (Webb [1915, p. 60]).
24   
                                                 
22 See Revelle, Wilt and Condon [2010] for an informative history of personality psychology. 
23 Here and elsewhere through this essay, we capitalize personality traits. 
24 Many other psychologists who developed and promoted IQ tests expressed similar sentiments.  See the Web 
Appendix Section 2.A. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Arthur Jensen, an intellectual heir of Spearman who is widely regarded as a proponent of 
g  as an explanatory factor of success and failure in many domains of life, writes: 
“What are the chief personality traits which, interacting with g , relate to individual 
differences in achievement and vocational success?  The most universal personality trait 
is conscientiousness, that is, being responsible, dependable, caring, organized and 
persistent” Jensen [1998, p. 575]. 
 
The Pioneers of Personality Psychology 
Over the past century, interest in personality among psychologists has fluctuated dramatically.  
During the first half of the twentieth century, many of the most prominent psychologists (e.g., 
Gordon Allport, Raymond Cattell, Hans Eysenck, Charles Spearman, Lewis Terman) were 
vigorously engaged in the study of individual differences in behaviors and traits.  Psychologists 
studied personality traits along with intelligence, interests, and motivation and measured 
differences and similarities within and across individuals.   
A systematic approach to the study of personality was conceived by early psychologists 
who believed that the most important dimensions on which human beings differed would be 
captured in natural language. These personality pioneers extracted words from the (English) 
dictionary that characterized individual differences between people (e.g., irritable, proud), after 
eliminating synonyms and words not associated with traits.  They designed and  administered 
studies of trait inventories to large samples of individuals and applied the same factor analytic 
methods developed by Galton, Spearman, Binet, Pearson, Cattell, and Thorndike  to these 
assessments in order to isolate “g ” to identify the structure of cognitive abilities.  Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
17 
 
The fruits of several decades of research in this tradition beginning in the 1970s have 
produced a widely (but not universally) shared consensus taxonomy of traits, known as the Big 
Five, that is arrived at through factor analysis of observer and self-reports of behaviors.
25  The 
Big Five posits a hierarchical organization for personality traits, with five factors at the highest 
level and progressively more narrowly defined traits (or facets) at lower and lower levels.   
 
Table 1. The Big Five Traits 
Trait Definition  of  Trait
*
I. Openness to Experience (Intellect)  The tendency to be open to new 
aesthetic, cultural, or intellectual 
experiences. 
 
II. Conscientiousness  The tendency to be organized, 
responsible, and hardworking. 
 
III. Extraversion  An orientation of one’s interests and 
energies toward the outer world of 
people and things rather than the inner 
world of subjective experience; 
characterized by positive affect and 
sociability. 
 
IV. Agreeableness  The tendency to act in a cooperative, 
unselfish manner. 
 
V. Neuroticism (Emotional Stability)  Neuroticism is a chronic level of 
emotional instability and proneness to 
psychological distress. 
Emotional stability is predictability and 
consistency in emotional reactions, 
with absence of rapid mood changes. 
 
* From the American Psychological Association Dictionary [2007]. 
 
 
Table 1 presents the Big Five traits.  They are Openness to Experience (also called 
Intellect or Culture), Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (also 
                                                 
25 Goldberg [1993], Barenbaum and Winter [2008], John and Srivastava [1999], Krueger and Johnson [2008] 




26  The Big Five factors represent personality traits at the broadest 
level of abstraction.  They summarize a large number of distinct, more specific, personality 
facets. 
  The Big Five are defined without reference to any context (i.e., situation).  This practice 
gives rise to an identification problem that we discuss in Section 3.  The behaviors used to 
measure the traits are also determined by factors other than the Big Five traits.  John [1990], 
Goldberg [1993], and Costa and McCrae [1992a] present evidence that most of the variables 
used to assess personality traits in academic research in the field of personality psychology can 
be mapped into one or more of the dimensions of the Big Five. They argue that the Big Five are 
the longitude and latitude of personality traits, by which all more narrowly defined traits may be 
categorized (see also Costa and McCrae [1992a]).  We discuss the Big Five further in Section 5, 
where we also consider alternative measurement systems. 
 
The Person-Situation Debate, Its Lingering Influence in Economics, and the Subsequent 
Flourishing of Personality Psychology 
In 1968, Walter Mischel published a monograph entitled Personality and Assessment, 
challenging the most important theoretical assumptions and empirical findings of personality 
psychology.  An acrimonious “person-situation” debate ensued, which pitted those who favored 
situational factors as explaining behavior against those who considered personality traits as more 
consequential. During this time, considered by many to be a dark age in the history of personality 
psychology, the general Zeitgeist favored experimental social psychological approaches which 
                                                 
26 The acronym OCEAN is sometimes used to summarize these traits. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
19 
 
focused on the importance of the situation compared to the individual traits featured in 
personality psychology.   
Mischel noted that correlations between behavioral task measures of personality and 
questionnaire measures seldom, if ever, exceeded 0.3.
27,28 The implication of such within-
individual behavioral heterogeneity suggested to Mischel that “the behaviors which are often 
construed as stable personality trait indicators are highly specific and depend on the details of the 
evoking situations and the response mode employed to measure them” (p. 37).  Mischel wrote 
“…with the possible exception of intelligence, highly generalized behavioral 
consistencies have not been demonstrated, and the concept of personality traits as broad 
dispositions is thus untenable” – Mischel [1968, p. 146] 
Mischel went on to write that global (i.e., domain-general) traits (e.g., “impulsive”, “confident”) 
measured in one situation did not predict future behavior and outcomes in other situations.  His 
view was that global traits, in attempting to summarize behavioral dispositions without regard to 
situational contingencies, were “excessively crude, gross units to encompass adequately the 
extraordinary complexity and subtlety of the discriminations that people constantly make” (p. 
301).   
  Mischel now suggests [2004] that behaviors can be consistent across time, but that the 
locus of consistency is to be found in highly contextualized if-situation/then-behavior 
contingencies (e.g., “If  I feel threatened, then I am aggressive”). Variance across situations was, 
                                                 
27 There is great irony in the fact that none of the correlations of cognitive measures with outcomes that are reported 
in Table A1 in the Web Appendix are as high as 0.3, but no one questions the power of cognition in predicting 
outcomes in social life.  Few studies in social psychology show correlations as high as 0.2 (see Richard, Bond and 
Stokes-Zoota [2003]). 
28 Psychologists often work with standardized variables (variables normalized by standard deviations).  They report 
correlations between standardized variables as “effect sizes.” Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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in Mischel’s view, improperly treated by most personality psychologists as “error.”
29  Indeed, in 
his view, the systematic variation of behavior across situations points to underlying motivations, 
beliefs, schemas, strategies, and other factors that collectively and interactively give rise to 
coherence in any individual’s measured personality.  His revised view of personality is broadly 
consistent with Robert’s Figure 2. 
In Section 3, we formalize the “if-then” relationship using an economic model.  We show 
that the person-situation debate boils down to an empirical question about the relative 
importance of person, situation, and their interaction in explaining behaviors.  Although Mischel 
may have intended otherwise, proponents of the situationist view have used his monograph as 
ammunition in the battle against accepting evidence from personality psychology into 
economics.  Like most heated debates in social science, this one occurred in the absence of much 
data.  In Section 5, we discuss the body of evidence that has emerged over the past four decades 
on the existence of stable personality traits.   
The debate over the relative importance of person and situation in the 1960s and 1970s 
reflected deeper currents in psychology and social science more generally, that still run strong.  
Behaviorism, associated with B. F. Skinner was influential.  It posited that experience explains 
all aspects of behavior.  There was the widely held notion that situation and experience were all 
powerful—that people were born as blank slates.
30  This captured the interventionist spirit of the 
times.  Inter-individual heterogeneity in traits was ignored.  Ross and Nisbett [1991] summarize 
the position of many social psychologists:  
                                                 
29 I.e., unobserved heterogeneity. 
30 Pinker [2002]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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“Manipulations of the immediate social situation can overwhelm in importance the type 
of individual differences in personal traits or dispositions that people normally think of 
as being determinative of social behavior” (p. xiv).  
Many behavioral economists hold a similar view and they often appeal to Mischel as a guiding 
influence.  For example, in a recent round table discussion, Richard Thaler noted that  
“The great contribution to psychology by Walter Mischel [...] is to show that there is no 
such thing as a stable personality trait” (Thaler [2008]).  
Many studies in behavioral economics attempt to establish inconsistency in behavior across 
situations, in violation of standard assumptions of stable preferences used in mainstream 
economics. For instance, several studies find very low correlations in risk-taking behavior across 
situations.
31    
  Personality psychology survived the Behaviorist assault and is a prospering field.  A rich 
body of correlational evidence, which we summarize in Section 7, shows that for many 
outcomes, measured personality traits are as predictive, and are sometimes more predictive than 
standard measures of cognition, that traits are stable across situations, and situations also matter.   
Mounting evidence that behavior has a biological basis suggests that personality is an 
important determinant of behavior.  The evidence from behavioral genetics shows that measured 
personality traits are as heritable as cognitive traits.  Studies in neuroscience show that 
alterations in brain structure and function through accidents, disease and by experiments affect 
measured personality.  They reinforce the evidence from heritability studies.  This evidence and 
other evidence shows that something about measured personality is real.  We review this 
evidence in Section 8. 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Slovic [1962], Kogan and Wallach [1967], Slovic [1972], Blais and Weber [2006], Johnson, Wilke and 




3.  Conceptualizing Personality and Personality Traits Within Economic 
Models 
Personality psychologists rarely use formal models to define or measure their constructs.  In 
order to introduce their knowledge to economists, we formalize their frameworks.  Doing so 
makes the concepts of personality psychology more precise and provides a basis for 
measurement and policy analysis. 
  We introduce a series of progressively more comprehensive models to integrate concepts 
from personality psychology into economics.
32  Roberts’ framework (Figure 2) captures the main 
features of the influential models used in personality psychology.  We use it as a point of 
departure.  Psychology adds new and often more nuanced descriptions of human behavior to the 
standard descriptions used in economics. 
  In the nineteenth century, economics and psychology were closely aligned.  Economists 
then spoke of the “hedonic calculus” used by people weighing choices.
33  One of the advances 
made in neoclassical economics in the first half of the twentieth century was to focus on choices 
and the objective (easily measured) factors (like prices and incomes) that determine choices.  
Revealed preference became a central tool of economics and was implemented using the 
marginal rate of substitution between choices—a key parameter that emerged from the 
neoclassical revolution.
34  This parameter did not require measurable utility or knowledge of the 
                                                 
32 Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman et al. [2008] develop a variety of economic models for integrating personality 
psychology into economic models.  We build on their analysis.  We review these frameworks in Section A3 of the 
Web Appendix. 
33 See, e.g., Schumpeter [1954]. 
34 See Hicks [1946]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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mental states of the agents making choices.  Mental states and measureable utility, once the 
province of economists, were eliminated by Occam’s Razor.   
  Measurable utility was used in utilitarian economics but fell out of favor (see Samuelson 
[1956], Foster and Sen [1997]).  Preferences that fulfilled criteria for rationality were consistent 
with utility functions that were determined up to monotonic transformations.  Measurable utility 
returned in a specific fashion with analyses of decision-making under uncertainty (see Savage 
[1954]).   
Most economists view mental states as unnecessary baggage except insofar as they affect 
choices.  Thus, the traits, abilities, and narratives used by Roberts in Figure 2 are of interest to 
most economists only if they affect choices through preferences, constraints, and effects on 
information processing capabilities.  Motives and values are captured in part by economic 
preference parameters.  Until recently, “happiness,” and “aggregate utility,” as well as other 
subjective mental states that do not affect behavior (choices) were considered uninteresting to 
most economists.
35 
 Preferences,  constraints,  and expectations provide the most direct way to introduce 
psychological variables into economic models.  We begin our analysis with a barebones 
approach that focuses on constraints.  For example, cognitive and personality traits affect 
earnings capacity because they enhance productivity (see, e.g., Bowles, Gintis and Osborne 
[2001a]), and, at least up to a point, more of a trait can generate more resources which enlarge 
choice sets and hence directly affect behavior.     
                                                 
35 See, however, the revival of utility measurement in the happiness literature (see Layard [2005]).  Perceptions on 
which one does not act, included in the domain of psychology, have recently entered economic studies through the 
happiness literature. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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3.A.  An Approach Based on Comparative Advantage 
The Roy model [1951] of comparative advantage provides a useful starting point.  Heckman, 
Stixrud and Urzua [2006] use the Roy model to introduce psychological variables into the study 
of social and economic outcomes.
36  Personality traits are treated as endowments, and choices are 
determined by personality traits and other factors as they affect productivity in skills.   
Agents can perform one of  J  tasks with productivity    ,   1 , ,  j Pj J .  The productivity 
in task j depends on the traits of agents represented by  , and the “effort” they expend on the 
task,  j e : 
(1)    (, ) , 1 , , ,    . jj j j Pe j =  J e ,                
The traits are the endowments of agents that govern behavior.  Examples of traits include height, 
personality characteristics, problem solving ability, and strength.    is a public good as it is 
available in the same amount for all tasks.  Productivity also depends on effort  j e .  Effort is 
assumed to be divisible and fixed in supply.   
In much applied research, effort and traits are often assumed to be measured so that over 
the relevant range, assuming differentiability with respects to  j e  and  , 









but neither condition is strictly required.  Excess effort (over-exertion; too much attention to 
detail) may be counterproductive so that function  j   need not be monotonic in  j e , contrary to 
what is assumed here.  Indeed, as discussed in Section 5, certain psychopathologies are 
associated with extreme levels of traits that are quite productive at normal levels.  Different traits 
                                                 
36 See Roy [1951], Heckman and Sedlacek [1985], and Heckman and Honoré [1990]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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may have different productivities in different tasks, leading to comparative advantage in different 
tasks for people with different endowments.
37   








     








     
  A 
variety of intermediate cases might exist where some effort-trait relationships are complementary 
and others are substitution relationships.  Some people may solve complex math problems with 
no effort, while others may have to allocate considerable time and effort to achieve the same 
result.  Effort can be a vector (time, mental energy, attention), and it is assumed to be a divisible 
private good with the feature that the more that is applied to task j, the less is available for all 







  , where e  is the endowment of total effort.  
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven et al. [1998] interpret self-control as a component of e that is 
fixed over given time periods.  A person who exerts more self-control in one task may be less 
self-controlled in another task.   
Let  j R  be the reward per unit productivity in task  j .  In the first case we analyze, agents 
can productively engage in only one of the  J  tasks at any time.  This restriction can be 
interpreted as a case where effort can only be applied to a single task.  A reward maximizing 
agent with trait   and endowment e  faces the problem of picking the maximal task to perform, 
ˆ j  where 
(2) 
    
1, ,







                                                 
37 Cattan [2010] shows that sociability has negative returns in some sectors but positive returns in other sectors. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
26 
 
In this case,   and e  play the same role.  People with different effort and capability 
endowments will generally choose different tasks.
38,39  Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] show 
how persons with different endowments of personality and intelligence sort into different 
occupations and levels of schooling.  People low in certain traits may have better endowments of 
effort and may compensate for their shortfall in ability by exerting effort.  For certain tasks (e.g., 
creating new branches of mathematics), there may be threshold levels of   such that for  , j     
 ,0 jj e    for all  j ee  .  (The person needs a given level of trait   no matter how hard they 
try.)  The higher  j R , the more likely will the person choose to perform task  j .  The particular 
choice of which  j  to perform depends on the productivity of traits in different tasks. 
 
3.B.  Allowing for Multiple Tasking 
More generally, at a point in time, people may perform multiple tasks.
40  A less discrete version 
of the Roy model builds on the same foundations, allows people to perform multiple tasks at any 
time and postulates that    , j j e   is concave and increasing in  j e .
41  The agent chooses effort 
levels  j e  across the  J  tasks to maximize total rewards: 
                                                 
38 A straightforward extension works with utilities and not rewards so we define utility    1,, J UP P   and the agents 
picks the  j that maximizes utility, with the other arguments zeroed out.  Formally, define  1
j P d   if a person 
chooses to perform task  j.  Array the 
j P d  into a vector  P d .  Array the  j P  into a vector  P .  Realized utility is thus 
  P Ud P    where    is a Hadamard (component-wise) product, i.e. a product of two vectors of the same length 
where the operation is such that the result is the product of the first element of one vector with the first element of 
the second vector and so forth for each component. 
39 See Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006], Cattan [2010], and the evidence in Section 7.  
40 This, of course, depends on the time unit.  Agents may be able to do only one task at one time if the time unit is 
defined finely enough. 






















  As the reward for activity  j ,  j R , increases, everything else constant, the effort devoted  
to  j  will increase.
43,44  This model is consistent with effort that compensates for shortfalls in 
endowments as well as effort that reinforces initial endowments.  The choice of effort depends 
on the pattern of complementarity and substitutability.  Different situations may be associated 
with different rewards for the same task.  Such variation can produce differences in performance 
across tasks of the sort featured in the person-situation debate discussed in Section 2.  One needs 
to standardize for the incentives to exert effort across tasks and differences in the endowments of 
effort in order to use measurements of performance on tasks to identify traits,  . 
3.C.  Identifying Personality Traits 
Before considering more general models, it is useful to discuss basic identification problems that 
arise in simple settings and that also arise in more general models.  At the current level of 
generality, all traits can potentially affect productivity in all tasks.  However, some tasks may 
                                                 











,  and  0
j e  ,  1, , j J   ,  where   is the 
vector of multipliers associated with the effort constraint.  Some people may allocate no effort in some tasks.   j P  
may be zero if  0 j e  , but this is not strictly required.  Again, it is straightforward to generalize this reward function 









 is a force toward devoting more effort to task  j .  If effort is complementary with traits in all tasks, as 
traits expand, more effort will be expended in those tasks that are relatively more complementary in effort.   
44 In case I, agents will pick  j . Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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require only a single trait or a subset of all of the traits.  Following a traditional dichotomy in 
psychology that is explicit in Roberts’ Figure 2, divide   into “mental,”  , and “personality,”  
 , traits:     and    , each of which may in turn be a vector.
45 
Psychological measurement systems sometimes use productivity measured in different 
tasks to identify     and    .
46  This is the way Carroll [1993] defines mental ability where the 
task is performance on “mental” tests.  To use performance on a task (or on multiple measures of 
the task) to identify a trait requires that performance on certain tasks (performance on a test, 
performance in an interpersonal situation, etc.) depends exclusively on one component of  , say 
1, j  .  In that case  
    1, ,. jjj j Pe    
Even if we can measure productivity  j P in task  j , and only one component of   affects  j P , to 
identify the level of a trait one must control for the level of effort applied to  j  in order to use  j P  
to infer the level of  1, j  .  That is, one must standardize for the effort at a benchmark level, say e

, to use  j P  to identify a measure of the trait that is uniform across different situations that elicit 
different levels of effort.
47 
  The activity of picking a task (or a collection of tasks) to measure a particular trait ( 1, j   
in our example) is called operationalization in psychology.  Construct validity refers to whether 
or not a purported measure of the trait constructed in the stage of operationalization correlates 
                                                 
45 Effort endowment might also be divided in the same fashion   , ee , but we do not explicitly develop this 
possibility. 
46 They also use observer reports and tests which can be interpreted as observation on performance of tasks and 
psychometric tasks. 
47 A weaker notion is to achieve relative ranks of a trait.  One can define the rank of a trait holding fixed the ranks of 
all other influences. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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with measures deemed to represent the trait.  Considerable judgment is required to operationalize 
a trait and independently validate it.  There is clear danger of circularity.  Economists should 
carefully scrutinize how the measures they borrow from psychology are operationalized and 
validated in that literature.  We should not necessarily assume that the measures created in that 
field have been rigorously established.   We discuss how major constructs are validated in 
Section 5.  
Assuming that construct validity has been established, if effort is involved in the 
performance of a task used to uniquely define a trait, the measurement of performance must be 
standardized in order to use measured productivity  j P  to identify the trait.  Otherwise, the 
endowment of effort, and all of the factors that contribute to the exertion of effort, including the 
reward to the task,  j R , will contaminate the estimate of the trait.  Failure to adjust for effort 
produces the kind of variability across situations with different rewards that was much discussed 
in the person-situation debate.  We present examples of such contamination of measurement by 
the operation of incentives on effort in Section 5. 
  Operationalization and construct validation clearly require heroic assumptions.  Even if 
one adjusts for effort in a task, and thus adjusts for situational specificity, productivity in a task 
may depend on multiple traits.  Thus two components of   (say  1,  ,  1,  ) may determine 
productivity in task  j .  Without further information, one cannot infer which of the two traits 
produces the productivity in  j .  But in general, even having two (or more) measures of 
productivity that depend on   1, 1, ,      is not enough to identify the separate components.   
Consider the following case of two productivity measurements on tasks  j  and  j : Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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One might have such measurements if data are available on the productivity of the same person 




48  If the functional forms of the    · j   and    · j    are known, and the system of 
equations satisfies a local rank condition, then one can solve for the pair   1, 1, ,      at e
.
49   
The rank condition might not be satisfied, and the functional forms  j   and  j    might not 
be known.  The productivity functions need not be monotone in  1,   or  1,  .  Interacting systems 
might produce multiple equilibria so that the same values of   produce different values of 
(, ) j j PP  .
50  Interacting systems might also have no solution. 
Note that even if these problems do not arise, only the pair   1, 1, ,      is identified.  One 
cannot (without further information) determine which component of the pair is  1,   or  1,  .  In 
Section 5, we present an example where scores on achievement tests depend on both IQ and 
personality traits.  In the absence of dedicated constructs (constructs that are generated by only 
one component of  ), an intrinsic identification problem arises in using measures of productivity 
                                                 
48 Note that if the support of  j e   and  j e   is disjoint, no e
  exists and so no such standardization is possible. 
49 Let        1, 1, , .  Assume that the functional forms of    · j   and    · j    are known.  Formally, a solution from 
j P  and  j P  for 
 1,  and 











be non-vanishing in open neighborhoods around any point of solutions for   (see, e.g., Buck [2003]). 
50 Thus there is a correspondence between   , j j PP   and  , but no unique functional relationship. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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in tasks to infer traits.
51  A dedicated measurement for at least one component is an essential 
requirement for identification.  Other components can be defined relative to that 
measurement.
52,53 
3.D.  Extensions of the Roy Model 
Many empirical economists use the simple gross income maximizing framework of the Roy 
model to study the effects of personality on outcomes.  The model is amended in many papers by 
including a cost   , j j Ce   for obtaining rewards so that instead of criterion (2), the agent picks ˆ j 
that maximizes the net reward 
 
      
, 1.
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Re C e  
                                                 
51 There are various ways around this identification problem.  For example, one might be able to choose 
configurations of data with low (or zero) values of one component.  At high levels of effort, induced by a change in 
the reward, the effect of one component on productivity might vanish, etc. 
52 This problem arises in linear factor models, but it is a more general problem.  See, e.g., Anderson and Rubin 
[1956] for a definitive treatment of linear factor models.  The scales in any factor model are arbitrary and are always 
defined with respect to a normalization (i.e. a dedicated measurement that defines the factor).  The more general 
nonlinear model considered in the text faces the same problem. 
53 In general, without knowledge of the functional forms of the    ·,    1 , , j jJ   , the problem of solving for two 
measurements  j P ,  j P  to infer  1,   and  1,   at a common level of  j j ee    is intractable.  Many alternative solutions 
are possible.  The traditional factor analysis literature reviewed in Section 5 below assumes linearity of the    · j  , 
1, , j J  .  But even in that literature, attention focuses primarily on identifying the distribution of  1, 1, ,      not 
individual values  1, 1, ,     when  j P ,  1, , j J   is measured with error, although methods for solving for 
individual values of  1, 1, ,      and correcting for measurement error of the resulting estimates are available in the 
literature and are widely applied.  (See, e.g., Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010], Savelyev [2010], Heckman 
and Williams [2011].)  Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] establish conditions under which it is possible to 
nonparametrically identify the functional form of    · j  ,  1, , j J    and the distributions of  1, 1, ,      in the 
presence of measurement error on  j P ,  1, , j J  . Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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with respect to the choice of  j e .  This extension creates a further identification problem—
whether the trait identified arises from its role in costs, productivity, or both.  The identification 
problem deepens when we allow the costs to be psychic costs as in Heckman and Sedlacek 
[1985], Cunha, Heckman and Navarro [2005], or Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006], and 
attempt to separate out productivity traits from preference traits.
54 
  The framework of the Roy model is widely used in recent analyses of the role of 
personality and cognition.
55  It has precedents in the work of Mandelbrot [1962], Heckman and 
Sedlacek [1985], and Heckman and Honoré [1990].  In most applications, the   ,  j j e  and 


















The analyst models both the choice of the task and the output from the chosen task.  A third 
(mixed) case can arise in which some clusters of tasks are mutually exclusive so the agent can 
perform only one task within each cluster of tasks, but the agent can simultaneously engage in 
tasks across clusters. 
3.E.  Adding Preferences and Goals 
Preferences and goals (see Figure 2) may also shape effort.
56  This takes us to a fourth and more 
general case.  There may be direct utility benefits or costs associated with exerting effort in each 
                                                 
54 Heckman and Navarro [2007] and Abbring and Heckman [2007] present conditions that allow identification of 
productivity and costs when there are direct measures of gross productivity, at least when there are measurements on 
j P  for individuals who select  j . 
55 See, e.g., Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006], Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010], Báron and Cobb-Clark 
[2010], and Cattan [2010].   
56 In some versions of the preceding models with costs, preferences can be embodied in psychic costs. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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task.  Array the effort across tasks in vector    1,, J ee e  .  Agents might also attach direct 
value to the productivity in tasks arrayed in vector    1,, J PP P   with reward  j R .   






   which can be spent on final consumption goods  X  
with associated prices W .  A utility function can be specified over  X , P, and e with preference 
parameter vector  .
57  Thus, we write 
(4)    ,,| , XP Ue   
where the agent maximizes (4) subject to the constraints 
(5)  , X RP W Y
    
where Y  is a flow of unearned income available to the agent in addition to his earnings from his 









   
Preference specification (4) captures the notions that (a) agents have preferences over goods, (b) 
agents may value the output of tasks in their own right, and (c) agents may value the effort 
devoted to tasks.
58 
The parameter   determines the tradeoffs in preferences among  X , P, and e.  In one 
interpretation, subjective measures of well-being (Layard [2005]) attempt to directly measure 
                                                 
57 Robson [1996; 2001] and Robson and Samuelson [2007; 2009] discuss the evolutionary origin of preference 
parameters. 
58 Goods might also be direct arguments of the productivity functions, but, for simplicity, we do not analyze that 




59  Parameters that affect subjective well-being but not choices can be identified from the 
measures of well-being, but not from choices.
60 
 
3.F.  Adding Learning and Uncertainty 
All of the preceding models can be extended to account for learning and uncertainty.  Let   be 
the information possessed by the agent, and let “E” denote mathematical expectations.  An 
agent can be interpreted as making decisions based on 
(7)  [(,, , )] UXPe E   ⛂⛂  
where   may be in the agent’s information set (i.e. the agent knows his preferences).   
Different theories specify different amounts of information available to agents.  They 
might be uncertain about their preferences,  ,   traits,  ,   the prices they face,  , W  the rewards to 
productivity, R , the outcomes of purchase decisions,  , X  and their endowments of effort, e , and 
the theory can be suitably modified to account for this uncertainty. 
The use of the expectations operator begs the question of how agents construct the 
information set and how subjective expectations are formed.  Psychological traits   may affect 
information perception and processing.  Several recent studies that apply personality traits to 
search economics suggest that agents with a higher perception of the control they have over their 
lives have greater confidence in the arrival of job offers.
61  Overconfidence may be a trait that 
                                                 
59 However, the happiness literature is not strictly wedded to the notion that happiness is the same as our U , which 
is used only to characterize choice behavior. 
60 The model can readily be extended to cover more general cases.  There is no need to impose the linear reward 
structure () RP  .  The resources raised from productive tasks can be a nonlinear in  P .  Another simple extension of 
the model is the case where there is no financial gain from engaging in tasks, but the agent receives a direct utility 
benefit from doing so.  In this case, constraint (5) is redefined as YW X   , but P  remains as an argument of the 
utility function.  One might also introduce goods as inputs into the  j   functions. 
61 McGee [2010]; Caliendo, Cobb-Clark and Uhlendorff [2010]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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causes persons to inflate their perceived productivity.
62  A production function for information 
may depend on components of  ,  , and the effort devoted to acquire information e .  
Intelligent people may acquire information more readily than dull people.  People more open to 
experience likely acquire more knowledge.  Aggressive people may reduce their social 
interactions and impair their ability to learn from others.  We discuss the evidence on how 
psychological traits affect information updating in Section 6. 
One might object to the rationality and self perception implicit in this formulation.  As in 
Freud [1909, reprinted 1990], decision making might be made by a subconscious mind lacking 
self perception.  Decision making may be unconscious and agents may not recognize their 
desired goals.  Nonetheless, constraints limit their revealed choice behavior.  Borghans, 
Duckworth, Heckman et al. [2008] develop a model in which agents have random preferences 
and make choices at random within their feasible set.  Variations in constraints drive the 
measured behavior of group averages but do not predict the behavior of any individual. 
3.G.  Definition of Personality Within an Economic Model 
Personality traits are the components of e,   and   that affect behavior.  One might define 
measured personality as the performance   the  j P  and effort   the  j e   that arise from solutions 
to any of the optimization problems previously discussed.  Thus, the derived productivity and 
effort functions would constitute the systems generating measured personality as a response to 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Akerlof and Dickens [1982] Caplin and Leahy [2001], Köszegi [2006], and Möbius, Niederle, Niehaus 
et al. [2010]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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constraints, information, and preferences, i.e. as a system of functions that solve out for the  j P  
and  j e  that agents choose in terms of their choice parameters.
63   
This approach to defining personality would not capture the full range of behaviors or 
actions considered by personality psychologists as constituting manifestations of personality.  
The actions considered by psychologists include a variety of activities that economists normally 
do not study, e.g., cajoling, beguiling, bewitching, charming, etc.  Thus, in selling a house, 
various actions might be taken, e.g., smiling, persuading people by reason, threatening, scowling, 
showing affection, etc.  Actions also include emotions, feelings, and thoughts, and are not 
restricted to be activities that promote physical productivity.  Colloquially, “there are many ways 
to skin a cat,” and the choice of which way to do so in any task defines the action taken. 
To capture these more general notions, we introduce the concept of “actions” that are 
broader than what is captured by e.  Actions are styles of behavior that affect how tasks are 
accomplished.  They include aspects of behavior that go beyond effort as we have defined it.   
Any task can be accomplished by taking various actions. We denote the 
th i  possible 
action to perform task  j  by  , ij a ,   1,... . j iK     Array the actions in a vector 
 1, , ,,  
j jj K j aa a  .  The actions may be the same or different across the tasks.  Thus one 
can smile in executing all tasks or one may smile in only some. The productivity of the agent in 
task  j  depends on the actions taken in that task: 
(8)    2, 1, , .. ,, . .
j j j j jK j Pa a a    
The actions themselves depend on traits   and “effort”  , ij e : 
                                                 
63 As previously noted in a simpler setting, no solutions may exist or multiple solutions may exist (so there is a 
system of correspondences) between traits and personality outcomes. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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    . 
Less effort may be required to perform a given action if a person has endowment   that favors 
performance of the action.  For example, a naturally gregarious person may find it easier to 
engage in social interactions than others.  Stated this way, actions generalize the notion of effort 
to a broader class of behavior.  Analytically, they play the same role as effort, and some actions 
may be components of effort.  There may be utility costs or benefits of effort exerted.  A special 
case arises when there are increasing returns to effort in each action. In that case, the agent will 
simply apply all of his effort  j e  in task  j  to the action which gives him the highest productivity, 
and the other possible actions are not taken. 
Agents may have utility over actions beyond the utility derived from consuming the 
outputs of tasks.  For example, an agent may prefer accomplishing a task by working hard rather 
than by cheating.  Different beliefs, thoughts, and feelings may have different effects on 
outcomes.  Introducing actions in this fashion allows for the possibility that some actions are 
valued in their own right and do not directly contribute to productivity in any of the  J  tasks.  Let 
  be the set of actions, including actions that do not directly contribute to productivity.  In this 
more general formulation 
    ,, , ,,   im im im em a    
where    .   Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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We define utility over actions.  Let a denote the choice of actions, some of which may 
not be associated with any particular task.  Using the same information as used to characterize 
(7), the agent solves 
    max , , , EUaXPe      ⛂⛂  
with respect to X  and e  given the stated constraints.  Actions may also directly affect , so the 
production of information can depend on  , e  and a .  The choice of which actions to take 
depends on goals and values (captured by  ) and on the available information.  Part of learning 
may consist of agents learning about the set of actions that are available to them,  ()  . 
  One can extend the framework to introduce the effects of the situation in the person-
situation debate, by considering specific situations represented by h .  These situations are 
assumed to affect productivity by affecting the set of possible actions and hence the action taken.  
Thus for a person with traits   and effort vector  j e  with action  , ij a , using the specification (9), 
the action function can be expanded to be dependent on situation h: 
(10)  ,, , , (, ) , , ijh ij ij e ah     
and productivity on a task can be specified as a function of the action taken to perform the task in 
situation h : 
(11)  ,1 , , ,, ,..., ()
j jh j jh K jh Pa a    
or by a more general specification where situation h , along with traits, has a direct effect on 
productivity in addition to their effects on actions taken: Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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(12)  , 1 ,, ,, ( , ,..., , ).
j jh j jh K jh Pa a h   
64 
Situations could include physical aspects of the environment in which the agent is located 
or the network (and other social situations) in which the agent is embodied. The situation can 
include social factors such as peer effects.
65  Persons taking an achievement test sometimes 
perform much worse if they are told that their scores will influence social perceptions of their 
group as is found in the stereotype threat literature.
66 
The situation represents a key notion in the “person-situation” debate discussed in 
Section 2.  Equations (10)-(12) capture the “if-then” notion of Mischel and Shoda [1995].  Under 
specification (12), agents with the same actions, the same efforts, and the same traits may have 
different productivities.  Failure to control for situation h, just like failure to control for effort, 
will contaminate identification of traits using measures of actions or productivities.  Situations 
may be forced on the agents or may be chosen.
67 
Let   T    be the vector of traits   ,, e  .  At any point in time, traits are endowments.  
In the general case, the solution to the constrained maximization problem involves choosing 
goods X , the situation h, the actions  , ij a , and efforts  j e ,    1, , jJ   subject to the constraints.  
h is fixed if agents cannot choose the situation.  For simplicity, we analyze this case.  Relaxing 
this assumption is straightforward but is notationally more cumbersome.   
                                                 
64 A more general formulation would treat h  as mutually exclusive descriptions of situations and not claim to 
represent all situations by a base set of characteristics and would index all of the 
, ij   functions by h . 
65 Included in situation h  might be the act of being observed by third parties and other possible sources of social 
interactions. 
66 Steele and Aronson [1998] and Sackett, Hardison and Cullen [2004]. 
67 At the cost of further notation, we could make the set of possible situations task-specific. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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For the case of fixed h, the solution to the maximization problem produces a set of 
response functions.
68  Preference parameters     characterize the tradeoffs and goals that help 
shape manifest behavior.  The agent’s response functions (assumed to exist) are 
(13)    ,, , , , XX R W T h Y    
(14)  (, ,) ,,, ee R W T h Y    
(15)    ,, , , , aa R W T h Y   . 
Productivity P across tasks is derived from the actions, efforts, and traits of the agents.
69 
  The behaviors that constitute personality are defined as a pattern of actions in response to 
the constraints, endowments, and incentives facing agents given their goals and preferences.  
This interpretation incorporates the notion that personality is a system of functions.  People may 
have different personalities depending on their trait endowments, constraints, and situations.  
Their actions—not the traits—constitute the data used to identify the traits. 
  Introducing actions widens the set of data from which one might infer the components of 
. T   Personality psychologists often use actions (e.g., “dispositions”) to infer traits.  The same 
identification issues previously discussed continue to arise but now apply to a broader set of 
measurements. 
  As noted in the introduction to Section 2, many personality psychologists define 
personality as “enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings and behaviors” that reflect tendencies of 
persons to respond in certain ways under certain circumstances.  Our notion of action a, is broad 
enough to encompass the wide array of behaviors considered by the personality psychologists.  
We previously defined personality traits T  as generators of behavior. 
                                                 
68 The same warnings as previously issued apply.  No solutions may exist or they may be multiple valued. 
69 For the case of h  chosen, we get a system of derived demands for  , ,, , ij j Xha e. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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  One way to capture the notion of enduring actions is to average the a functions (15) for a 
person with a given trait vector Tt   over situations and efforts.  Thus for a given task j  and 
trait vector  t , the average action for information set   can be defined as 
     
, ,
,, , , , ,
(, )
, ,, ( ) , ,| , ,
i Tj
Tj ij ij ij ij
he
ae h g h e T d h d e e       
 
 
where  ,, (, ) Ti j he   is the support of  , (, ) ij he given T  and  , and    , , , ,( ) , | ij gh e T e     is 
the density of  , (, ) ij he  given  , () , Te     and information set  .   ,, Tj a   is the “enduring 
action” of agents across situations in task j  with information  , i.e., the average personality.  
Notice that if 
, ij is separable in T , the marginal effect of personality trait vector   is the same 
in all situations.  One can define the “enduring traits” in a variety of ways, say by averaging over 
tasks,  j , situations, h, or both.  Only under separability will one obtain the same marginal effect 
of  .  Epstein [1979] and a subsequent literature present evidence against nonseparability and in 
favor of an “enduring trait” that is common across situations.   
 
3.H.  Life Cycle Dynamics 
The analysis in the preceding subsection was for a particular point in time (e.g., a period).  Traits 
are not set in stone.  In a dynamic setting, one can think of traits, T , information,  , situations, 
h, and actions, a, as state variables that evolve through aging, experience, and investment.  As a 
result of experience (including social interactions), situations, biology (ontogeny), and 
investment, traits may change over the life cycle.  We briefly discuss the dynamics of trait and 
state formation, leaving a more complete discussion to Section 8. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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To capture the evidence from a large and growing literature, we consider the dynamic 
evolution of traits.
70  Let 
v T  be traits at age v,      1, , vV     .  Traits may change through 
family and self investment (Cunha and Heckman [2007; 2009]), through schooling, through 
biology or through experience.  Information 
v   may be updated through various channels of 
learning.  All task outputs, actions and goods inputs may be time dated. 
Investment in period v is an action or set of actions that an individual (or a person or 
group acting for the individual) may take in period v.  Investments have dynamic effects.  The 
technology of skill formation (Cunha and Heckman [2007; 2009]) captures the notion that traits 
may evolve in response to the inputs of a vector of investments (IN
v), and through aspects of the 
situation in which the agent is found, 
v h , where 
v h  is the vector of attributes of the situation: 
(16)   
1
self-productivity investment
(, , ) , 0 , , 1
vv vv v TT I N h v V 
     
where the first set of arguments arises from self and cross productivity (skill begets skill; traits 
beget other traits and traits cross-foster each other; see Cunha and Heckman [2007; 2009]).  The 
second set of arguments arises from investment.  Investment is a broad concept and includes 
parental nurturance, schooling, learning by doing, and learning by imitation, etc.  The third set of 
arguments arises from the situation in which the person is placed.
71 
  Notice that if elements of 
v T  are augmented over the life cycle through investment and 
practice, the actions and efforts required to achieve a given task can change. Thus, if 
, v   is 
enhanced over time, the amount of effort required to perform a task may be reduced.  In this 
                                                 
70 We survey the evidence on the life cycle dynamics of traits in Section 8, focusing primarily on the traits   that 
affect measured productivity.   
71 The actions taken by agents might also enter as arguments to this technology. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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way, we can model habit formation and capture the notion of arete, effortless performance of 
actions, discussed in Aristotle [1956].
72 
  As emphasized by Mischel and Shoda [1995] and Roberts and Jackson [2008], situations 
may change over time as a function of past actions, past situations, investment, information, and 
the like.  We present this possibility by the following equation of motion: 
(17)   
1  ,,.
vv v v v hh I N a 
   
Past actions may serve to determine the set of present situations.  Those situations in turn may 
influence current actions. 
 Information 
v   may change over the life cycle through experimentation as well as 
through exogenous learning: 
(18)   
1 ,,, , .
vv v vv v v aTI Nh 
    
This learning mechanism incorporates the beliefs of agents about the available data.  Thus people 
may learn about their environments and themselves in part as a consequence of their own actions 
and in part as a consequence of the exogenous arrival of information.  Equations of motion (16)-
(18) are very general.  We consider special cases of them used in the empirical literature in 
Section 8. 
  A rich and evolving literature investigates dynamic preferences when agents do not 
possess full knowledge of their future environments (see, for example, Hansen [2005], Hansen 
and Sargent [2008], Rust [2008], Epstein and Zin [1989], Epstein and Schneider [2003], and 
Skiadas [1998]).  That literature is too large to summarize in this paper.  Preferences need not be 
                                                 
72 See Lear [2004].  A habit can be defined as effortless performance of a task, i.e., an action that requires no effort.  
It is possible to build a stock of traits to sufficient level that one achieves actions effortlessly. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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separable over time, and there may be time inconsistency of choices associated with hyperbolic 
discounting.
73  We discuss commonly used dynamic preference specifications in Section 6. 
3.I.  Relationship of the Model in This Section to Existing Models in Personality 
Psychology 
Personality psychologists generally do not present formal models.  The formalization in this 
section is, to our knowledge, the first mathematically precise definition of personality traits and 
measured personality.  The models we have sketched in this section capture central features of 
the major models in personality psychology.   
By its authors’ own admission, the McCrae-Costa [2008] Five Factor Theory is not a 
fully articulated model.  Their model emphasizes the role of traits   T  and, in particular, the Big 
Five factors, in producing outcomes and agent actions, and is sketchy about other details.  Agents 
are assumed to learn about their own traits, but precise learning mechanisms are not discussed.  
Expression of traits is affected by the external environment and through social interactions in a 
not fully specified fashion.  The concept of an evolving information set 
v   plays a central role in 
Five Factor Theory.  People learn about their traits through actions and experience, but the exact 
mechanisms are not precisely formulated.  Equation (18) captures these notions.  Situations may 
also evolve as a function of actions and experience, but no role is assigned to investment in Five 
Factor Theory.   
Thus, a restricted version of (17) formalizes aspects of the Five Factor Theory.  The 
theory features “characteristic adaptations,” which correspond to the actions and efforts of our 
model that also affect the productivity in tasks.  The role of preferences is left unspecified.  
However, McCrae and Costa explicitly feature rationality (McCrae and Costa [2008, p. 161]) 
                                                 
73 See Kirby and Herrnstein [1995] and Gul and Pesendorfer [2004]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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and reject the characterization of flawed human decision making that dominates social 
psychology and the field of behavioral economics that was spawned from social psychology.  
They explicitly reject a purely situationist explanation of the origin of actions, but they allow for 
situations to affect actions.  Traits evolve through biological processes (ontogeny), but 
investment or experience do not affect the evolution of traits.  Thus, the arguments of equation 
(16) are shut down, but traits may still exogenously evolve as a function of age and the biology 
of the individual.  Even though traits evolve as part of an exogeneous maturation process, 
persons may learn about themselves (their traits) by taking actions and by being acted on by the 
external environment. 
“Social cognitive” theories are rivals to trait theories based on the Big Five.
74  Albert 
Bandura, Daniel Cervone, and Walter Mischel are central figures in this literature.  Roberts’ 
diagram (Figure 2) captures key aspects of this theory, and Roberts himself can be viewed as a 
member of both camps.  This line of thinking stresses the role of cognition in shaping personality 
and the role of social context in shaping actions and self-knowledge.  Authors writing in this 
school of thought reject the “cognitive-noncognitive” distinction that is often used in economics.  
They view manifest personality as an outcome of cognitive processes.  A major role is assigned 
to agency—individual goals and motives that produce actions.  Their goals and motives are 
captured by our  .  The arrival of information is captured by  .  Although the literature in 
personality psychology often contrasts these two schools of thought, to us the lines are not 
distinct.  Only in one extreme version of the social-cognitive theory are traits are entirely absent.  
In that version, agent behavior is entirely shaped by situations.  For example, Mischel and Shoda 
[2008] focus on the role of situation in shaping actions, efforts, and productivities, but also allow 
                                                 
74 See Cervone and Pervin [2009]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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for traits to influence actions.  The “sociogenomic” model of Roberts and Jackson [2008] also 
considers the dynamics of personality formation. 
Thus, both schools of thought accept specification (9) or its extension (10), and both 
would be comfortable with response systems (13)-(15).  The relative importance of the factors 
emphasized by the two schools of thought can only be settled by empirical research.  The social-
cognitive theorists tolerate deviations from rationality in their theories, while trait theorists 
typically do not. 
Both schools of thought entertain the possibility of learning about oneself.   A major 
difference between the two groups comes in the role of investment in producing traits.  The 
social-cognitive theorists feature investment and social interactions as direct determinants of 
traits that are assumed to evolve as a function of the experiences of agents.  The trait theorists do 
not consider this possibility.  Instead they emphasize self-learning about traits that evolve by 
fixed biological principles unrelated to the experiences of individuals.
75 
 
   
                                                 
75 Cervone [2004] contrasts the two schools of thought. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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4.  Measuring Personality 
Unlike other personal traits, like height or weight, personality traits cannot be directly measured.  
Observed productivities, efforts, and actions are used to infer traits.  This leads directly to the 
analysis of latent variables and to factor models that underlie much of the analysis of trait 
psychology.  This is an area where psychology and the econometrics of measurement error, and 
latent variables more generally, fruitfully interact.  Factor models underlie the concepts of 
validity of measurements that are used in psychology.  
 
4.A.  Linear Factor Models 
Linear factor models are widely used in personality psychology and in psychometric models for 
mental test scores.  We review the use of these models in psychology.  Versions are already in 
widespread use in economics.
76  To capture essential points, we abstract from a lot of the issues 
discussed in Section 3.  We consider measurements arising from productivity in tasks.  We thus 
focus solely on outputs of tasks, abstracting from actions, efforts, and situations.  With suitable 
extensions of the notation used here, we can extend the factor model to the more general models 
discussed in Section 3.   
We assume additive separability of the arguments of equation (1).  The stripped down 
model writes task performance of person n  on task  j ,  , nj P , based on traits  n T  in the following 
manner: 
(19)  ,, ,  1, , , 1, , , nj j n j jn PT n N j J 
           
                                                 
76 See, e.g., Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006], Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010], Piatek and Pinger 
[2010], Cattan [2010], and Cunha and Heckman [2008]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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where  j  is the mean productivity in the j
th task,  j   is a vector of factor loadings, and 
, nj is 
other determinants of measured performance, including measurement errors.  The number of 
components in  n T , L, has to be small relative to J (LJ  ) for the factor model to have any 
explanatory power.  Otherwise for each task one can create a unique factor and the model 
becomes tautological.  A purely cognitive task would be associated with zero values of the 
components of vector  j   on elements of  n T  that are associated with personality traits.  Factor 
model (19) captures the notions that: (a) latent traits  n T  generate a variety of outcomes, (b) task 
outputs are imperfect measures of the traits   n T
 
because 
, nj also determines task output, and 
(c) tasks other than tests or observer reports may also proxy the underlying traits, i.e., latent traits 
generate both test scores and behaviors.  A correlation of outcomes across tasks can arise 
because tasks depend on the same vector of traits.
77  Outcomes across tasks may be correlated 
even if the components of  n T  are not.
78 
4.B.  Discriminant and Convergent Validity 
In this simplified framework, most personality psychologists focus on observer- and self-reports 
as measures of 
, nj P .  The measurements are designed to capture a particular trait.  As discussed 
in Section 3, the choice of which collection of tasks is used to measure a capability 
(“operationalization and construct validity”) is an inherently subjective activity.  Many 
psychologists take a pragmatic, empirical point of view.  Traits are what the measurements used 
                                                 
77 The strength of the correlation depends on the magnitudes of  j 
 
and  j    across the two tasks,  j  and  j. 
78 Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] present a nonparametric identification analysis for a general nonseparable 
model allowing for measurement error in measures of performance.  In the notation of equation (19), they 
nonparametrically identify the distribution of  n T  and the distribution of  , nj  ,  ,, 1 j J   , the latter without 




79  The danger with this empiricist definition is that it offers no guide to the choice of 
measurements, which are usually settled by conventions or intuitions.   
The concept of “discriminant validity” of a collection of tasks (e.g., a set of test scores or 
a set of observer reports or measurements of productivities) is commonly used to test for 
construct validity.  This approach exploits the notion that a particular battery of measurements 
captures a component of  n T , for example,  , nl T , and not other components.  Many measurements 
may be taken on  , nl T , and having multiple measurements helps to control for measurement error.   
All measurements are really just outcomes on a type of task although the effort applied 
may vary greatly across tasks.  The literature in psychology usually assigns a special status to 
tests, self-reports, and observer-reports of latent traits, but also uses direct measures of 
productivity, such as supervisor ratings.
80  Behaviors, tests, observer reports, and self reports all 
can be used to proxy the underlying traits.  These include repeated measurements on the same 
types of assessment mechanisms as well as measurements on different behaviors and 
assessments that are assumed to be generated by common traits.
81 
 A standard approach to defining constructs in personality psychology is based on factor 
analysis.  This approach takes a set of measurements that are designed to capture a construct, and 
measures within-cluster and across-cluster correlations of the measurements to isolate latent 
factors  , ,1 , , nl l TL   or their distributions.  The measurements and clusters of tests are selected 
on intuitive grounds or a priori grounds, and not on the basis of any predictive validity in terms 
of real-world outcomes (for example, success in college, performance on the job, earnings).  This 
                                                 
79 Borsboom, Mellenbergh and van Heerden [2003] compare the approach taken in Section 3 of defining traits a 
priori within a model with the operationalist approach (Bridgman [1959]) of defining a trait by whatever 
measurements are available on it.  Operationalism begs the question of operationalization and construct validity. 
80 See Groth-Marnat [2009]. 
81 Different measurements may load onto different traits. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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process gave rise to the taxonomy of traits that became the Big Five.  Because of the somewhat 
arbitrary basis of these taxonomies, there is some controversy in psychology about competing 
construct systems which we discuss in Section 5.  In practice, as we document below, the 
requirement of independence of the latent factors across constructs (lack of correlation of tests 
across clusters) is not easily satisfied.
82  This fuels controversy among psychologists advocating 
competing taxonomies. 
To state these issues more formally, let  ,
q
nl P  be the q
th measurement on trait l  for person 




1,..., , 1,..., , 1,..., .
qq q q








The factor  , nl T  is assumed to be statistically independent of the “measurement errors,”  ,
q
nl  , 
1,..., l qQ  .  Different factors are assumed to be independent ( , nl T  independent of  , nl T   for  
ll  ).  The measurement errors (or “uniquenesses”) are usually assumed to be mutually 
independent within and across constructs.
83 
In fact, measurement  ,
q
nl P  may depend on other components of  n T , so that the 
measurement captures a composite of latent traits.  A more general case is 
(21)    ,, ,     1,...,
qqq q
nl l n nl l PT q Q 

    , 
                                                 
82 Indeed, as documented in Section 7, the factors associated with personality are also correlated with some 
measures of cognitive factors but not all. 
83 The literature in economics relaxes the independence assumptions.  See Cunha and Heckman [2008] and Cunha, 
Heckman and Schennach [2010] and the literature they cite.  They present conditions under which independence is 




q   is a vector with possibly as many as L nonzero components.  The  ,
q
nl   are assumed to 
be independent of  n T  and mutually independent within and across constructs (l and l are two 
constructs).  The task has discriminant validity for trait l  if the only nonzero component of 
q   is 
q
l  .  The 
q
l   and 
q
l   can depend on measured characteristics of the agent, 
n Q .
84  The task has 
convergent validity if measures within the construct are highly correlated. 
More precisely, conventional psychometric validity of a collection of items or test scores 
for different constructs has three aspects.  (a) Factor  l T  for construct l  is statistically 
independent of factor  l T   for construct  l l , discriminant validity.
85  (b) A factor  l T  is assumed 
to account for the intercorrelations among the items or tests within a construct l .  (c) Item-
specific and random error variance are low (intercorrelations among items are high within a 
cluster).
86  Criteria (b) and (c) define convergent validity.
87 
4.C.  Predictive Validity 
An alternative criterion for validating measurement systems is based on the predictive power of 
the tests for real world outcomes, that is, on behaviors measured outside of the exam room or 
observer system.  The Hogan Personality Inventory,
88 the California Personality Inventory, and 
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory were all developed with the specific purpose of 
                                                 
84 Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004] show how to allow  n Q  to depend on  l T  and still identify the model 
85 This is sometimes weakened to a condition of zero correlation. 
86 Cronbach’s alpha is a widely used measure of intercorrelation among test scores, that is, a measure of importance 
of the variance of the  ,
q
nl   uniquenesses relative to the variance of the factors.  See Hogan, Hogan and Roberts 
[1996] for a precise definition.  Sijtsma [2009] discusses the severe limitations of Cronbach’s alpha. 
87 Nothing in these standard testing procedures guarantees that the measurements that satisfy convergent and 
discriminant validity identify a single trait.  Multiple traits operating in the same fashion across many outcomes 
would produce outcomes and factors that satisfy the criteria.  The multiple traits would be captured into a single 
factor.  Only if different traits differentially affect different outcomes can one identify different traits. 
88 See http://www.hoganassessments.com/products_services/hpi.aspx and also Hogan and Roberts [2001]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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predicting real-world outcomes. Decisions to retain or drop items during the development of 
these inventories were based, at least in part, upon the ability of items to predict such outcomes. 
This approach has an appealing concreteness about it.  Instead of relying on abstract a priori 
notions about domains of personality and subjectively defined latent factors generated from test 
scores and self and observer personality assessments, it anchors measurements in tangible, real-
world outcomes and constructs explicit tests with predictive power.  Yet this approach has its 
own problems.   
First, all measurements of factor  , nl T  can claim incremental predictive validity as long as 
each measurement is subject to error   , 0
q
nl  .  Proxies for  , nl T  can appear to be separate 
determinants (or “causes”) instead of surrogates for an underlying one-dimensional construct or 
factor.  Thus suppose that measurement system (20) is the correct specification and that a set of 
measurements display both convergent and discriminant validity.  As long as there are 
measurement errors for construct l , there is no limit to the number of proxies for  , nl T  that will 
show up as statistically significant predictors of an outcome.
89  For this reason, it is necessary to 
correct for measurement error in using predictive validity to identify and measure traits. 
A second problem with this approach to validation is reverse causality.  This is especially 
problematic when interpreting correlations between personality measurements and outcomes.  
Outcomes may influence personality measures as well as the other way around.  For example, 
self-esteem might increase income, and income might increase self-esteem.  Measuring 
personality traits prior to measuring predicted outcomes does not necessarily solve this problem. 
For example, the anticipation of a future pay raise may increase present self-esteem.   
                                                 
89 This is a standard result in the econometrics of measurement error.  See, e.g., Aigner, Hsiao, Kapteyn et al. 
[1984]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Psychologists sometimes address the problem of reverse causality by using early 
measures of traits determined well before the outcomes are measured to predict later outcomes.
90  
This approach is problematic if the traits the analyst seeks to identify evolve over time and the 
contemporary values of traits drive behavior.  This practice trades a reverse causality problem 
with a version of an errors in variables problem.  Early measures of the traits may be poor 
proxies for the traits that drive measured current behavior.  In our review of the literature in 
Section 7, we distinguish studies that attempt to control for reverse causality and those that do 
not. 
Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] and Urzua [2008] demonstrate the importance of 
correcting for reverse causality arising from schooling affecting traits and traits affecting 
schooling in interpreting the effects of personality tests on a variety of socioeconomic outcomes.  
Application of econometric techniques for determining the causal effects of factors on outcomes 
makes a distinctive contribution to psychology.   
Many psychologists focus on prediction, not causality.
91  Establishing predictive validity 
will often be enough to achieve the goal of making personnel assignment and student placement 
decisions.
92  However, for policy analysis, including analyses of new programs designed to 
augment the skills of the disadvantaged, causal models are required in order to generate policy 
counterfactuals.
93 
The papers of Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] and Cunha and Heckman [2008], 
develop frameworks for circumventing the problems that arise in using predictive validity to 
                                                 
90 This approach is based on the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. 
91 There is a long tradition in psychology of conducting predictive analysis based on factor analysis (see, for 
example, the essays in Cudeck and MacCullum [2007]), but there is no systematic treatment of the problem of 
reverse causality in that field. 
92 See, e.g., Hogan and Roberts [2001] and Hogan and Hogan [2007]. 
93 See Heckman [2008a]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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define and measure personality constructs.  These frameworks recognize the problem of 
measurement error in the proxies for constructs.  Constructs are created on the basis of how well 
latent factors predict outcomes not direct measures.  They develop frameworks for testing 
discriminant validity.  They allow the factors across different clusters of constructs to be 
correlated and show how to test for the presence of correlations across the factors. 
They use an extension of factor analysis to represent proxies for low-dimensional factors.  
They test for the number of latent factors required to fit the data and rationalize the proxies.
94  
Generalizing the analysis of Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004], Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua 
[2006] allow for lifetime experiences and investments to determine, in part, the coefficients of 
the factor model and to affect the factor itself.  Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] and 
Cunha and Heckman [2008] allow for the latent factor to determine investment and experience.  
They correct estimates of latent factors on outcomes for the effects of spurious feedback, and 
separate proxies from factors.  The factors are estimated to change over the life cycle as a 
consequence of experience and investment.  We review these studies in Sections 7 and 8. 
4.D.  Faking 
“Faking” may corrupt measurements designed to proxy latent factors.  There are at least two 
types of false responses: those arising from impression management and those arising from self-
deception (Paulhus [1984]). For example, individuals who know that their responses on a 
personality questionnaire will be used to make hiring decisions may deliberately exaggerate their 
strengths and downplay their weaknesses.
95 Subconscious motives to see themselves as virtuous 
may produce the same faking behavior, even when responses are anonymous.  It is possible to 
                                                 
94 Conti, Heckman, Lopes et al. [2010] discuss alternative approaches to selecting the number of latent factors.  See 
also Cragg and Donald [1997]. 
95  See Viswesvaran and Ones [1999]; and Sternberg [2001; Sternberg, Forsythe, Hedlund et al. [2000]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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fake Conscientiousness on a self-report questionnaire, whereas it is impossible to fake superior 
reasoning ability on an IQ test. To a lesser degree, a similar bias may also operate in cognitive 
tests. Persons who know that their test scores will affect personnel or admissions decisions may 
try harder.  The literature on “stereotype threat” shows that the framing of an achievement test 
can affect the performance of the test taker.
96  Some evidence suggests that faking has a 
surprisingly minimal effect on predicting job performance.
97  Correcting for faking using scales 
designed to measure deliberate lying does not seem to improve predictive validity.
98  
Nevertheless, when measuring cognitive and personality traits, as noted in Section 3, one should 
standardize for incentives and environment. 
The linear factor model does not capture a variety of interesting interactions among traits.  
Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] and the papers they cite develop a nonlinear non-normal 
factor analysis that allows for measurement errors to be correlated across measures and over 
time.  We report estimates based on their nonlinear factor analyses in Section 8. 
4.E.  The Causal Status of Latent Variables 
Some psychologists question the causal status of latent variables extracted from factor analyses 
of measurements across individuals.
99  Such factor analytic studies summarize interindividual 
variation but do not necessarily inform analysts about the effects of exogenously changing the 
factor in producing outcomes across individuals.  In addition, variations of traits within persons 
may have very different effects than variations across persons. 
                                                 
96 See Steele and Aronson [1998] and Sackett, Hardison and Cullen [2004]. 
97 Hough, Eaton, Dunnette et al. [1990]; Hough and Ones [2002]; Ones and Viswesvaran [1998]. 
98 Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye et al. [2007]. 
99 Borsboom, Mellenbergh and van Heerden [2003] and Cervone [2005]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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  The distinction between the effects of changing traits within and across persons is 
traditional in econometrics.
100  Econometric models that capture this distinction could be 
fruitfully applied to psychology.  So can hierarchical linear models.
101 
  These methods do not address the deeper problem that most of the estimates of “the 
effects” of psychological traits on outcomes (either from “within” or “across” studies) have no 
causal status.  Structural equation methods have been used to estimate causal relationships using 
cross-person variation.  They rely on the usual toolkit of simultaneous equations exclusion 
restrictions to secure identification.
102  Standard experimental and econometric techniques for 
inferring causality from within person changes have only recently been applied to generate 
causal effects of personality.
103  We review this literature in Section 8. 
 
  
                                                 
100 See, e.g., Mundlak [1978] and Hsiao [2003]. 
101 See Raudenbush and Bryk [2001]. 
102 See, e.g., Aigner, Hsiao, Kapteyn et al. [1984] for a review of this classical literature. 
103 See, e.g., Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] and Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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5.  Implementing the Measurement Systems   
 
How do psychologists measure individual differences?  In this section we analyze the major 
measurement systems for cognition and personality.  We examine the relative performance of 
cognition and personality in predicting a variety of outcomes.  For cognition, there is a fairly 
well-established set of terminologies and conventions.  Aptitude tests are designed to measure 
differences in the rates at which individuals learn (i.e., fluid intelligence). Achievement tests are 
designed to measure acquired knowledge (i.e., crystallized intelligence).  For personality, a 
variety of alternative measurement systems are proposed, and this is a source of confusion.  We 
attempt to compare and equate these systems of measurement.  We link them to measures of 
childhood temperament and psychopathology which are also used to describe individual 
differences.  We note that the problems of operationalization and construct validity are present in 
analyzing any measures of traits.  
 
5.A.  Cognition 
Intelligence (also called cognitive ability and general mental ability) is defined by psychologists 
to include the “ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to 
learn from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking 
thought” (Neisser, Boodoo, Bouchard et al. [1996, p. 77]).
104  These are clearly distinct traits, 
and the literature distinguishes more finely among them.  The term “IQ” is often used 
synonymously with intelligence but in fact refers specifically to scores on intelligence tests.  
                                                 
104 Psychologists have attempted to broaden the concept of intelligence beyond this list. Most notably, Gardner 
[2004] suggests that the notion of intelligence should also include creativity and the ability to solve practical, real-
world problems.  He includes in his theory of multiple intelligences, musical intelligence, kinaesthetic intelligence, 
and interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligence, among others. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Notwithstanding a century of active study and general agreement about the sorts of tasks on 
which more intelligent individuals perform better, the construct of intelligence “resists a 
consensual definition.”
105 
Scores on different tests of cognitive ability tend to be highly correlated, with half or 
more of the variance of diverse tests accounted for by a single general factor labeled “g” and 
more specific mental abilities loading on other factors.
106  g is widely interpreted as general 
mental ability.
107  An extreme version of g-theory that is no longer widely accepted is that g 
accounts for all the correlation among different tests of cognition.
108   
Psychometricians have expanded this notion to create a hierarchy of “orders.”  The order 
of a factor indicates its generality in explaining a variety of tests of cognitive ability deemed to 
satisfy construct validity.  Tests have different emphases (for example, verbal ability, numeracy, 
coding speed, and other tasks).  A first-order factor is predictive in all cognitive tasks, j=1,..., J 
in equation (19).  In modern parlance this general correlation is called “g ,” but it is no longer 
viewed as the sole predictor of cognitive test scores.  A lower-order factor is predictive of 
performance in only some tasks.  Lower-order factors can be correlated with the higher-order 
factors and may be correlated with each other.  They have independent predictive power from the 
higher-order factors.    Figure 3 reports one possible partition of general intelligence due to 
Ackerman and Heggestad [1997], who summarize the work of Carroll [1993] on the multiple 
facets of intelligence.
109 
                                                 
105 Wilhelm and Engle [2005]. 
106 Johnson, Bouchard, Krueger et al. [2004]; Jensen [1998]; Lubinski [2004]; Spearman [1904; 1927]. 
107 Gottfredson [2002] 
108 See, e.g., Carroll [1993]. 




Figure 3. A Hierarchical Scheme of General Intelligence and Its Components 
 
Source: Recreated from Ackerman and Heggestad [1997]. 
 Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Fluid vs. Crystallized Intelligence 
There is less agreement about the number and identity of lower-order factors.
110  Carroll [1993] 
proposed a general intelligence factor g  and several more specific second-order factors, 
including,  but not limited to, what Cattell [1971; 1987] dubbed crystallized and fluid 
intelligence. Crystallized intelligence, Cattell proposed, comprises acquired skills and knowledge 
and thus is partly dependent upon educational opportunity and motivation. Fluid intelligence, by 
contrast, is a general “relation-perceiving ability” (p. 138). Cattell’s student Rindermann [2007] 
elaborates:  
“Fluid intelligence is the ability to perceive complex relations, educe complex 
correlates, form concepts, develop aids, reason, abstract, and maintain span of 
immediate apprehension in solving novel problems in which advanced elements of 
the collective intelligence of the culture were not required for solution” (p. 462).  
In contrast, crystallized intelligence is the same class of skills, “but in materials in which past 
appropriation of the collective intelligence of the culture would give one a distinct advantage in 
solving the problems involved” (p. 462). 
Carroll [1993] and Horn and McArdle [2007] summarize the large body of evidence 
against the claim that a single factor g  is sufficient to explain the correlation structure of 
achievement and intelligence tests.
 111 Two pieces of evidence are worth highlighting. First, 
crystallized intelligence tends to increase monotonically for most of the life cycle, whereas fluid 
                                                 
110 Carroll [1993] analyzed 477 data sets and estimated a structure with g as the highest-order factor, eight second-
order ability clusters, and over 70 more narrowly defined third-order abilities on a variety of different tests.  
Alternative hierarchical models, also with g as the highest-order factor, have been proposed (for example, Lubinski 
[2004]; Horn [1970]). 
111 Recent research by Ardila, Pineda and Rosselli [2000] shows that more than one factor is required to summarize 
the predictive power of cognitive tests in economic data.  This could be due to the existence of multiple intellective 
factors or because personality factors affect the measurement of cognitive factors as we discuss later on in this 
section.   Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
61 
 
intelligence tends to peak in very early adulthood then to decline.
112  Second, the well-known 
Flynn effect, which documents the population-wide increase in performance on intelligence tests 
over the past half-century, is particularly dramatic for measures of fluid intelligence but much 
smaller for measures of crystallized intelligence.
113  SAT scores have declined rather than 
increased over the same period, requiring a renorming in the 1990s. 
The relative weighting of fluid versus crystallized intelligence varies among tests 
according to the degree to which prior experience is crucial to performance.  These second order 
factors are correlated with the first-order factor g  but also contribute additional explanatory 
power to predicting some clusters of test score outcomes.  Achievement tests, like the Armed 
Forces Qualifying Test used by economists and psychologists alike, are heavily weighted 
towards crystallized intelligence,
114 whereas tests like the Raven Progressive Matrices [1962] are 
heavily weighted towards fluid intelligence.
115 Several studies have shown that fluid intelligence 
is much more strongly related to g than are measures of crystallized intelligence.
116 Moreover, 
lay intuitions of intelligence (i.e., what most people mean by “being smart”) correspond more 
closely with the ability to learn than with possession of already acquired knowledge.
117 Thus, it 
seems to us useful to reserve the term “intelligence tests” for tests that primarily measure fluid 
intelligence, and the term “achievement tests” for tests that primarily measure crystallized 
intelligence.  Some would argue that g has been usurped by fluid intelligence.  A closer reading 
                                                 
112 McArdle, Hamagami, Meredith et al. [2000]. 
113 Dickens and Flynn [2001]. 
114 Roberts, Goff, Anjoul et al. [2000]. 
115 Raven, Raven and Court [1988 ].  Conti and Pudney [2007] uses data on intelligence and achievement tests 
across nations to show that a single factor accounts for 94-95 percent of the variance across both kinds of tests. The 
high correlation between intelligence and achievement tests is in part due to the fact that both require cognitive 
ability and knowledge, even if to different degrees, that common developmental factors may affect both of these 
traits, and that fluid intelligence promotes the acquisition of crystallized intelligence. 
116 Cattell [1971; 1987]; Gustafsson [1988; Kvist and Gustafsson [2008]. 
117 Gottfredson [1998]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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is that what is commonly meant by intelligence encompasses a number of distinct traits captured 
in the lower order factors of Figure 3. 
 
Predictive Validity of Tests of Cognition  
How well do IQ and achievement tests predict success in life? This is a hard question to answer. 
Many different skills are required to achieve success in any task.
118  Different tasks in life require 
different skills in different degrees.
119  Table 2 shows the domains of validation and the 
estimated validities of a number of widely used tests of cognition. Notice that the domains of 
validation differ greatly. For IQ tests, the validities are usually established by comparing test 
scores with other test scores or with grades in school and not success in life. Nevertheless, it is 
well-established that standardized tests of ability and achievement predict objectively measured 
academic, occupational, and life outcomes.
120 
The SAT college entrance exam is moderately successful in predicting grades in 
college—which was what the SAT was designed to do.
121  However, high school grades are 
better predictors of college performance.
122  The rival American College Test (ACT) is validated 
in a similar fashion but uses somewhat broader measures of college performance, such as grades 
in higher years of college rather than just freshman year grades.
123  The Graduate Record Exam 
is validated by performance in graduate school.
124 The Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) is 
validated by performance in the military. Performance is measured by success in military 
                                                 
118Mandelbrot [1962]. 
119 See, e.g., Roy [1951], Mandelbrot [1962], Willis and Rosen [1979], Heckman and Sedlacek [1985], and 
Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006]. 
120 Kuncel, Ones and Sackett [2010].   
121 See Young and Kobrin [2001]. 
122 Bowen, Chingos and McPherson [2009a] and Geiser and Santelices [2007].  Notice, however, that there is a 
potential problem with restriction on the range in many of these studies. 
123 ACT [2007]. 
124 Kuncel and Hezlett [2007]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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training schools and performance standardized tasks like fixing a rifle or repairing a radio.
125  
One can interpret The Bell Curve by Herrnstein and Murray and the flood of papers it stimulated 
as conducting validity studies of the AFQT using real world outcomes of the sort studied in 
Tables A1 and A2 in the Web Appendix. The correlation of AFQT with wages is a moderate 
0.3 r  . The General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) predicts success at work as measured by 
supervisor ratings in over 12,000 occupations and participation in training programs.
126   
  
  
                                                 
125 See McHenry, Hough, Toquam et al. [1990]. 
126 Schmidt and Hunter [1983; 1998], Hartigan and Wigdor [1989] and McHenry, Hough, Toquam et al. [1990]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Table 2. Predictive Validities of Various Tests of Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence 
 
Cognitive Achievement and IQ Tests
Test  Domain over which it 
is validated 
Estimated Validities  Source  Notes 
SAT  First year college GPA  0.35 to 0.53 Validity of the SAT for 
Predicting First-Year 
College Grade Point 
Average
 
ACT  Grades in early years of 
college 
0.42 ACT Technical 
Manual
 
Stanford-Binet  Correlations with other 
intelligence tests 
0.77 to 0.87 with WISC-R Rothlisberg [1987]; 




Intelligence Scale for 
Children) 
Correlations with academic 
achievement 
 
WISC: 0.443 to 0.751 with 
WRAT tests, 0.482 to 0.788 
with 1st grade 
grades, 0.462 to 0.794 with 
2nd grade grades; WISC-R: 
0.346 to 0.760 with WRAT 
tests, 0.358 to 0.537 with 
1st grade grades, 0.420 to 
0.721 with 2nd grade grades




WRAT = Wide Range  
Achievement Test; 
ranges are given 
because correlations 







Correlations with other 
intelligence tests,  
achievement tests, and 
outcomes 
 
0.67 (median) with verbal 
tests, 0.61 (median) with 
nonverbal tests, 0.69 with 
education attained, 0.38 to 
0.43 with college grades, 









Correlations with other   
intelligence tests 
0.74 to 0.84 with WAIS-R
 








performance in training 






Large range due to 




Performance in military 
training programs and 
military attrition rates 
 
0.37 to 0.78 for training 
(mean=0.56); -0.15 for 
attrition 
Schmidt, Hunter and 
Larson [1988] for 
performance in training 
programs; Sticht, Hooke 
and Caylor [1982] for 
attrition rates
Large range in training 
correlations due to a 





Test difficulty is normed 
against graduating HS 
seniors. Test scores of high 
school seniors and grades of 
high school seniors 
0.33 to 0.49 for HS Senior 
GPA 
Technical Manual: 





Correlations with  academic 
achievement 
0.13 to 0.62 for college 
GPA 
Omizo [1980] Large range is due to 







Correlation with other 
achievement tests; teacher 
ratings of student 
achievement 
0.80 with grade 4 CAT/2, 
0.69 with grade 5 CAT/2, 
0.83 with grade 6 CAT/2; 
0.67 with teacher ratings






Sources: Feingold [1982], Greene, Sapp and Chissom [1990], Hartlage and Steele [1977], Hunter [1986], Kobrin, 
Patterson, Shaw et al. [2008], Michalko and Saklofske [1996], O'Leary, Rusch and Guastello [1991], Omizo [1980], 
Rothlisberg [1987], Schmidt, Hunter and Larson [1988], Sticht, Hooke and Caylor [1982], American Council On 




5.B.  Personality Traits 
We have noted in Sections 2 and 3 that sharp contrasts between cognition and personality are not 
easy to make. Consider, for example, the so-called “quasi-cognitive” traits (Kyllonen, Walters 
and Kaufman [2005]). These include creativity (Csikszentmihalyi [1996]), emotional intelligence 
(Mayer and Salovey [1997]), cognitive style (Stanovich [1999]; Perkins and Tishman [2001]), 
typical intellectual engagement (Ackerman and Heggestad [1997]), and practical intelligence 
(Sternberg, Forsythe, Hedlund et al. [2000]). Furthermore, the Big Five factor of Openness to 
Experience has as facets curiosity (“ideas”) and imagination (“fantasy”) that are often associated 
with intellect and measured intelligence.
127  (See the entries under Openness in Table 3.)  We 
note in Section 5.C that personality can affect performance on tests of fluid intelligence. 
Personality traits also affect acquired skills and knowledge (i.e., crystallized intelligence).
128  A 
general pattern is higher correlation of personality tests with tests of crystallized knowledge (e.g., 
achievement tests).
129  For many personality traits and for measures of cognition that are based 
on fluid intelligence, the correlations are close to zero, as we note below. 
Finally, consider the construct of executive function. “Cognitive control” and “executive 
function” are terms used interchangeably, primarily in the neuroscience literature. Both have 
been defined as the voluntary, effortful blocking of a habitual behavior in order to execute a less 
familiar behavior.
130  Some authors (e.g., Gray [2004]) also use the terms “cognitive control” and 
“self-control” interchangeably, though self-control is traditionally considered a personality trait 
rather than an aspect of cognition. While tasks requiring executive function are related to 
                                                 
127 McCrae and Costa [1997a]; Noftle and Robins [2007]. 
128 See Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham [2005] for an extended discussion of this topic. 
129 See, e.g., Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2010]. 
130 Matsumoto and Tanaka [2004]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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questionnaire measures of self-control, the size of these associations is only about 
0.11 to 0.14 r  .(Duckworth and Schulze [2009]).  
A region of the brain called the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), in conjunction with 
the nearby region called the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), are now understood as responsible 
for “executive control” over lower order processes.
131 That is, executive control entails top-
down, intentional control of behavior and is not necessary for the performance of simple, 
automatic tasks (Miller and Cohen [2001]). The PFC achieves structural and functional maturity 
later than other (e.g., sensorimotor) brain regions (Casey, Tottenham, Liston et al. [2005]). 
Specific executive functions attributed to the PFC include abstract reasoning, planning, decision 
making, working memory (the ability to keep the facts of a problem at hand), attention, conflict 
monitoring, task switching, and inhibition of prepotent (i.e., dominant, habitual) impulses. While 
many functions have been attributed to the PFC, Miller [2000] notes that “there is little 
agreement on the cardinal prefrontal functions” (p. 449). Nevertheless, there is some consensus 
that one can distinguish between working memory on the one hand, and response inhibition and 
task switching on the other (Garon, Bryson and Smith [2008], Miyake, Friedman, Emerson et al. 
[2000]). This distinction is important because working memory is highly related to performance 
on measures of fluid intelligence.
132  Being able to access to all of the data about a problem is 
helpful in solving it.  Thus, working memory is a common component of the constructs of both 
executive function and general intelligence.
133 
While the construct of executive function demonstrates the inadequacy of terms such as 
“cognitive” and “non-cognitive”, many personality traits nevertheless are conceptually and 
                                                 
131 Notably, the volume of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) is correlated with Big Five Conscientiousness 
(DeYoung, Hirsh, Shane et al. [2010]). 
132 Carpenter, Just and Shell [1990]; Heitz, Unsworth and Engle [2005]. 
133 Friedman, Miyake, Corley et al. [2006]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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empirically easily distinguished from general cognitive ability.  Most personality traits are in fact 
very weakly correlated with IQ (Webb [1915]; McCrae and Costa [1994]; Stankov [2005]; 
Ackerman and Heggestad [1997]).  Thus, regardless of the terms used to describe individual 
differences that determine life outcomes, one thing is clear: human ability entails more than 
intelligence. Personality traits, however defined, do matter, and they have independent predictive 
power from standard measures of intelligence. 
5.C.  Operationalizing the Concepts 
Intelligence tests are routinely used in a variety of settings including business, education, civil 
service, and the military.
134  Psychometricians attempt to use test scores to measure a factor (a 
component of T  in the notation of Section 4).  The working hypothesis in the intelligence testing 
business is that specific tests measure only a single component of T , and that tests with different 
“content domains” measure different components.  We first discuss the origins of the 




Modern intelligence tests have been used for just over a century, beginning with the decision of a 
French minister of public instruction to identify retarded pupils in need of specialized education 
programs. In response, Alfred Binet created the first IQ test.
136 Other pioneers in intelligence 
testing include Cattell [1890] and Galton [1883], both of whom developed tests of basic 
cognitive functions (for example, discriminating between objects of different weights).  These 
                                                 
134 Siegler [1992] provide a detailed overview of the different types of applications of psychological testing. 
135 See Roberts, Markham, Matthews et al. [2005] for a more complete history of intelligence testing. 
136 In 1904, La Société Libre pour l’Etude Psychologique de l’Enfant appointed a commission to create a mechanism 
for identifying these pupils in need of alternative education led by Binet. See Herrnstein and Murray [1994] for an 
overview of Binet’s life and work. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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early tests were eventually rejected in favor of tests that attempt to tap higher mental processes.  
Terman [1916] adapted Binet’s IQ test for use with American populations. Known as the 
Stanford-Binet IQ test, Terman’s adaptation was, like the original French test, used primarily to 
predict academic performance. Stanford-Binet test scores were presented as ratios of mental age 
to chronological age multiplied by 100.  IQ scores centered at 100 as the average are now 
conventional for most intelligence tests. 
Wechsler [1939] noted two major limitations of the Stanford-Binet test.  First, it was 
overly reliant on verbal skills and, therefore, dependent upon formal education and cultural 
exposure. Second, the ratio of mental to chronological age was an inappropriate metric for adults 
(Boake [2002]).  Wechsler created a new intelligence test battery divided into verbal subtests 
(e.g., similarities) and performance subtests (e.g., block design, matrix reasoning). He also 
replaced the ratio IQ score with deviation scores that have the same normal distribution at each 
age. This test, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS)—and, later, the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC)—produces two different IQ subscores, verbal IQ and 
performance IQ, which sum to a full-scale IQ score. The WAIS and the WISC have for the past 
several decades been by far the most commonly used IQ tests.  
Similar to Wechsler’s Matrix Reasoning subtest, the Raven Progressive Matrices test is a 
so-called “culture-free” IQ test because it does not depend heavily on verbal skills or other 
knowledge explicitly taught during formal education.  Each matrix test item presents a pattern of 
abstract figures.
137  The test taker must choose the missing part.
138  If subjects have not had 
exposure to such visual puzzles, the Raven test is an almost pure measure of fluid intelligence. 
However, the assumption that subjects are unfamiliar with such puzzles is not typically tested. It 
                                                 
137 See John and Srivastava [1999] for a discussion of the Raven test. 
138 See Figure A1 in Section A5 of the Web Appendix.   Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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is likely that children from more educated families or from more developed countries have more 
exposure to such abstract puzzles (Blair [2006]).  Our view is that to varying degrees, IQ and 
achievement tests reflect fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and personality factors, such 
as motivation, to succeed on the test.  We offer evidence on the effect of motivation on test 
scores below in Section 5.E.   
5.D.  Personality Constructs 
Dominant theories of personality assume a hierarchical structure analogous to that found for 
intelligence.  However, despite early efforts to identify a g  for personality (for example, Webb 
[1915]), even the most parsimonious personality models incorporate more than one factor. The 
most widely accepted taxonomy of personality traits is the Big Five.
139  The Big Five factors are 
obtained from conventional factor analysis using a version of (19) where the “tests” are measures 
of different domains of personality based on observer reports or self reports. 
The five-factor model has its origins in Allport and Odbert’s [1936] lexical hypothesis, 
which posits that the most important individual differences are encoded in language. Allport and 
Odbert combed English dictionaries and found 17,953 personality-describing words, which were 
later reduced to 4,504 personality-describing adjectives. Subsequently, several different 
psychologists working independently and on different samples concluded that personality traits 
can be organized into five superordinate factors.  
Table 3 presents the Big Five factors that were discussed in Section 2.  It summarizes the 
30 lower-level facets (six facets for each of five factors) identified in the Revised NEO 
Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R, Costa and McCrae [1992b]).  The acronym is shorthand for 
Neuroticism, Extroversion, Openness to Experience—Personality Inventory—Revised.  Of 
                                                 
139 See Goldsmith, Buss, Plomin et al. [1987] for an historical overview of the development of the Big Five. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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course, these lower-level facets (e.g., “impulsive”) can be further subdivided into even more 
narrow traits (“impulsive about junk food,” “impulsive about smoking”). The more narrowly 
defined a trait, the more specific are the contexts in which the trait is predictive. In parentheses in 
the third column of Table 3, we have included a strongly related trait adjective.  In the fourth 
column of Table 3, we present other traits in each family.  In the fifth column, we relate the Big 
Five to children’s temperament traits studied by developmental psychologists. 
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Table 3. The Big Five Domains and Their Facets 





Facets (and correlated 
trait adjective) 
Related Traits  Childhood 
Temperament Traits 





Dutifulness (not careless) 
Achievement striving 
(ambitious) 




















“the tendency to be open 
to new aesthetic, 














Extraversion  “an orientation of one’s 
interests and energies 
toward the outer world 
of people and things 
rather than the inner 
world of subjective 
experience; 
characterized by 












































Emotional Stability  
Emotional stability is 
“predictability and 
consistency in emotional 
reactions, with absence 
of rapid mood changes.” 
Neuroticism is “a 
chronic level of 









Vulnerability to stress 
(not self-confident) 
Internal vs. External 
Locus of control 


















(Lack of) soothability 
Sadness 
Notes: Facets specified by the NEO-PI-R personality inventory (Costa and McCrae [1992b]). Trait adjectives in 
parentheses from the Adjective Check List (Gough and Heilbrun [1983]). *These temperament traits may be related 
to two Big Five factors.  
Source: Table adapted from John and Srivastava [1999]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Temperament is the term used by developmental psychologists to describe the behavioral 
tendencies of infants and children.
140  Because individual differences in temperament emerge so 
early in life, these traits have traditionally been assumed to be biological (as opposed to 
environmental) in origin.
141 However, findings in behavioral genetics suggest that, like adult 
personality, temperament is only partly heritable, and as discussed in Section 8, both adult and 
child measured traits are affected by the environment. 
 Temperament is studied primarily by child and developmental psychologists, while 
personality is studied by adult personality psychologists. The past decade has seen some 
convergence of these two research traditions, however, and there is evidence that temperamental 
differences observed during the preschool years anticipate adult personality and interpersonal 
functioning decades later (for example, Caspi [2000]; Newman, Caspi, Moffitt et al. [1997]; 
Shiner and Caspi [2003]).  Column 5 of Table 3 displays temperament traits that have been 
associated both theoretically and empirically with adult personality traits. 
Historically, many temperament researchers examined specific lower-order traits rather 
than broader, higher-level factors that characterize studies of adult intelligence and 
personality.
142 Shiner [1998] suggests that “there is therefore a great need to bring order to this 
vast array of studies of single lower-level traits” (p. 320).  Recently, taxonomies of temperament 
                                                 
140 See Caspi and Shiner [2006] and Zentner and Bates [2008] for a discussion of varying perspectives on 
temperament, including a summary of points where major theorists converge. 
141 Indeed, some psychologists use the term “temperament” to indicate all aspects of personality that are biological 
in origin. They study temperament in both children and adults. 
142 Measuring temperament presents unique methodological challenges. Self-report measures, by far the most widely 
used measure for adult personality, are not appropriate for young children for obvious reasons. One strategy is to ask 
parents and teachers to rate the child’s overt behavior (for example, California Child Q-sort), but informants can 
only guess what a child might be thinking and feeling. Infants present a special challenge because their behavioral 
repertoire is so limited. One strategy is to place infants in a standard situation and code reactions under a 
standardized scenario (for example, the Strange Situation, which is used to distinguish infants who are securely 
attached to their caregiver versus insecurely attached). Young children can be interviewed using puppets or stories. 
For obvious reasons, all measures of temperament are more difficult and more expensive to collect than adult self-
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have been proposed that group lower-order traits into higher-order dimensions; several of these 
taxonomies resemble the Big Five (for example, John, Caspi, Robins et al. [1994]; Putnam, Ellis 
and Rothbart [2001]; Rothbart, Ahadi and Evans [2000]; Shiner and Caspi [2003]). However, 
compared to adults, there seem to be fewer ways that young children can differ from one another. 
Child psychologists often refer to the “elaboration” or “differentiation” of childhood 
temperament into the full flower of complex, adult personality.  The lack of direct 
correspondence between measures of temperament and measures of adult personality presents a 
challenge to researchers interested in documenting changes in personality over the full life cycle.  
Developing the required measures is an active area of research. 
 
Alternatives to the Big Five 
The Five-Factor model is not without its critics.  Alternative systems have been proposed.  For 
example, Eysenck [1991] offers a model with just three factors (i.e., Neuroticism, Extraversion, 
and Psychoticism). Cloninger [1987] and Tellegen [1985] offer different three-factor models.  
Figure 4 shows the commonalities across some competing taxonomies and also areas of 
divergence. Solutions with more factors can increase the prediction of outcomes including job 
performance, income, and change in psychiatric status (Mershon and Gorsuch [1988]). On the 
other hand, more parsimonious models in which the five factors are reduced to two “metatraits” 
have also been suggested (Digman [1997]).  In addition to these controversies, the facet-level 
organization of any given Big Five factor is subject to debate and controversy.   
 Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Figure 4.  Competing Taxonomies of Personality 
 
 
Source: Figure reproduced from Bouchard and Loehlin [2001], with kind permission from Springer Science and 
Business Media. 
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Recent research suggests that the rush to accept the Big Five may be premature.
143  The 
first studies of the Big Five were based primarily on English speaking samples. And, although 
the Big Five structure appears to replicate across many cultures (McCrae and Costa [1997b]), 
studies of more diverse cultures show that taxonomies known as the Big Six (Ashton, Lee, 
Perugini et al. [2004]) or the Multi-Language Seven (ML7; Saucier [2003]), may better represent 
the personality domain. While they add one or two dimensions to the Big Five and shift the 
meaning of the Big Five slightly, they are, however, not very different from the Big Five.
144 
One of the most stinging criticisms of the Five-Factor model is that it is atheoretical 
(Block [1995]).  It is derived from factor analysis of a variety of measures without any firm 
biological underpinnings.  While research is under way on determining the neural substrates of 
the Big Five (see Canli [2006] and DeYoung, Hirsh, Shane et al. [2010]), the finding that 
descriptions of behavior as measured by tests, self-reports, and reports of observers cluster 
reliably into five groups has not so far been satisfactorily explained by any scientifically 
grounded theory. 
Some psychologists suggest that the categories are too crude to be useful.  Estimates 
based on the Big Five factors obscure relationships between specific facets of the Big Five and 
outcomes.
145  Given that each Big Five factor is a composite of distinct facets, the predictive 
validities are diluted when analyses consider only factor-level aggregate scores. For instance, 
Paunonen and Ashton [2001] compared Big Five Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience 
with two related facets, need for achievement and need for understanding. In each comparison, 
                                                 
143 This discussion draws heavily on Roberts [2006]. 
144 See Roberts [2006] for a description of these shifts. 
145 Hough [1992]; Hough and Oswald [2000]; Paunonen and Ashton [2001]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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the lower-level facet predicted course grades among undergraduates better than its higher-level 
factor measure. 
The Five-Factor model is largely silent about motivation.  In the notation of Section 3,   
parameterizes preferences and goals.  The omission of motivation (that is, what people value or 
desire) from measures of Big Five traits is not complete, however.  The NEO-PI-R, for example, 
includes as a facet “achievement striving”.  Individual differences in motivation were more 
prominent in older (now rarely used) measures of personality. The starting point for Jackson’s 
Personality Research Form (PRF; Jackson [1974]), for example, was Murray’s [1938] theory of 
basic human drives. Included in the PRF are scales for (need for) play, order, autonomy, 
achievement, affiliation, social recognition, and safety. The Schwartz Values Survey (Schwartz 
[1992]) is another self-report measure of motivation which yields scores on ten different 
motivations including power, achievement, benevolence, and conformity.  Some motivation 
theorists believe that one’s deepest desires are unconscious and, therefore, may dispute the 
practice of measuring motivation using self-report questionnaires (see McClelland, Koestner and 
Weinberger [1989]). For a brief review of this debate and an overview of how motivation and 
personality trait measures differ, see Roberts, Harms, Smith et al. [2006]. 
A practical problem facing the analyst who wishes to measure personality is the 
multiplicity of personality questionnaires. The proliferation of personality measures reflects, in 
part, the more heterogeneous nature of personality in comparison to cognitive ability, although, 
as we have seen, various types of cognitive ability have been distinguished in the literature.
146 
The panoply of measures and constructs also points to the relatively recent and incomplete 
convergence of personality psychologists on the Big Five model, as well as the lack of consensus 
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among researchers about identifying and organizing lower-order facets of the Big Five factors 
(see DeYoung, Quilty and Peterson [2007] and Hofstee, de Raad and Goldberg [1992]). For 
example, some theorists argue that impulsivity is a facet of Neuroticism (Costa and McCrae 
[1992b]), others claim that it is a facet of Conscientiousness (Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark et al. 
[2005]), and still others suggest that it is a blend of Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and perhaps 
Neuroticism (Revelle [1997]).  Figure 4 shows in italics facets of the Big Five whose 
classifications are under question.  One reason for the proliferation of measures is the variety of 
alternative methodologies for verifying tests discussed in Section 4 which are not guaranteed to 
produce the same taxonomies. 
5.D.1.  Self-Esteem and Locus of Control Are Related to Big Five Emotional Stability 
The traits of self-esteem and locus of control deserve special attention since they are collected in 
large-sample longitudinal studies used by economists.
147  They are not part of the traditional Big 
Five typology.  However, they can be related to it. 
Self-esteem refers to an individual’s subjective estimation of his or her own worth. An 
example item from the widely-used Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg [1989]) asks 
respondents to indicate their agreement with the statement, “I feel that I am a person of worth, at 
least on an equal plane with others.” Locus of control refers to one’s belief about whether the 
determinants of one’s life events are largely internal or external. Those with an internal (as 
opposed to external) locus of control believe that life events are typically caused by their own 
actions. An example item from the widely-used Rotter Locus of Control Scale (Rotter [1966]) 
                                                 
147 See, e.g., NLSY79 based studies Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] and Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. 
[2010].  The German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) also collects these measures. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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requires respondents to choose between “Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly 
due to bad luck” and “People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.” 
For the most part, researchers who study self-esteem and locus of control have carried out 
their work in isolation of each other and without reference to the Big Five taxonomy. However, 
Judge and colleagues (Judge, Bono, Erez et al. [2005]; Judge, Erez, Bono et al. [2002]; Judge 
and Hurst [2007]) have proposed that locus of control, self-esteem, and Big Five Emotional 
Stability are indicators of a common construct, termed core self-evaluations. They point out that 
measures of these three traits, as well as generalized self-efficacy (the belief that one can act 
effectively to bring about desired results) demonstrate high convergent validity, poor 
discriminant validity, and poor incremental predictive validity. Positive core self-evaluations 
indicate a generally positive and proactive view of oneself and one’s relationship to the world. 
Accordingly, we have, in Table 3, associated aspects of core self-evaluations with the Big Five 
factors of Neuroticism and Emotional Stability. 
5.D.2.  Relating the Big Five to Measures of Psychopathology 
Extreme manifestations of personality traits may be a form of mental illness.  Thus, a very 
conscientious person may be viewed as an obsessive compulsive person.  It is of interest to 
consider how psychopathology may be characterized using the Big Five. 
Psychopathology is defined by the APA dictionary as “patterns of behavior or thought 
processes that are abnormal or maladaptive.” Used interchangeably with the terms mental illness 
and mental disorder, psychopathology is primarily studied by psychiatrists and clinical 
psychologists. Historically, the study of psychopathology was carried out in near complete 
isolation from the study of “normal” variation in personality. Very recently, however, several 
attempts have been made to integrate taxonomies of psychopathology and normal personality Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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into a single framework. In particular, a compelling argument can be made for conceptualizing of 
and measuring mental disorders  as extreme variants of personality traits (see Krueger and Eaton 
[2010] and ensuing commentary). This approach is quite revolutionary in the study of 
psychopathology in at least two ways. First, it takes a dimensional as opposed to categorical 
characterization of mental disorders.  By a dimensional approach, psychologists mean that traits 
lie on an underlying continuum and are not discrete valued. Second, the recent research relies 
upon structural validity (e.g., evidence of convergent and discriminant validity) rather than 
historical path dependency (e.g., diagnoses that persist because they are familiar to clinicians 
who learned about them during their training). 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association 
distinguishes between Axis I disorders, which are acute disorders requiring clinical attention 
(e.g., depression, schizophrenia) and Axis II disorders
148, 10 personality disorders that are more 
chronic and, generally, less impairing of overall functioning. Research has documented that Big 
Five Neuroticism is a non-specific correlate of various Axis I disorders, and that various other 
reliable associations can be documented (e.g., the positive emotionality facet of Extraversion is 
associated with bipolar disorder); however, the direction of causality is difficult to ascertain in 
what have typically been cross-sectional studies (Bagby, Bindseil, Schuller et al. [1997; 
Cloninger, Svrakic, Bayon et al. [1999; Gunderson, Triebwasser, Phillips et al. [1999]). Twin 
studies demonstrate that the shared variance in mental disorders and personality traits is 
predominantly genetic – that is, common genetic antecedents give rise to certain mental disorders 
and personality traits. 
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More research has examined relations between Axis II disorders and normal personality 
variation. Several authors have proposed a Big Four taxonomy (the Big Five minus Openness to 
Experience). Watson, Clark and Chmielewski [2008] proposed that a fifth factor called Oddity is 
needed to model traits related to eccentricity. Others have argued that the Big Five structure 
itself, without modification, can account for Axis II personality disorders (Widiger and Costa Jr. 
[2002]; Widiger, Trull, Clarkin et al. [2002]). For instance, Widiger, Trull, Clarkin et al. [2002] 
suggest that all Axis II personality disorders can be “translated as maladaptively extreme variants 
of the 30 facets” of the NEO-PI-R, a  widely used Big Five personality inventory.  More 
recently, Samuel and Widiger [2008] completed a meta-analytic review of the relationships 
between facets of the NEO-PI-R and Axis II personality disorders which we reproduce in Table 
4.  Notably, personality disorders relate to multiple facets spanning more than one Big Five 
factor. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Table 4 . Independent Weighted Mean Effect Size Correlations  
 
  FFM  facet  Paranoid Schizoid Schizotypal Antisocial Borderline Histrionic Narcissistic Avoidant Dependent  Obsessive 
N Anxiousness  0.27  0.13  0.27 0.00  0.38 0.00 0.02  0.41 0.39 0.16 
 Angry  hostility  0.41  0.19  0.29 0.27 0.48 0.08  0.23 0.29 0.18 0.10 
 Depressiveness  0.35  0.28 0.39 0.12  0.50 − 0.06 0.03  0.53 0.41 0.09 
 Self-consciousness  0.29  0.23 0.32 0.02  0.35 − 0.11  − 0.03  0.56 0.42 0.13 
 Impulsiveness  0.15  0.00  0.17  0.27 0.34 0.17 0.14 0.14  0.17 − 0.07 
 Vulnerability  0.22  0.14  0.25 0.04  0.39 0.01  − 0.01  0.40 0.43 0.03 
E Warmth  − 0.28  − 0.42 − 0.28 − 0.13  − 0.20 0.26  − 0.07  − 0.35 − 0.03  − 0.07 
 Gregariousness  − 0.20  − 0.48 − 0.25 0.02  − 0.12  0.35  0.04  − 0.42 − 0.03  − 0.16 
 Assertiveness  − 0.08  − 0.22 − 0.13 0.06 − 0.09  0.27  0.19  − 0.39 − 0.21 − 0.01 
 Activity  − 0.08  − 0.25 − 0.13 0.02 − 0.10  0.25  0.09  − 0.29 − 0.12  0.03 
 Excitement  seeking  − 0.01  − 0.21  − 0.04  0.25 0.06  0.27  0.16  − 0.23 − 0.06  − 0.12 
 Positive  emotions  − 0.27  − 0.38  − 0.26  − 0.09  − 0.26  0.23  − 0.02  − 0.39  − 0.15  − 0.09 
O Fantasy  0.00  − 0.05  0.14 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.05 − 0.09 
 Aesthetics  − 0.05  − 0.06  0.07  0.00  0.05  0.10  0.04  − 0.03  0.01  0.01 
 Feelings  − 0.02  − 0.17  0.03  − 0.02  0.09  0.18  0.05  − 0.04  0.05  0.01 
 Actions  − 0.10  − 0.13  − 0.06  0.10  − 0.03  0.12 0.04  − 0.20 − 0.13  − 0.12 
 Ideas  − 0.03  0.00  0.09 0.04  − 0.01 0.04 0.07  − 0.05  − 0.12  0.03 
 Values  − 0.05  − 0.05  0.01  0.08  0.05  0.04  − 0.01  − 0.05  − 0.04  − 0.09 
A Trust  − 0.45  − 0.28 − 0.31 − 0.22 − 0.29 0.05  − 0.20 − 0.29 − 0.07  − 0.08 
 Straightforwardness  − 0.24  − 0.09  − 0.16  − 0.37 − 0.21 − 0.10  − 0.31  − 0.06 0.00  0.04 
 Altruism  − 0.21  − 0.19  − 0.15  − 0.24 − 0.18  0.02  − 0.20 − 0.12  0.03  0.04 
 Compliance  − 0.27  − 0.08  − 0.13  − 0.32 − 0.27  − 0.12  − 0.26 − 0.02 0.10  0.01 
 Modesty  − 0.06  0.08 0.05  − 0.17  0.03  − 0.16  − 0.37 0.20 0.16 0.02 
 Tender-mindedness  − 0.18  − 0.11  − 0.05  − 0.19  − 0.09  0.02  − 0.17  − 0.02  0.09 0.00 
C Competence  − 0.13  − 0.13  − 0.18  − 0.21 − 0.29 − 0.01 0.01  − 0.23 − 0.25 0.19 
 Order  0.00  − 0.02  − 0.06  − 0.18  − 0.10  − 0.05  − 0.03  − 0.03  − 0.06  0.25
 Dutifulness  − 0.10  − 0.08  − 0.10  − 0.29 − 0.22  − 0.08  − 0.10  − 0.09  − 0.08  0.25
 Achievement  striving  − 0.07  − 0.13  − 0.13  − 0.19  − 0.19  0.04 0.02  − 0.19  − 0.16  0.25
 Self-discipline  − 0.14  − 0.12  − 0.18  − 0.25 − 0.29 − 0.04  − 0.09  − 0.22 − 0.23 0.21
 Deliberation  − 0.09  − 0.02  − 0.10  − 0.38 − 0.27 − 0.16  − 0.13  − 0.01  − 0.06  0.24
Note: All values larger than r = 0.04 are significant at p < 0.05; correlations larger than 0.20 are marked in boldface type. Underlined values indicate those for 
which the assumption of homogeneity of variances was rejected.  Source:  Reproduced from Samuel and Widiger [2008]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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5.E.  IQ and Achievement Test Scores Reflect Incentives and Capture Both Cognitive and 
Personality Traits 
We now elaborate on the discussion of Section 3 on the difficulty of isolating a pure measure of 
intelligence.  Performance on intelligence and achievement tests depends in part on personality 
traits of the test taker, as well as their motivation to perform.
149  A smart child unable to sit still 
during an exam or uninterested in exerting much effort can produce spuriously low scores on an 
IQ test. 
It is sometimes claimed that IQ tests measure maximal performance, i.e. that IQ scores 
reflect the application of the maximal capacity of the person to the test.
150  The analysis of 
Section 3 suggests that IQ scores should be standardized for effort.  A series of studies conducted 
over the past 40 years support this concern. 
These studies show that among individuals with low IQ scores, performance on IQ tests 
could be increased up to a full standard deviation by offering incentives such as money or candy, 
particularly on group-administered tests and particularly with individuals at the low-end of the 
IQ spectrum.
151  Engaging in complex thinking is effortful, not automatic (Schmeichel, Vohs and 
Baumeister [2003]), and therefore motivation to exert effort affects performance. Zigler and 
Butterfield [1968] found that early intervention (nursery school, for example) for low-SES kids 
may have a beneficial effect on motivation, not on cognitive ability per se. In their study, the 
benefits of intervention (in comparison to a no-treatment control group) on IQ were not apparent 
under testing conditions where motivation to perform well was maximal. Raver and Zigler 
                                                 
149 It is likely that performance on personality tests can also depend on cognitive ability, but that is less well 
documented.  For example, it is likely that more intelligent people can ascertain the rewards to performance on a 
personality inventory test.  Motivation is sometimes, but not usually, counted as a personality trait. 
150 A leading psychometrician, Carroll [1993], does not accept the notion that IQ captures maximal effort. 
151 The incentives for invoking effort vary across studies.   Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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[1997] present further evidence on this point.  Table 5 summarizes evidence that extrinsic 




                                                 
152 The studies do not include direct measures of personality traits. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Table 5.  Incentives and Performance on Intelligence Tests 











study. 11 matched 
pairs of low SES 
children; children 
were about one 
standard deviation 
below average in 
IQ at baseline  
M&M candies 
given for each 
right answer 
Experimental group 
scored 12 points higher 
than control group 
during a second testing 
on an alternative form of 
the Stanford Binet 
(about 0.8 standard 
deviations). 
“…a carefully chosen 
consequence, candy, given 
contingent on each occurrence 
of correct responses to an IQ 
test, can result in a 







study. 12 mentally 
retarded children 
(avg IQ 46.8) 
Tokens given in 
experimental 




6.25 points out of a 
possible 51 points on 
Metropolitan Readiness 
Test. t = 4.03 
“…test scores often reflect 
poor academic skills, but they 
may also reflect lack of 
motivation to do well in the 
criterion test…These results, 
obtained from both a 
population typically limited in 
skills and ability as well as 
from a group of normal 
children (Experiment II), 
demonstrate that the use of 
reinforcement procedures 
applied to a behavior that is 
tacitly regarded as “at its 
peak” can significantly alter 
the level of performance of 






study 34 urban 
fourth graders (avg 
IQ = 92.8) 
Tokens given in 
experimental 










study of 12 
matched pairs of 
mentally retarded 
children 





scored 3.67 points out of 
possible 51 points on a 
post-test given under 
standard conditions 
higher than at baseline; 
control group dropped 
2.75 points. On a second 
post-test with incentives, 
exp and control groups 













reward, or no 
reward conditions. 
M&Ms given for 







Only among low-IQ 
(<100) subjects was 
there an effect of the 
incentive. Contingent 
reward group scored 
about 0.33 standard 
deviations higher on the 
Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary test than did 
no reward group.  
“…contingent candy increased 
the I.Q. scores of only the 
‘low I.Q.’ children. This result 
suggests that the high and 
medium I.Q. groups were 
already functioning at a higher 
motivational level than 
children in the low I.Q. 
group.” (p. 22) 
  Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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(Table 5. Incentives and Performance on Intelligence Tests Continued …) 












study of 52 low 
SES children who 
did or did not 
attend nursery 
school were tested 
at the beginning 
and end of the 
year on Stanford-
Binet Intelligence 









easier items after 
items were missed, 
and so on. 
At baseline (in the fall), 
there was a full standard 
deviation difference (10.6 
points and SD was about 
9.5 in this sample) 
between scores of children 
in the optimized vs 
standardconditions The 
nursery group improved 
their scores, but only in 
the standard condition. 
“…performance on an 
intelligence test is best 
conceptualized as reflecting 
three distinct factors: (a) 
formal cognitive processes; 
(b) informational 
achievements which reflect 
the content rather than the 
formal properties of 
cognition, and (c) 
motivational factors which 
involve a wide range of 
personality variables. (p. 2) 
“…the significant difference 
in improvement in standard 
IQ performance found 
between the nursery and 
non-nursery groups was 
attributable solely to 







study of 485 
special education 
high school 
students all took 
IQ tests, then were 
randomly assigned 
to control or 
incentive groups 




Incentives such as 
record albums, 
radios (<$25) given 
for improvement in 
test performance  
Scores increased by about 
17 points. Results were 
consistent across the Otis-












“In summary, the promise 
of individualized incentives 
contingent on an increase in 
IQ test performance (as 
compared with pretest 
performance) resulted in an 
approximate 17-point 
increase in IQ test scores. 
These increases were 
equally spread across 
subtests… The incentive 
condition effects were much 
less pronounced for students 
having pretest IQs between 
98 and 120 and did not 
occur for students having 
pretest IQs between 121 and 
140.” (p. 225) 
  Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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(Table 5. Incentives and Performance on Intelligence Tests Continued …) 












study of 80 
delinquent boys 
randomly 
assigned to three 
experimental 
groups and one 
control group. 

















1.06 standard deviation 
difference between the 
token reinforcement and 
control groups (inferred 
from t= 3.31 for 39 degrees 
of freedom) 
“Knowledge of results does 
not appear to be a 
sufficient incentive to 




rewards or response cost 
may be more effective with 
below-average I.Q. 
subjects while other 
conditions may be more 



















“While both groups 
improved with practice, the 
incentive group improved 
slightly more.” (p.34)  
(1,93) 2.76, .05 Fp   
2 reasons why incentive 
did not produce dramatic 
increase: 1) few or no 
unmotivated subjects 
among college volunteers, 
2) information processing 
tasks are too simple for 











test during their 
freshman year, 
then again 2 years 






followed for the 
WASI brief test. 
Performance was 
expected to be 
higher because of 
the one-on-one 
environment. 
Performance on the WASI 
as juniors was about 16 
points higher than on the 
group-administered test as 
freshmen. Notably, on the 
WASI, this population looks 
almost “average” in IQ, 
whereas by Otis-Lennon 
standards they are low IQ. 
t(60) = 10.67, p < 0.001 
The increase in IQ scores 
could be attributed to any 
combination of the 
following 1) an increase in 
“g” due to schooling at an 
intensive charter school, 2) 
an increase in knowledge 
or crystallized intelligence, 
3) an increase in 
motivation due to the 
change in IQ test format, 
and/or 4) an increase in 
motivation due to 




  Segal [2008] shows that introducing performance-based cash incentives in a low-stakes 
administration of the coding speed test of the Armed Services Vocational Battery (ASVAB) 
increases performance substantially among roughly one-third of participants.  Men with lower 
levels of Conscientiousness are particularly affected by incentives.  Segal’s work and a large 
body of related work emphasize heterogeneity in the motivations that affect human performance.  Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Borghans, Meijers and ter Weel [2008] show that adults spend substantially more time answering 
IQ questions when rewards are higher, but subjects high in Emotional Stability and 
Conscientiousness are less affected by these incentives.  They already operate at a high level 
even without these incentives.  Similarly, Pailing and Segalowitz [2004] find that an event-
related potential (ERP) indexing the emotional response to making an error increases in 
amplitude when incentives are offered for superior test performance.
 153  This effect is smaller for 
individuals high in Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability. Thus, IQ scores do not accurately 
reflect maximal intellectual performance for individuals who are low in Conscientiousness and 
Emotional Stability.  Performance on IQ tests encodes, in part, how effective persons may be in 
application of their intelligence, that is, how people are likely to perform in a real-world setting.  
However, it is far from obvious that motivation on an exam and motivation in a real-world 
situation are the same. 
Like low motivation, test anxiety can significantly impair performance (Hembree 
[1988]). That is, subjects do worse when they worry excessively about how they are performing 
and when their autonomic nervous system over-reacts by increasing perspiration, heart rate, and 
so on. Because individuals who are higher in Big Five Neuroticism are more likely to experience 
test anxiety, there is another reason, beyond incentives, why Emotional Stability can impact IQ 
scores (Moutafi, Furnham and Tsaousis [2006]).   
Many IQ tests require factual knowledge acquired through schooling and life experience, 
which are, in part, determined by the motivation, curiosity, and persistence of the test taker.  
Thus, personality traits can also affect IQ scores indirectly through the knowledge acquired by 
individuals who are higher in Big Five Openness to Experience and Big Five Conscientiousness. 
                                                 
153 An ERP is an electrophysiological response of characteristic form and timing to a particular category of stimuli. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Cunha and Heckman [2008] show a correlation between cognitive and personality factors of the 
order of  0.3 r  .  Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004], and Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua 
[2006] show how schooling and other acquired traits substantially causally affect measured 
cognitive and personality test scores. We discuss this research in Section 8.  Cattell’s investment 
theory [1971] anticipates recent findings that knowledge and specific complex skills depend not 
only on fluid intelligence but also on the cumulative investment of effort and exposure to 
learning opportunities. 
How, then, should one interpret a low IQ score? Collectively, the evidence surveyed here 
suggests that IQ test performance reflects not only pure intelligence, but also personality traits 
(including anxiety), intrinsic motivation, and reactions to extrinsic incentives to perform well, as 
indicated in our discussion of Section 3.  It also reflects the knowledge acquired up to the date of 
the test, which reflects personality and motivational traits that affect the acquisition of 
knowledge.  The relative impurity of IQ tests likely varies from test to test and individual to 
individual.  Little effort to date has been made to standardize the context and incentives of tests.  
To capture pure intelligence, it is necessary to adjust for incentives, motivations, and context in 
which the measurements are taken, using the framework discussed in Section 3.  
Just as personality traits and incentives can affect IQ scores, they can also affect 
standardized achievement tests that are commonly used as proxies for pure intelligence.  Figure 5 
and Figure 6, below, show how scores on two achievement tests, the Armed Forces Qualifying 
Test (AFQT) and the Differential Aptitudes Test (DAT), are decomposed into IQ and personality 
measures.
154  We adjust by Rotter and Rosenberg in Figure 5 and by the Big Five in Figure 6.
155  
                                                 
154 AFQT and DAT scores are highly correlated ( 0.76 r  ).  See Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2010], 
Kilburn, Hanser and Klerman [1998], Sticht [1995], and Wang [1993].   
155 The Big Five are not available in the NLSY79 data that have AFQT scores. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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A substantial portion of the variance in both the AFQT score and DAT scores is explained by 
personality factors.
156 The variance explained is less than the variance independently explained 
by IQ scores, but it is still substantial.  Furthermore, the facets are incrementally valid in that 
they explain the variance above and beyond the variance that IQ explains when all three are 
included in a regression. These findings caution the interpretation that these commonly used tests 
proxy mental ability.  They likely proxy aspects of personality as well.  Ironically, the measure 
of intelligence used by Herrnstein and Murray in The Bell Curve to predict a variety of social and 
economic outcomes is substantially affected by personality measures.  We discuss evidence 
about personality and standardized achievement tests further in Section 7. 
 
  
                                                 
156 The lower explained variance in the sample with DAT is likely a consequence of restriction on range.  The DAT 
data come from a single school, whereas the AFQT data come from a national sample. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Figure 5. AFQT Decomposed by IQ, Rosenberg, and Rotter 
 (A) Not Controlling for Background Characteristics 
 
(B) Controlling for Background Characteristics 
 
Notes: The data come from the NLSY79. Rotter was administered 1979. The ASVAB and Rosenberg were 
administered in 1980.To account for varying levels of schooling at the time of the test, scores have been adjusted 
for schooling at the time of the test conditional on final schooling using the method developed in Hansen, Heckman 
and Mullen [2004]. AFQT is constructed from the Arithmetic Reasoning, Word Knowledge, Mathematical 
Knowledge, and Paragraph Comprehension ASVAB subtests.  IQ, and GPA are from high school transcript data. IQ 
is pooled across several IQ tests using IQ percentiles. GPA is the individual's core-subject GPA from 9th grade. 
Sample excludes the military over-sample. Background variables include race and sex dummies, mother's 
highest grade completed, father's highest grade completed, southern residence at age 14, urban residence at age 14, 
living in a broken home at age 14, receiving newspapers in the household at age 14, receiving magazines in the 
household at age 14, and the household having a library card at age 14. Top 50% and Bottom 50% are based on 
AFQT scores from the cross-sectional sample of the NLSY79. Sample restricted to the non-military sub sample.  
Source: Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2010]. 
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Figure 6. DAT Scores and GPA Decomposed by IQ and Personality 
 
 
Notes: Data is from Stella Maris, a high school in the Netherlands. Students were administered part of a Raven's IQ 
test and personality questions based on the Big 5. DAT and GPA are from high school records. 
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5.F.  The Evidence on the Situational Specificity Hypothesis 
Since the publication of Mischel’s [1968] book, psychologists have addressed the situational 
specificity hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis that situations help explain variations across people in 
actions, effort and behavior.
157  Boiled down to its essence, this hypothesis says little more than 
that situations affect actions and efforts in a nonlinear fashion, i.e., that in equations (13)-(15), 
situational variables enter in a nonlinear fashion.  This interaction effect gives rise to the 
Mischel-Shoda [1995] “if-then” relationship.   
An important paper by Epstein [1979] defines stability of personality generated by traits 
across situations using measurements that average across tasks.  He notes that in the presence of 
nonlinearities, agents with the same traits will take different actions in different situations.  In 
four different studies, he presents compelling empirical evidence that, averaging over tasks and 
situations at a point in time, persons act in a predictable fashion with a high level of reliability     
(
2 R  of 0.6-0.8) of average behavior (“measured personality”) across situations.  He uses a 
variety of measures based on objective behavior, self ratings, and ratings by others.  He also 
establishes consistency (high levels of correlation) across the different types of measures.  In any 
given situation, personality may not play a particularly powerful role but averaging over many 
situations, stable patterns emerge.  Fleeson [2001] and Moskowitz [1982] present additional 
evidence on this question.  Fleeson and Noftle [2008] summarize a substantial body of evidence 
on the stability of behaviors across tasks and situations, and the evidence of consistency of 
different measurements of personality (e.g., self reports, observer reports). 
In one of the most ambitious recent studies of this question, Borkenau, Mauer, Riemann 
et al. [2004] establish a correlation of 0.43 of personality traits measured by the Big Five (self 
                                                 
157 For an early symposium in psychology on the person-situation debate, see Endler and Magnusson [1976].   Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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rated and observer rated) across 15 very different tasks.  The range of correlations is from 0.29 to 
0.51.
158  Wood and Roberts [2006] present further evidence on the persistence of traits across a 
variety of situations.  Roberts [2009] provides a valuable overview of the latest research.  Funder 
[2008] provides another useful overview of the debate and the evidence on the existence of a 
stable personality trait that at a point in time predicts behavior in a variety of different situations.  
Mischel’s [1968] claim that there is no stable personality trait across situations does not hold up 
against a large array of data. 
A recent summary of the evidence on the person-situation debate is provided in a series 
of papers in the Journal of Research in Personality [January, 2009, Vol. 43] that offer a 
retrospective on the controversy.  Virtually all papers in that special issue acknowledge the 
existence of stable personality traits whose manifestations are tempered by situations and 
incentives.  The editors summarize the main message of the collected papers with the following 
words: 
“All personality psychologists should be unified when it comes to asserting that 
personality differences are worthy of scientific study, that individual differences 
are more than just error variance and that not all behavior is simply a function of 
the situation” – Lucas and Donnellan [2009, p. 147] 
  
                                                 
158 Achenbach, McConaughy and Howell [1987] summarize correlations between children’s problem behavior 
ratings by parents and teachers.  Their meta-analysis produces an estimate of  0.28 r   and suggests consistency and 
variation in behavior and assessment across home and school situations.  Whether this arises from parental bias or 
from situational specificity is not clear. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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6.  Personality and Preference Parameters 
Measures of personality predict a wide range of life outcomes that economists study. However, 
with our current knowledge, it is difficult to relate them to economic preference parameters 
except, of course, when the traits are the parameters.  Since personality psychologists define 
traits as “relatively” stable, person-specific determinants of behavior, preferences are the natural 
counterpart of these traits in economics.  Preferences are unaffected by changes in constraints. 
While personality might relate to preferences, the exact link is unclear.  Do preferences generate 
measured personality? Does personality generate preferences? Or are both generated from other, 
deeper, parameters that are as yet unknown? The model in Section 3 links preferences to 
measured personality. This section reviews the empirical evidence linking preferences and 
personality and discusses the conceptual differences between the two. 
  Overall, the links between measures of personality and preferences are largely 
unexplored. However, some evidence suggests that social preferences can be linked to the Big 
Five. The link between traditional preferences, such as risk aversion and time discounting, and 
personality, remain largely unknown. Personality measures might allow economists to broaden 
the dimensions of preferences and could potentially resolve some apparent inconsistencies in 
observed choices that arise from commonly used preference specifications in economics. 
6.A.  Evidence on Preference Parameters and Corresponding Personality Measures 
The features of preferences that receive the most attention in the economics literature—time 
discounting, risk aversion, leisure preference, and social preferences
159—appear to have 
analogues in the literature in psychology.  Table 6 presents the definitions of commonly used 
preferences, some tasks and survey questions that have been used to measure them, and an 
                                                 
159 For a definition of these concepts, and a discussion of measurement of preferences, see the appendix. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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overview of how they relate to measures of personality. The table includes measures as well as 
latent factors (see Section 4).  
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Table 6. Measures of Standard Preference Parameters and Analogous Measures in the Psychology Literature 
Preference  Survey Questions and Experiments used to Elicit Preference  Overview of Relationship to Personality Measures 
Time Preference – 
Preference over 
consumption in 
different time periods 
Delay Discounting:  A participant is given a series of choices for whether he would 
prefer to receive smaller payments sooner versus a larger payments later. The amounts 
and times vary across choices. The choices can be over hypothetical payoffs or real-
stakes payoffs. (see e.g. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2011]) 
 
Marshmallow Task: A participant (usually a child) is given a marshmallow. The 
experimenter leaves the room and tells the participant that he will receive a second 
marshmallow if he resists consuming the marshmallow until the experimenter returns. 
The length of time that the participant waits is a measure of short-term discounting. 
(see, e.g. Mischel, Ayduk, Berman et al. [2010])  
 
Example Survey Question: "How patient are you on a scale from 1 to 10?" (see 
GSOEP, 2008) 
Conceptual Relationships: Conscientiousness, Self-
Control, Affective Mindfulness, Consideration of Future 




Conscientiousness, Self-Control, Affective Mindfulness, 
Elaboration of Consequences, Consideration of Future 
Consequences (Daly, Delaney and Harmon [2009])  
 
Extraversion, Time Preference (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et 
al. [2010]) 
 
Agreeableness, Inhibitive Side of Conscientiousness 
(Anderson, Burks, DeYoung et al. [2011]) 
Risk Aversion – 
Preference over 
different states of the 
world  
Lottery Choice Task: A participant is given a series of choices between a safe amount 
of money and a lottery. The lottery remains the same across choices, whereas the safe 
amount varies. The lowest safe amount for which the participant prefers the lottery is a 
measure of risk aversion. The choices can be over hypothetical payoffs or real-stakes 
payoffs. (see, e.g. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2011]) 
 
Devil's Task (Slovic's Risk Task): A participant sequentially chooses between ten 
"switches" or urns associated with hidden payoffs. The participant is told that nine of 
the switches are associated with a reward and one of them results in a loss of all 
previous winnings. Once a participant chooses a switch, he cannot flip the same switch 
again. The participant can elect to stop picking switches at any time.  The number of 
switches chosen is a measure of risk aversion. (see, e.g Slovic [1966]) 
 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART): The participant is given a computerized task in 
which he is presented with a series of "balloons" that  can be inflated by "pumping" the 
balloon. The participant receives potential earnings each time he pumps a balloon. At 
any point, the participant can stop pumping, realize the potential earnings, and move to 
the next balloon. After a threshold number of pumps each balloon "explodes," and the 
participant receives nothing. The threshold varies across balloons, and participants are 
not told the distribution of thresholds.  (see, e.g. Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky et al. 
[2003]) 
 
Example Survey Question: "How willing are you to take risks, in general?" (see, e.g. 
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2011]) 
Conceptual Relationships: Impulsive Sensation Seeking, 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
 
Empirical Relationships: 
Sensation Seeking (Zuckerman [1994]; Eckel and 
Grossman [2002]) 
 
Openness (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010]) 
 
Neuroticism, Ambition, Agreeableness (Borghans, 
Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2009]) 
 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky et 
al. [2003]) 
 
Neuroticism, Inhibitive Side of Conscientiousness 
(Anderson, Burks, DeYoung et al. [2011]) 
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(Table 6. Measures of Standard Preference Parameters and Analogous Measures in the Psychology Literature Continued…) 
Preference  Survey Questions and Experiments used to Elicit Preference Overview of Relationship to Personality Measures 
Leisure – Preference 
over consumption and 
leisure 
Payments for Working: The participant is given a choice to work at different wages. 
Their reservation wage is their preference for leisure. The choices can be over 
hypothetical payoffs or real-stakes payoffs. (see, e.g. Borghans, Meijers and ter Weel 
[2008])  
Conceptual Relationships: Achievement Striving, 
Endurance, Industriousness  
 
Empirical Relationships:  
Inconsistent with psychological measures of leisure 





Value of equality in 
payoffs 
    
Dictator Game: A "proposer" has the option to transfer part of an endowment to a 
"responder." The responder passively receives any transfer. The transfer is used as a 
measure of pure altruism. (see, e.g. Fehr and Schmidt [2006]) 
 
Conceptual Relationships: Warmth, Gregariousness, 
Tender-Mindedness, Hostility (opposite) 
 
Empirical Relationships: 
Neuroticism, Agreeableness (Ashton, Paunonen, Helmes et 
al. [1998]; Osiński [2009]; Bekkers [2006]; Ben-Ner and 
Kramer [2011]) 





Trust Game: An "investor" receives an endowment and can decide to transfer some of 
it to a "trustee." The amount transferred increases in value. The trustee can then decide 
to transfer some back to the investor but has no monetary incentive to do so. The 
amount the investor transfers to the trustee is used a measure of trust. (see, e.g. Fehr 
and Schmidt [2006]) 
 
Example Survey Question: "In general, one can trust  people" (see, e.g. Dohmen, Falk, 
Huffman et al. [2008]) 
Conceptual Relationships: Trust 
 
Empirical Relationships: 
Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Openness, Conscientiousness 
(Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2008]) 
  Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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(Table 6. Measures of Standard Preference Parameters and Analogous Measures in the Psychology Literature Continued…) 
Preference  Survey Questions and Experiments used to Elicit Preference Overview of Relationship to Personality Measures 
Reciprocity – The way 
in which one person 
responds to another's 
actions 
 
Positive Reciprocity – 
Tendency to reward 
kind actions  
 
Negative Reciprocity – 
Tendency to punish 
others for unkind 
actions 
Ultimatum Game: A "proposer" offers part of an endowment to a "responder." The 
responder can choose to accept the offer in which case both players keep the payoffs, 
or the responder can choose to reject the offer in which case the players receive 
nothing. The responder's choice is a measure of reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt [2006]) 
 
Trust Game: See above description. The trustee's action is used as a measure of 
reciprocity. 
 
Gift Exchange Game: An "employer" proposes a wage and an amount of desired effort 
to a potential "worker." The worker can either reject the proposal so that no one 
receives anything or can accept the proposal and choose any amount of effort. The 
employer receives a payment proportional to the worker's effort net of the wage.  The 
workers action is used as a measure of reciprocity. (see, e.g. Fehr and Schmidt [2006]) 
 
Example Survey Question (Positive Reciprocity): "If someone does me a favor, I am 
prepared to return it." (see, e.g. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2008]) 
 
Example Survey Question (Negative Reciprocity): "If I suffer a serious wrong, I will 
take revenge as soon as possible, no matter the cost." (see, e.g. Dohmen, Falk, 
Huffman et al. [2008]) 




Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness (Dohmen, 
Falk, Huffman et al. [2008]) Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Since the 1960s, psychologists have used experiments to elicit time preference and risk 
preference here, see, e.g., Mischel, Ayduk, Berman et al. [2010] and Slovic [1962]. A recent 
example is the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Lejuez, Read, Kahler et al. [2002]), a 
computer game in which participants make repeated choices between keeping a certain smaller 
monetary reward and taking a chance on an incrementally larger reward. In addition to the 
experimental measures, it is tempting to try to map preferences to more vaguely defined traits, 
but the precise mapping has not yet been made.  Still, some speculation is useful.  Time 
preference likely relates to Conscientiousness, Self-control, and Consideration of Future 
Consequences. Risk Aversion is likely related to Openness to Experience and impulsive 
sensation seeking, a trait proposed by Zuckerman, Kolin, Price et al. [1964], defined as “the 
tendency to seek novel, varied, complex, and intense sensations and experiences and the 
willingness to take risks for the sake of such experience.”
161  
Preferences for leisure may be related to several personality measures. The Big Five 
includes an Achievement Striving subscale of Conscientiousness, which describes ambition, the 
capacity for hard work, and an inclination toward purposeful behavior. Jackson’s Personality 
Research Form [1974] includes an achievement scale measuring the aspiration to accomplish 
difficult tasks and to put forth effort to attain excellence, as well as an endurance scale, 
measuring willingness to work long hours and perseverance in the face of difficulty, and a play 
scale, measuring the inclination to participate in games, sports, and social activities “just for 
fun.” Industriousness has been proposed as one of six facets of Conscientiousness (Roberts, 
Chernyshenko, Stark et al. [2005]) and is plausibly related to the preference for leisure.   
                                                 
161 See Zuckerman [1994]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Social preferences also have conceptual analogues in the personality literature. Warmth 
and Gregariousness are facets of Extraversion; Trust, Altruism, and Tender-Mindedness are 
facets of Agreeableness; and Hostility is a facet of Neuroticism. 
  Despite this intuitive mapping of preferences to traits, the empirical evidence supporting 
such mappings is weak.  The few studies investigating empirical links typically report only 
simple regressions or correlations without discussing any underlying model. Some use survey 
and self-report measures similar to those used by psychologists rather than elicited preferences. 
The last column of Table 6 gives an overview of papers investigating the links. 
The evidence relating personality to time preferences is mixed. Using data from an 
experiment involving college students, Daly, Delaney and Harmon [2009] find that a factor that 
loads heavily on self-control, consideration of future consequences, elaboration of consequences, 
affective mindfulness, and Conscientiousness, is negatively associated with the discount rate. 
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010] measure time preferences experimentally, and while time 
preference is related to cognition, Openness to Experience is the only Big Five trait that explains 
any variation in time preference. Figure 7 reports correlations between experimental measures of 
time preference, Big Five factors and measures of cognition. Here only cognitive measures are 
correlated with time preference.
162    
  
                                                 
162 Figure A2 in Section A6 of the Web Appendix display correlations among the survey measures in the GSOEP. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Figure 7. Pairwise Correlations between Time Preference (Impatience), Risk Tolerance, 
Personality, and Cognitive Ability for Males and Females from GSOEP 
Time 
Preference 


























































































Notes:  *statistically significant at the10 percent level; **statistically significant at the 5 percent level; 
***statistically. O-Openness to Experience; C-Conscientiousness; E-Extraversion; A-Agreeableness; N-
Neuroticism.  The value in each box is the pairwise correlation. Darker shaded boxes have lower p-values.  The 
measures of the Big Five are based on 3 questions each.  The measures of cognitive ability (symbol test and word 
test) are based on timed modules similar to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). Time preference and risk 
tolerance were elicited through a real-stakes experiment. 
Source: The data come from Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010], available online. The calculations were 
conducted by the authors of this Handbook chapter. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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 Figure 8 displays a related analysis by Anderson, Burks, DeYoung et al. [2011], who 
find that both cognitive ability and Agreeableness are positively associated with delay 




Figure 8. Pairwise Correlations between Risk Acceptance, Delay Acceptance, Cognitive Ability, 
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Notes:  *statistically significant at the10 percent level; **statistically significant at the 5 percent level; 
***statistically. C-Conscientiousness; E-Extraversion; A-Agreeableness; N-Neuroticism.  The value in each box is 
the pairwise correlation. Darker shaded boxes have lower p-values. Delay Acceptance and Risk Acceptance for 
Gains and Losses come from real-stakes experiments. Cognitive Skill is the first factor from a Raven's Progressive 
Matrix test, a numeracy test, and the Hit 15. The facets of the Big Five were constructed from the Multidimensional 
Personality Questionnaire. The sample consists of 1,065 trainee truck drivers in the U.S.  
Source: Adapted from Anderson, Burks, DeYoung et al. [2011]. 
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When they separately regress delay acceptance on Neuroticism, Agreeableness, 
Extraversion, Conscientiousness , cognitive skill, race, marital status, age, and education, none of 
the personality traits are statistically significant at the 10% level. However, when they split 
Conscientiousness into an inhibitive side (moral scrupulousness and cautiousness) and a 
proactive side (the need for achievement), they find that the inhibitive side is positively 
associated with delay acceptance ( 0.13, 0.10) p    . This result highlights the importance of 
examining facets of the Big Five when considering the relationship between preferences and 
personality.  
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010] find that Openness to Experience and 
Agreeableness are related to risk aversion. Figure 7 reports correlations between risk aversion, 
Big Five and measures of cognition for a sample of Germans. Of the Big Five, Openness to 
Experience and Agreeableness are correlated with risk aversion. There is little evidence 
connecting risk aversion and sensation seeking, but Eckel and Grossman [2002] include it as a 
control in a study of risk aversion and find no statistically significant effect. However, Bibby and 
Ferguson [2011] find that sensation seeking is associated with a lottery measure of risk 
tolerance.
166 They also find that people who are better at processing emotional information and 
who are less extraverted are more susceptible to framing effects when making risky decisions.  
Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2009] show that risk-aversion is positively associated with 
Neuroticism, which contains measures of fear and strong emotional responses to bad outcomes. 
They also find that risk aversion is negatively associated with ambition, a trait which may 
involve investment in uncertain opportunities. Further, Agreeableness is positively associated 
with risk aversion. As shown in Figure 8, Anderson, Burks, DeYoung et al. [2011] find that of 
                                                 
166 Bibby and Ferguson report this as a measure of loss aversion, but it is more akin to a measure of risk tolerance. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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the Big Five, only Neuroticism is positively associated with risk aversion but only for lotteries 
over gains not losses. In separate a regression controlling for cognitive skill, Neuroticism, 
Agreeableness, Extraversion,  Conscientiousness , cognitive skill, race, marital status, age, and 
education , risk aversion is positively associated with both Neuroticism ( 0.15, 0.01) p    and 
the inhibitive side of Conscientiousness ( 0.10, 0.10) p    .   
The links between social preferences and the Big Five traits are better established. The 
links between social preferences and the Big Five traits is better established. Ben-Ner and 
Kramer [2011]find that Extraversion is associated with higher giving in a dictator game. 
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2008] use an experimentally validated survey measure of trust 
and find that Conscientiousness and  Neuroticism are negatively associated with trust, whereas 
Agreeableness and Openness to Experiences are positively associated with trust. Agreeableness 
and Conscientiousness are associated with more positive reciprocity and less negative 
reciprocity, whereas Neuroticism is associated with more negative reciprocity.  
In sum, while many measures of personality and preferences seem conceptually related, 
the empirical associations are not uniform across studies, and often the measures of preference 
are uncorrelated with intuitively similar personality traits. Nevertheless, in several studies 
Neuroticism is associated with risk aversion and facets of Conscientiousness are associated with 
delay acceptance. Some evidence suggests that considering facets of the Big Five might help 
establish a mapping between personality and preferences. However, the empirical links between 
preference parameters and personality traits depend on the data used.   
 
6.B.  Mapping Preferences into Personality 
Despite some plausible empirical and conceptual links between preferences and traits, a precise 
mapping between the measures is not yet available. In Section 3, we argued that measured Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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personality is generated by underlying preference parameters and constraints. However, the 
preferences measured by economists are often chosen to ensure identification on particular types 
of data on choices and may be misspecified. Further, studies documenting relationships between 
preferences and traits typically only study correlations without being motivated by an underlying 
model.  Hence causal claims are, at this stage, largely premature. There are two main reasons for 
the disconnection between measures of personality and measures of preferences. 
First, economists typically study marginal rates of substitution, measured over relevant 
ranges via observed choices. Personality psychologists typically do not study these tradeoffs and 
often do not measure choices. Most approaches to measuring preferences in economics, whether 
observational or experimental, use some variation of revealed preference given observed choices. 
In contrast, psychologists typically use surveys to elicit preferences, information, or "typical" 
actions.  Some questions elicit how respondents would feel about a given outcome, without 
presenting an alternative outcome. While such questions may elicit some (unspecified) feature of 
preferences, it is not clear what is being measured. The difference in approach makes it 
intrinsically difficult to compare economic and psychological measures.  
Second, traditional preference parameters may not span the entire space of human 
decisions measured by psychologists.  Time, risk, social, and leisure preferences do not capture 
the only tradeoffs in life.  While time preference, risk aversion, leisure preference, and social 
preference have analogues in psychology, many personality psychologists do not perceive self-
control and delay of gratification, risk-taking behavior and sensation-seeking, and motivation 
and ambition as the most important aspects of human decision making. 
Economists typically make strong simplifying assumptions to make their models tractable 
and to secure identification. The estimated parameters are used to build models, evaluate policy, Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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and create counterfactuals.  The most widely used specifications of tradeoffs are through 
parameterizations assuming separability, and assume that marginal rates of substitution are 
summarized by one or two parameters. Personality psychologists do not have the same incentives 
as economists to describe behavior by simple specifications as they are often content to stop with 
rich descriptions and do not use their estimated relationships in subsequent policy analyses.  
Thus, they allow for a more complex range of behaviors.  The choice of measured traits is large 
and often defies a simple, tractable, explanation.  As discussed in the previous sections, to 
economists these often appear to be arbitrary.  
6.C.  Do Measured Parameters Predict Real World Behavior? 
One test of the stability of measured preferences is whether they predict behavior in other 
contexts. Several recent studies have investigated whether risk preference predict behavior. For 
example, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2011], use an experimentally validated measure of risk 
preference in the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and find that it predicts self-reported 
risky behaviors, such as holding stocks, being self-employed, participating in sports, and 
smoking, but it does not predict as well as a survey question about ‘willingness to take risks in 
general.’ However, the observed relationship might  arise because both the self-reported 
behaviors and questions about willingness to take risk are noisy contemporaneous survey 
measures.  Barsky, Juster, Kimball et al. [1997] measure risk tolerance, time preference, and the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and find that risk tolerance predicts smoking and drinking, 
holding insurance and stock, and decisions to immigrate and be self-employed. However, 
measures of risk tolerance only explain a small fraction of the variation in risky behaviors. 
Benz and Meier [2008] compare measures of social preferences with charitable giving in 
a field experiment and find that experimental measures do not predict real life behavior well. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Levitt and List [2007] and List [2009] discuss the more general discrepancy between results from 
the lab and the field and argue that this is not necessarily because people behave inconsistently, 
but because experimenters are not controlling for relevant aspects of the choice situation.  This is 
just a rehash of the old person-situation debate.  Falk and Heckman [2009] present a different 
interpretation of the value of experiments.  We discuss the evidence below. 
6.D.  Integrating Traits into Economic Models 
Behavioral economics has incorporated some aspects of personality psychology to investigate 
how standard models of preferences can be improved to better reflect reality. Behavioral 
economics has highlighted many so-called anomalies, ways in which standard preferences do not 
accurately describe human behavior. We can divide these attempts into two main approaches.  
First, behavioral economists have tried to improve models of behavior by developing 
more flexible functional forms for preferences. Below we discuss some of the now standard 
examples, such as loss aversion, hyperbolic discounting, and reciprocity. These are not 
anomalies with respect to rationality, but are examples that challenge standard models of 
preferences. For example, the time inconsistent actions induced by hyperbolic discounting 
(defined below), are often described as "errors", but they are not. The agent is simply optimizing 
non-standard preferences. 
Second, behavioral economists have introduced the concept of bounded rationality. These 
are behaviors for which there is no reasonable preference specification that can rationalize a 
behavior. They are called anomalies or biases relative to conventional economic choice 
frameworks. Examples include failure to predict the winner's curse, mental accounting, framing 
effects, failure to apply Bayesian updating, and default effects. We think of these as mental 
constraints, or traits, along the lines of the models discussed in Section 3. However, these Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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examples are consistent with evidence reviewed below on the interaction between cognitive 
ability and preference parameters. 
Note that while some of the nonstandard features of preferences may seem compelling, 
the higher level of generality tends to make it difficult to identify the parameters in the data 
commonly used by economists.  See the discussion in Hansen [2005].  
6.D.1.  Traits as Constraints 
Preference measurements that do not account for all of the constraints that agents face might be 
biased. In the model of personality in Section 3, we describe how agents act based on both 
preference parameters and productive traits that embody constraints.  The marginal rate of 
substitution is typically identified through price variation.  However, the true price ratio might 
also depend partly on the unobserved traits of the individual.  Failure to account for the traits that 
reflect constraints could lead to bias.  
The empirical literature has focused on the interaction between cognition and preference 
parameters. Virtually all methods of estimating time preference assume that respondents are 
equally numerate, but Peters, Vastfjall, Slovic et al. [2006] show that this assumption is often 
untrue. Furthermore, more numerate individuals are less susceptible to framing effects and draw 
stronger and more precise affective meaning from numbers and comparisons using numbers. The 
confound with numeracy may explain why more intelligent (or educated) individuals often 
display lower discount rates when decisions require complex calculations to compare subtly 
different delays or reward amounts (for example, de Wit, Flory, Acheson et al. [2007]; Dohmen, 
Falk, Huffman et al. [2010]), but it does not shed light on why smarter individuals also have 
lower discount rates when choosing between relatively simple cash sums (Funder and Block 




167 A meta-analysis by Shamosh and Gray [2007] of 24 studies in which both IQ 
and discount rates were measured shows the two traits are inversely related (0 . 2 3 ) r  . The 
complexity entailed by comparing the present and future values of rewards suggests that the 
inverse relationship between discount rates and intelligence is not just an artifact of 
measurement.  One explanation for this could be that cognitive ability is related to the ability to 
direct attention. Daly, Delaney and Harmon [2009] find that lower discount rates are associated 
with cognitive mindfulness, which includes the ability to control attention.  Further, an individual 
with poor working memory and low intelligence may not be capable of accurately calculating or 
even perceiving the value of a deferred reward. At the least, making such calculations is more 
effortful (that is, costly) for individuals of low cognitive ability. If the cost of making 
calculations exceeds the expected benefit of such deliberation, the individual may choose by 
default the immediate, certain reward. However, it is important to be aware of reverse causality, 
since more patient individuals may also invest more in cognitive ability.  
Measures of cognitive constraints also relate to measured risk preference. There is an 
inverse relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion, where higher-IQ people have 
higher risk tolerance (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010]).
168 Reference dependence can lead 
subjects to be susceptible to framing, because they will perceive two identical lotteries 
differentially when one is framed as a loss and the other is framed as a gain. Some evidence 
suggests that individuals with higher cognitive ability and education are less risk averse.  Burks, 
Carpenter, Goette et al. [2009] find that higher IQ individuals are more consistent in their 
                                                 
167 Heckman [1976] shows that more educated people have lower discount rates.  More able people are more likely 
to attend more years of school. 
168 The two cognitive ability tests used by Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2010] were coding speed and vocabulary 
tests. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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choices between a lottery and fixed sums. They hypothesize that agents with higher cognitive 
ability can better translate their preferences into choices between lotteries. 
Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2010] find that while risk aversion is related to 
personality traits, ambiguity is not. In particular, IQ does not explain how subjects choose 
between a risky and an ambiguous urn. 
6.D.2.  Traits as Preferences 
Some aspects of traits may be more naturally thought of as aspects of preferences than as 
constraints. For example, Openness to Experience might relate to a preference for learning, and 
Extraversion might reflect a preference for social interactions. The distinction between 
preferences and constraints often seems tautological. One way of incorporating personality into 
preferences is by modifying functional forms, which fall into two broad and sometimes 
overlapping categories. First, some of the domains which are traditionally treated as 
fundamentally different, such as risk and time preference, social and risk preference, and leisure 
and time preference, may be closely related and generated from a common set of psychological 
traits.  Second, nonseparabilities could confound measures of tradeoffs.  The literature on 
addiction presents an interesting class of nonseparable models.
169  So does the literature on 




Marginal rates of substitution are often assumed to be generated by only one or two parameters, 
for example the discount factor and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This facilitates 
                                                 
169 See Becker and Murphy [1988]. 
170 See Epstein and Zin [1989], Hansen [2005] and Hansen and Sargent [2008]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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identification given sparse data, and, if it is a sensible specification of preferences, it gives a 
convenient description of behaviour. However, one or two parameters may not describe 
behaviour well. Conversely, some of the concepts analyzed separately in the literature may be 
governed by the same parameters. 
In discussing the concept of time discounting, Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue 
[2002] argue that time preference has three dimensions: impulsivity, the tendency to act 
spontaneously and without planning; compulsivity, the tendency to stick with plans; and 
inhibition, the ability to override automatic responses to urges or emotions.  There may be 
multiple interpretations of this assertion.   
First, the tradeoff between different time periods might be described by several 
parameters. Second, impulsivity, inhibition, and compulsivity might reflect constraints, i.e., 
something that affects shadow prices of consumption in different time periods. Third,  the 
relevant tradeoff might not be between different time periods but, for example in the case of 
impulsivity, might be between various levels of sensation seeking, a behavior which is also 
related to risk seeking. 
Like time preference, risk preference may depend on multiple parameters.  As noted by 
Rabin [2000], the simple expected utility framework does not explain risk aversion over small 
stakes, since it would imply an implausibly high curvature of the utility function. See Starmer 
[2000] for a review of the literature on departures from expected utility.  When psychologists 
started measuring risk-taking behavior, they were puzzled by the large variance across domains 
(see the discussion of situational specificity in Section 2). More recently, Weber [2001] shows 
that risk preference varies by domain, and a scale that assesses risk taking in five different 
domains shows low correlations across these domains (Weber, Blais and Betz [2002]). One can Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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be quite risk-averse when it comes to financial decisions but risk-loving when it comes to health 
decisions (Hanoch, Johnson and Wilke [2006]). Weber’s risk-return model of risk taking (Weber 
and Milliman [1997]; Weber and Hsee [1998]) finds that low correlations among risk-taking 
preference across domains can be explained by domain-specific perceptions of riskiness and 
return.  Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2011] find that a survey question on willingness to take 
risks within a domain predicts self-reported behaviors within each domain.  Einav, Finkelstein, 
Pascu et al. [2010] also find that there are domain-specific components of risk-taking behavior. 
Domain specificity might arise because sensation-seeking, enjoyment of risk per se, is an 
important aspect of risk preferences.
171  
Ambiguity aversion, the disutility from model uncertainty, might help explain some 
apparent inconsistencies. Ambiguity aversion is measured as the tradeoff between lower 
expected return and higher model uncertainty. Ambiguity aversion explains Ellsberg’s paradox: 
people tend to prefer an urn with a 0.5 probability of winning to an urn with an unknown 
probability where they are allowed to choose which side to bet on. One version of preferences 
over ambiguity is due to Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989].  They specify max-min preferences, 
where the agent maximizes an expected utility function which has been minimized with respect 
to the prior probabilities, i.e. 
      
12 12 1 1 2 2 ,. . . , ,..., min ...       
K K KK UX X X uX uX uX . 
Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2009] measure ambiguity aversion and risk aversion in a 
group of Dutch high school students and show that this aspect of choice is distinct from risk 
aversion.   
                                                 
171 Zuckerman [2007] suggests that sensation seeking is related more closely to Big Five Conscientiousness 
(inversely), but there is obvious conceptual overlap with excitement seeking, a facet of Big Five Extraversion on the 
NEO-PI-R questionnaire, as well as with Big Five Openness to Experience. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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There is no consensus on how social preferences govern choices. Social preferences refer 
to any explanation for non-selfish behavior, usually as measured in a dictator game where people 
have to divide a sum between themselves and another person. Typically, more than 60 percent of 
proposers give positive amounts, averaging 20 percent of the sum. A variation of this game is the 
classic ultimatum game in which a giver divides a sum between himself and another subject, the 
receiver, and the other subject can accept or decline the sum. If he declines, both will lose their 
money. Studies typically find that receivers decline if offered less than 20 percent. These results 
cannot be explained by pure selfishness. In the dictator game, the giver is willing to forgo his 
own consumption in order to increase another person’s consumption, and in the ultimatum game, 
the receiver is willing to forgo his own consumption in order to decrease the giver’s consumption 
if he pays him too little. Many studies seek to find deeper traits that govern these behaviors, such 
as preferences over the utility of oneself compared to others, efficiency, and fairness. The notion 
of fairness covers various concepts, including equality and rewards in proportion to talent, effort, 
kindness, or intentions.  For reviews of this literature, see List [2009], and Camerer and Fehr 
[2004]. 
In the linear, separable model, where each good  i X is the consumption of person  i, we 
can think of the weights as caring or altruism, the fact that people often care about other people’s 
utility or consumption. See Meier [2007] for a review. Fehr and Schmidt [1999] analyze 
inequality aversion in which people dislike inequality rather than valuing the consumption or 
utility of agents per se. 
Caring and altruism have been shown to decrease with social distance. People typically 
care more about themselves than about others, and they are less altruistic the less well they know 
other people.  Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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The social preference of reciprocity has been studied.  Fehr and Gächter [2000], and Falk 
and Fischbacher [2006] present evidence on reciprocity and conditional cooperation, in which 
agents act in a pro-social or antisocial manner depending on the behavior of others with whom 
they interact. People exert positive reciprocity if they tend to reward others for kindness but 
negative reciprocity if they tend to punish others for unkindness. More precisely, they are willing 
to incur a cost in order to reward or punish others. Falk and Fischbacher [2006] develop a theory 
of reciprocity where utility depends on the kindness of others, which is a function not only of the 
outcome from the another person’s action, but also of the perceived intentions. Reciprocity then 
reflects how much value a person puts on rewarding kindness. Economists could model these 
features by letting the person-specific weights on the subutilities depend on social distance and 
past actions of others.  Reciprocity is often measured using a gift-giving game where the 
proposer offers a wage to a responder, who then subsequently chooses a level of effort. However, 
List [2009] argues that the importance of fairness preferences may have been overstated in the 
literature, that many of the observed results are due to concerns over either reputation or scrutiny 
by experimenters. Several studies have shown that observed reciprocity fades over a longer time 
frame than the short duration of lab experiments (Gneezy and List [2006], Hennig-Schmidt, 
Rockenbach and Sadrieh [2010], Kube, Maréchal and Puppe [2006]).  Andreoni’s [1995] warm 
glow model of altruism suggests that people do not care about others, but value the act of giving.  
Inequality aversion is distinct from caring in the sense that A’s utility may be decreasing 
in B’s consumption if it is higher than A’s.  (See Fehr and Schmidt [2006] for a review.)  Fehr 





































where the weights satisfy  nn     and 01 n    .  In this case, the MRS changes from 1 to -1 at 
A B X X  . People place a higher weight on own consumption compared to others’, but when 
asked about the distribution of rewards in games where subjects do not have any interest in the 
outcome, preferences vary greatly.  
People seem to be more accepting of inequality if they believe that it represents a 
difference earned through effort rather than from differences in exogenously given talent.  (See 
Tausch, Potters and Riedl [2010] for a review.)  This finding may be related to the notion of 
reciprocity. The distinction may be whether the preference is for people who have earned their 
reward for doing something “for me” or something admirable in general.   
Some aspects of preferences seem to be multidimensional.  However, many preference 
parameters are correlated. For example, the social preference of “trust” relates to risk aversion 
and reciprocity. Altmann, Dohmen and Wibral [2008] measure trust as the willingness to give 
money to an investor in a trust game where he will only be repaid if the investor decides to return 
the favor. In this game, one can think of trust as the belief about how own actions affect those of 
others. They find that trust and positive reciprocity are positively related. Using the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),  Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2008] find that most people 
exert positive reciprocity; positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity are only weakly 
correlated; and people who are negatively reciprocal are less willing to trust others. In situations 
involving trust, it seems natural that trust is closely related to risk and ambiguity aversion, that a 
person who is more prone to accept uncertainty is also more likely to trust others.  Altmann, Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Dohmen and Wibral [2008] also find that people who are less risk averse are also more willing to 
trust. However, they do not measure which beliefs the agents hold.  
Care has to be taken in distinguishing trust from risk aversion. We demonstrate below 
how additively separable specifications of preferences impose observational equivalence 
between risk and social preferences.  Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak et al. [2005] find that people who 
receive oxytocin exhibit more trusting behavior in a real-stakes trust game. Oxytocin, however, 
does not make subjects more generous, suggesting that trust is not simply altruism. Additionally, 
oxytocin does not affect people's decision over risky outcomes when playing against a computer 
rather than a human. Combined, these findings suggest that there is a unique characteristic that 
affects willingness to trust, distinct from altruism and risk aversion.  Fehr [2009] posits that this 
missing element might be “betrayal aversion.”  Using survey data from Germany, Fehr [2009] 
finds that risk preferences, betrayal aversion, and altruism (as expressed through volunteering) 
predict people's self-reported willingness to trust others.  
 
Preference Specifications and Their Consequences 
The most restrictive version of the additively separable model suggests that the marginal rate of 
substitution between two goods does not depend on the consumption of other goods.  Browning, 
Hansen and Heckman [1999] present ample evidence against this assumption. Apparent 
inconsistencies can arise if  nonseparability is ignored. Further, estimates will suffer from 
omitted variable bias.
172  
The additively separable intertemporal model imposes the requirement that the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is the same as the relative risk aversion parameter.  
                                                 
172 See Section A6.D. in the Web Appendix for a discussion of additive separability and its implications. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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However, Barsky, Juster, Kimball et al. [1997] find no evidence that the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution is correlated with risk tolerance. However, the sample on which they measure 
these parameters is small. Green and Myerson [2004] argue that risk and time belong to different 
underlying psychological processes. As evidence, they point out that the two constructs react 
differently to the same effect: for example, an increase in the size of reward generally decreases 
the discount on time but increases the discount rate when rewards are probabilistic.
173  This is 
evidence against the standard intertemporally separable model of risk aversion. 
One type of nonseparability is between goods and the state or time period. The additively 
separable model allows for this type of dependence, represented by the subscript v on the utility 
function. While exponential discounting is still the most common representation of time 
preferences, experiments show that people tend to put higher weight on the present than on 
future periods than would be predicted by exponential discounting.  This is the motive for 
hyperbolic discounting. The most often used specification is   ,   -preferences, where   is the 
usual discount factor while δ is an additional discounting of all future periods, is 
       
2
11 2 ,, . . . vvv v v v UXX u X u X u X        . 
The consequence of these preferences is that the tradeoff between period v and period  1 v   is 
not evaluated the same way from the perspective of period  1 v   and period v, leading to time 
inconsistency.
174  Other possibilities are that the discount rates change with age. Hyperbolic and 
age-dependent discounting makes use of the subscript  v  on the utility function. We may think 
of an agent in multiple periods as several agents who play a game with each other. The agent 
                                                 
173 Further support for this disassociation comes from a cross-cultural study by Du, Green and Myerson [2002], in 
which Chinese graduate students discounted delayed rewards much more steeply than Japanese students, but 
Japanese students discounted probabilistic rewards more steeply than did the Chinese.  Barsky, Juster, Kimball et al. 
[1997] report that their estimates of time preference and risk tolerance are independent. 
174 This specification originates in the work of Phelps and Pollak [1968]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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today might account for what future agents might do. Further, discount rates appear to vary 
inversely with the size of reward and vary with the type of reward offered.
175 
  As previously noted, the expected utility form for risk preferences does not explain risk 
preferences over small stakes, as argued by Rabin [2000]. If subutility functions represent utility 
of lifetime wealth in different states, people should be approximately risk neutral for small 
stakes. However, people often avoid more than fair small bets. If this is explained by expected 
utility, then the curvature of the utility of wealth function would have to be implausibly high.  
Kahneman and Tversky [1979] suggest that people are loss averse, i.e., that losses weigh higher 
than gains in the utility function. This would imply that people have state-dependent preferences, 
which can be expressed as 
      12 1 1 2 2 , ,... ,... ...       nn K n n K K n UX X X X u X X u X X u X X 
where n is the current state, and where    u y   is higher for negative y than for positive y. Note 
that this specification is very similar to that of inequality aversion discussed above.  Both models 
share the feature that people do not have stable preferences over levels, but over differences. 
  The concepts of loss aversion, reference point dependence, and endowment effects 
(Thaler [1980], Kahneman and Tversky [1979]) are variations on this theme. If an agent has had 
an object in his possession for even a short amount of time, it affects how he trades it off against 
other goods. List [2003] has shown that this effect disappears when agents have market 
experience. However, loss aversion will interact with many choices in life, for example, how 
agents evaluate lotteries.  
                                                 
175 Green, Fry and Myerson [1994]; Chapman, Nelson and Hier [1999; Kirby [1997]; Chapman and Coups [1999]; 
Estle, Green, Myerson et al. [2007]; Bickel, Odum and Madden [1999]; Bonato and Boland [1983]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Reference point dependence has also been demonstrated in dictator games. In the 
standard dictator game, the first player, the “dictator,” is given a positive endowment and can 
choose to transfer some of it to a second player at which point the game ends. Numerous studies 
have shown that most dictators transfer a positive amount, even though they have no monetary 
incentive to do so.  List [2007] and Bardsley [2008] modified the standard dictator game by 
allowing dictators to take part of the second player’s endowment. With this modification, most 
dictators did not transfer positive amounts to the second player.  
Experimental measures of social preferences vary greatly across studies. Levitt and List 
[2007] and List [2009] argue that the degree of scrutiny in the lab as opposed to in the real world 
may make subjects behave more pro-socially (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul [2005], List [2006]) 
and argue against the “realism” of experimental data.
176  Further, several studies have found that 
people tend to be more selfish when the stakes of the game increase (Carpenter, Verhoogen and 
Burks [2005], Slonim and Roth [1998], Parco, Rapoport and Stein [2002]). 
There is evidence of substantial heterogeneity in preferences both between 
socioeconomic groups and within groups. Marginal rates of substitution depend on other factors 
such as education, age, cultural values, etc.
177  This evidence supports the claim that people are 
different at a basic level, since preferences govern the choices that shape life.  However, 
preferences may be experience dependent.  While most studies view life outcomes as the result 
of choices governed by exogenous preferences, and hence infer preferences from outcomes, 
initial conditions might determine both preferences and constraints on the available choices. 
The motivation for preference specifications in economics is typically introspection, 
axioms about rationality, and convenience, rather than empirical evidence. When measuring 
                                                 
176 See, however, Falk and Heckman [2009]. 
177 See the evidence in Browning, Hansen and Heckman [1999]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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preferences, functional forms are chosen in an attempt to minimize approximation error subject 
to identification.  However, economists typically consider preferences over a limited range of 
fundamental attributes. Time, risk, and social preferences may not be the right dimensions of 
choice over which parameters are stable. Each of these domains seem to be guided by multiple 
parameters, and some of these parameters seem to matter for each of the domains. While the 
marginal rates of substitution economists measure are correct at observed prices, they may not be 
easily mapped into the conventional preference specifications.  Personality psychology may help 
in guiding economists as where to look for more fundamental parameters.  However, the 
potential is largely unexplained. 
 
Summary of Section 6 
Table 7 summarizes the main papers relating economic preference parameters to psychological 
measurements.    Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Table 7. Link between Personality Traits and Preferences 




Outcome(s): trust – amount the first-
player sends in a real-stakes experimental 
trust game  
 
Explanatory Variable(s): reciprocity – 
amount returned by the second player in a 
real-stakes experimental trust game; risk 
aversion – certainty equivalent as 
measured by real-stakes choices over 
lotteries 
Data: Collected by 
authors; 240 students 
from the University 





Timing of Measurements: The 
measures are contemporaneous. 
 
Theory: People might generally 
value adhering to social norms 
associated with trust and 
reciprocity. 
Reciprocity and trust are 
positively related (p<0.01). Risk 




Heckman et al. 
[2009] 
Outcome(s): risk aversion – choices over 
real-stakes lotteries; ambiguity aversion – 
comparison of the willingness to bet on 
lotteries when the probability distribution 
is unknown  
 
Explanatory Variable(s): gender; 
personality – self-reported measures of 
The Big Five, ambition, flexible thinking, 
and self-control 
Data: Collected by 
authors; 347 students 
aged 15 to 16 from a 
Dutch high school 
 
Methods: OLS, F-test 
Controls: n/a 
 
Timing of Measurements: The 
measures are contemporaneous. 
 
Theory: Risk aversion and 
ambiguity aversion represent 
different preferences and might 
reflect different personality traits. 
Men are less risk averse than 
women (p<0.001) but more 
ambiguity averse (p<0.05). Risk-
aversion is mediated by 
personality (p<0.05), while 
ambiguity aversion is not. Risk-
aversion is positively associated 
with Agreeableness and 
Neuroticism and is negatively 
associated with ambition (p<0.05). 
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(Table 7. Link between Personality Traits and Preferences Continued …) 
Author(s)  Main Variable(s)  Data and Methods  Causal Evidence  Main Result(s) 
Borghans, Meijers 
and ter Weel [2008] 
Outcome(s): cognitive ability – number of 
correct answers on an IQ test; effort – 
time spent on each question 
 
Explanatory Variable(s): risk aversion – 
survey response to lotteries; time 
preference – survey response to trade-offs 
across time; leisure preference – survey 
response; experiment incentives – 
payment for correct answers to the IQ 
test; personality – self-reported Big Five, 
performance motivation, positive and 
negative fear of failure, locus of control, 
social desirability, curiosity, resilience, 
enjoyment of success, attitude toward 
work 
Data: Collected by 
authors; 128 
university students 
from a Dutch 
University 
 
Methods: probit  
Controls: type of cognitive test, 
the amount of incentive pay, and 
time constraints 
 
Timing of Measurements: They 
measured IQ both before and 
after providing incentives. 
 
Theory: People with different 
personalities and preferences 
might be willing to expend 
different amounts of mental 
effort during a test. 
 
Performance motivation, fear of failure, 
internal locus of control, curiosity, low 
discount rates, and risk aversion are positively 
associated with more correct answers 
(p<0.05). Negative fear of failure, 
Extroversion, Openness to Experience, and 
Agreeableness are negatively associated with 
answering the question correctly (p<0.05). 
Incentives did not affect the number of 
questions answered correctly. Intrinsic 
motivation, curiosity, internal locus of 
control, Emotional Stability, 
Conscientiousness, and discount rates are 
negatively associated with responsiveness to 
incentives (p<0.05).  Risk aversion is 
negatively associated with responsiveness to 
incentives (p<0.10). Leisure preference and 
Openness to Experience are positively 
associated with responsiveness (p<0.05). 
Burks, Carpenter, 
Goette et al. [2009] 
Outcome(s): risk aversion – choices over 
real-stakes lotteries; time discounting – 
choices over real-stakes payments at 
different times; inconsistent risk and time 
preference – making at least one 
inconsistent choice in the experiments 
eliciting preferences; job performance – 
whether a worker leaves before the end of 
the first year 
 
Explanatory Variable(s): cognitive ability 
– IQ as measured by an adaptation of 
Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices 
Data: Collected by 
authors, 
administrative data; 
892 trainee truckers 









Controls: race, age, age squared, 
education, household income, 
absorption, achievement, 
aggression, alienation, control 
harm avoidance, social 
closeness, social potency, stress 
reaction, traditionalism, and 
well-being 
 
Timing of Measurements: The 
measures are contemporaneous, 
except for job-turnover which 
was evaluated after the 
experiment. 
 
Theory: People with higher IQ 
can better forecast the future. 
An increase in IQ from the bottom quartile to 
the top quartile is associated with an increase 
in risk-taking consistency of 25 percentage 
points (p<0.001), an increase of intertemporal 
consistency of 15 percentage points 
(p<0.001), a decrease in discount rate  
(p<0.001), and a decrease in risk aversion 
(p<0.001). People in the lowest quartile of IQ 
are about twice as likely to leave the job 
within the first year (p<0.001). 
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(Table 7. Link between Personality Traits and Preferences Continued …) 




Outcome(s): time preference – discount 
rate measured by a real-stakes choices 
over delayed payments  
 
Explanatory Variable(s): health – blood 
pressure, body fat, blood glucose, weight, 
height, heart rate; personality – 
questionnaire measures of The Big Five, 
self-control, consideration of future 
consequences, elaboration of potential 
outcomes, emotional regulation, cognitive 
and affective mindfulness, suppression of 
unwanted thoughts, experiential 
avoidance 
Data: Collected by 
authors; 204 students 





Controls: age and sex 
 
Timing of Measurements: The 
measures are contemporaneous. 
 
Theory: Personality traits and 
health indicators might be 
associated with willingness to 
delay gratification. 
Age and sex do not predict the 
estimated discount rate. A factor 
that loads heavily on self-control, 
consideration of future 
consequences, elaboration of 
consequences, affective 
mindfulness, and 
Conscientiousness is negatively 
associated with the discount rate 
(p<0.01). A factor that loads on 
blood pressure is positively 
associated with the discount rate 
(p<0.10). 
Dohmen, Falk, 
Huffman et al. 
[2011] 
Outcome(s): experimental risk measure – 
measured by real-stakes choices over 
lotteries and cash payments 
 
Explanatory Variable(s): survey risk 
measure – survey responses on an 11-
point scale, relating to general risk 
preference and risk preference relating to 
car driving, financial matters, leisure and 
sports, career and health 
Data: Collected by 
the authors; 450 
adults from Germany 
 
Methods: OLS 
Controls: gender, age, height, and 
other personal characteristics 
 
Timing of Measurements: The 
measures are contemporaneous.  
 
Theory: Survey and 
experimentally-elicited risk 
measure the same concept  
Survey measures of general risk 
attitude predict incentive 
compatible, experimentally 
elicited measures of risk attitude 
(p<0.01). 
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(Table 7. Link between Personality Traits and Preferences Continued …) 
Author(s)  Main Variable(s)  Data and Methods  Causal Evidence  Main Result(s) 
Ding, Hartog 
and Sun [2010] 
Outcome(s): experimental risk measure – 
measured by real-stakes choices over 
lotteries and cash payments 
 
Explanatory Variable(s): survey risk 
measure – responses on an 11 point scale, 
relating to general risk preference and 
risk preference relating to car driving, 
financial matters, leisure and sports, 
career and health, survey responses to 
hypothetical lotteries 
Data: Collected by 
the authors; 121 
students of PKU in 
Beijing who 





Controls: major, gender, family 
income, and class rank 
 
Timing of Measurements: The 
measures are contemporaneous. 
 
Theory: There could be an 
underlying risk parameter that 
applies in all situations. 
The survey measures of risk 
explain at most 10 percent of the 
variance in the experimental 
measures of risk (general risk 
attitude and financial risk are the 
best). Self-assessed risk depends 
much on the domain or context; 
the highest correlation between 
context-based survey questions is 
r=0.55. Women are more risk 
averse than men; risk-aversion 
decreases with parental income; 
and risk attitudes depend on 
domain (context). People view 
winning and losing money 
differently. 
 




7.  The Predictive Power of Personality Traits  
This section discusses the empirical evidence on the power of personality in predicting life 
outcomes.  A growing body of evidence suggests that personality measures—especially those 
related to Conscientiousness, and, to a lesser extent, Neuroticism—predict a wide range of 
outcomes. The predictive power of any particular personality measure tends to be less than the 
predictive power of IQ but in some cases rivals it.    
For three reasons, summarizing the large literature on the predictive power of personality 
on outcomes is a daunting task.  First, the measures of personality and cognition differ among 
studies.  As noted in Section 5, not all psychologists use the Big Five.  We attempt to cast all 
measures into Big Five categories.  When this is not possible, we discuss the measures used and 
how they relate to the Big Five measures.    
Second, different studies use different measures of predictive power.  Many studies report 
only simple correlations or simple standardized regression coefficients.
178  Such estimated 
relationships do not control for other factors that may influence outcomes.  This is particularly 
problematic for estimated relationships between personality measures and other outcomes that do 
not control for cognition, situation, or the effect of other personality measures.  Where possible, 
we report both simple and partial correlations.   
We also consider a measure of predictive validity that extends traditional conceptions of 
variance explained.  Recent work by economists relaxes the normality and linearity assumptions 
that underlie the use of simple partial correlations and standardized regression coefficients that 
are used in psychology.  This method measures the predictive power of variables by the slopes of 
                                                 
178 Standardized regressions produce regression coefficients of outcomes divided by their standard deviations 
regressed on explanatory variables divided by their standard deviations.  This produces correlation coefficients in 
bivariate regressions and partial correlation coefficients in multivariate regressions.  See, e.g., Goldberger [1968]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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percentile changes on outcomes and not by variance explained.  If outcomes are characterized by 
substantial measurement error, a low 
2 R  for a predictor may still be consistent with a substantial 
effect of the predictor on means and quantiles.
179   
For example, Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] report the effects of percentile changes 
in cognitive and personality measures on a variety of outcomes over the full range of estimated 
relationships, relaxing traditional normality or linearity assumptions and not relying directly on 
measures of variance explained.  This approach to measuring predictive power is increasingly 
being applied by economists.
180  
  Third, many studies do not address the question of causality, i.e., does the measured trait 
cause (rather than just predict) the outcome?  Empirical associations are not a reliable basis for 
policy analysis. Problems with reverse causality are rife in personality psychology.  
Contemporaneous measures of personality and outcomes are especially problematic.  For 
example, does greater Neuroticism lower earnings, is it the other way around, or do they 
mutually influence each other?  
Few economists or psychologists working on the relationship between personality and 
outcomes address the issue of causality, and when they do so, it is usually by employing early 
measures of cognition and personality to predict later outcomes.  As discussed in Section 4, 
using early measures of personality traits to predict later outcomes raises problems of its own.  
We delineate how each study addresses causality. 
  
                                                 
179 The slope versus variance explained distinction is an old one.  However, the use of slopes as measures of 
“importance” is problematic in general because of the arbitrariness in the scales of the dependent and independent 
variables.  (See Goldberger [1968].)  This arbitrariness is resolved in the new measure by mapping quantiles into 
quantiles.  This literature is nonparametric.  The measure is clear in its choice of units but the economic significance 
is still questionable.  A better measure would relate costs of a change in the independent variable to the benefits. 
180 See, e.g., Piatek and Pinger [2010]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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An Overview of the Main Findings 
Before presenting a detailed survey of the effects of personality and cognition on a variety of 
outcomes, it is useful to have an overview of the main findings.  One principle finding of our 
survey, consistent with the claims of the early psychologists cited in Section 2, is that 
Conscientiousness is the most predictive Big Five trait across many outcomes.  However, other 
personality measures predict some outcomes.  
Measures of personality predict a range of educational outcomes. Of the Big Five, 
Conscientiousness best predicts overall attainment and achievement. Other traits, such as 
Openness to Experience, predict finer measures of educational attainment, such as attendance 
and course difficulty. Traits related to Neuroticism also affect educational attainment, but the 
relationship is not always monotonic. Conscientiousness predicts college grades to the same 
degree that SAT scores do. Personality measures predict performance on achievement tests and, 
to a lesser degree, performance on intelligence tests.   
Personality measures also predict a variety of labor market outcomes. Of the Big Five 
traits, Conscientiousness best predicts overall job performance but is less predictive than 
measures of intelligence. Conscientiousness, however, predicts performance and wages across a 
broad range of occupational categories, whereas the predictive power of measures of intelligence 
decreases with job complexity. Additionally, traits related to Neuroticism (e.g. locus of control 
and self-esteem) predict a variety of labor market outcomes, including job search effort. Many 
traits predict sorting into occupations, consistent with the economic models of comparative 
advantage discussed in Section 3. Personality traits are valued differentially across occupations.  
All Big Five traits predict some health outcomes. Conscientiousness, however, is the 
most predictive and can better predict longevity than does intelligence or background. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Personality measures predict health both through the channel of education and by improving 
health-related behavior, such as smoking. 
The little evidence on the effect of personality measures on crime suggests that traits 
related to Conscientiousness and Agreeableness are important predictors of criminality. These 
findings are consistent with the possibility that personality is related to social preferences, as 
discussed in Section 6.   
Our survey, even though extensive, is not fully comprehensive.  We place additional 
material in the Web Appendix. 
 
7.A.  Educational Attainment and Achievement 
We now turn to evidence for the predictive power of personality traits for educational outcomes, 
separately considering educational attainment, grades, and test scores.    
 
Educational Attainment 
Despite recent increases in college attendance, American high school dropout rates remain high. 
About one in four American students drops out of formal schooling before receiving a high 
school diploma, and in recent decades the dropout rate has increased slightly (Heckman and 
LaFontaine [2010]). A growing body of research finds that personality is associated with 
educational attainment, suggesting that further study of personality and its determinants might 
shed light on the recent stagnation in educational attainment.  We begin by reviewing evidence 
about the relationship of personality measures with years of schooling and then consider specific 
aspects of educational achievement.   Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Traits such as perseverance and preferences related to an interest in learning might lead 
people to attain more total years of schooling. Indeed some evidence suggests that this might be 
the case.  Table 8 presents associations between years of schooling and the Big Five from three 
nationally representative samples. The studies yield different results, possibly because they 
control for different covariates or because they come from different countries.  The first study 
controls for  age, sex, and gender and finds that of the Big Five, Openness to Experience and 
Conscientiousness are most related to years of schooling attained  (Goldberg, Sweeney, Merenda 
et al. [1998]) . The second study—which also controls for parental education and father’s 
occupational status—reports reports a strong relationship with Openness to Experience but a 
much weaker relationship with Conscientiousness than the first study, suggesting that parental 
background might mediate some of the effects of Conscientiousness (van Eijck and de Graaf 
[2004]).   
The first two samples lack information on cognitive ability.  Openness to Experience, 
however, is the only Big Five factor with moderate associations with general intelligence             
( 0.33 r   in a meta-analysis by Ackerman and Heggestad [1997]), and intelligence is associated 
with years of education  ( 0.55 r  in Neisser, Boodoo, Bouchard et al. [1996]).  Thus Openness 
to Experience may proxy for intelligence. However, as Figure 9 illustrates, controlling for 
rudimentary measures of crystallized intelligence and fluid intelligence does not affect the 
coefficients on the Big Five within the third sample.
181 This sample differs from the others, 
because Openness to Experience is not strongly associated with years of education unconditional 
on intelligence, possibly because it is based on a smaller inventory of questions. 
Conscientiousness, however, is associated with years of schooling to a similar degree as 
                                                 
181 Table A7 in Section A7 of the Web Appendix presents the full results from this regression. Table A8 in Section 
A7 of the Web Appendix presents analogous results for high school graduation. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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intelligence.   In each study, schooling and personality are measured at the same point in time, so 
that for older individuals, personality is measured long after schooling has been completed.  This 
complicates the interpretation of the estimated effects of schooling on personality in young 
samples. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Figure 9. Association of the Big Five and Intelligence with Years of Schooling in GSOEP 
 
 
Notes: The figure displays standardized regression coefficients from multivariate of years of school attended on the 
Big Five and intelligence, controlling for age and age-squared. The bars represent standard errors. The Big Five 
coefficients are corrected for attenuation bias. The Big Five were measured in 2005. Years of schooling were 
measured in 2008. Intelligence was measured in 2006. The measures of intelligence were based on components of 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). The data is a representative sample of German adults between the 
ages of 21 and 94.  
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), waves 2004-2008, own calculations. 
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Nevertheless, the components of Openness to Experience representing an intrinsic 
interest in ideas and learning may affect educational attainment not measured by total years of 
schooling such as the student’s difficulty with classes and attendance.  Consistent with this 
supposition, a longitudinal study of talented high school students showed that when controlling 
for PSAT score, students who expressed more intrinsic motivation in learning took more difficult 
math courses one year later ( 0.30, 0.05) p   , two years later (0 . 3 1 ,0 . 0 5 ) p    , and three 
years later (0 . 2 6 ,0 . 1 0 ) p    but did not have higher grades in a standardized set of courses.
182  
Likewise, of the Big Five, Openness to Experience is most consistently associated with fewer 
contemporaneously measured school absences in seventh
  grade ( 0.31, 0.01) rp   , tenth 
grade ( 0.19, 0.01) rp   , and twelfth grade ( 0.27, 0.01) rp     (Lounsbury, Steel, Loveland 
et al. [2004]). Still, interest in learning is not the whole story. Using prospective data, Lleras 
[2008] finds that controlling for cognitive ability, three Conscientious behaviors (completing 
homework, working hard, arriving promptly to class) in tenth grade predicted educational 
attainment ten years later, whereas relating well to others, a behavior related to Extraversion and 
Agreeableness, did not.   
Examining discrete educational decisions, rather than total years of education, gives a 
more nuanced picture. The decision to obtain a GED is a particularly telling example. Many 
view GED certification as equivalent to earning a high school diploma. Indeed GED recipients 
have the same distribution of measured achievement test scores as high school graduates who do 
not attend college. However, controlling for cognitive ability, GED recipients have lower hourly 
wages and annual earnings and attain fewer years of education, suggesting they may “lack the 
abilities to think ahead, to persist in tasks, or to adapt to their environments” (Heckman and 
                                                 
182 Wong and Csikszentmihalyi [1991]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Rubinstein [2001, p. 146]).  Figure 10, taken from Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010], 
shows that GED recipients have cognitive skills similar to students who obtain high school 
diplomas but do not attend college. However, GED recipients have noncognitive skills 




Figure 10. Distribution of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills by Education Group 
 
 
                                                 
183 See the discussion of the GED program in Heckman, Humphries and Mader [2010]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Notes: The data come from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (no college sample, all ethnic 
groups).  The distributions above represent noncognitive ability factors estimated using measures of early violent 
crime, minor crime, marijuana use, regular smoking, drinking, early sexual intercourse, and educational attainment 
as laid out in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004]. The sample is restricted to the cross-sectional subsample for 
both males and females. Distributions show only those with no post-secondary educational attainment. The 
noncognitive ability factors are separately normalized to be mean zero standard deviation one. 
Source: Reproduced from Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010]. 
 
Supporting the evidence from the GED program that personality plays an important role 
in explaining educational attainment in adolescence, several prospective studies have shown that 
facets of Conscientiousness (e.g., self-control, distractibility) and facets of Neuroticism (e.g., 
internal locus of control) predict successful graduation from high school (Bowman and Matthews 
[1960; Gough [1964; Hathaway, Reynolds and Monachesi [1969; Janosz, LeBlanc, Boulerice et 
al. [1997; Kelly and Veldman [1964; Whisenton and Lorre [1970]).
184  Table 9 presents findings 
from three more recent studies examining the relationship between locus of control, a trait 
                                                 
184 See Section 5.D for a discussion of the links between these personality facets and the Big Five traits. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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related to Emotional Stability, and high school graduation. While the level of statistical 
significance varies across studies, the studies report remarkably similar estimates.  When 
controlling for basic demographics, a one standard deviation increase in locus of control is 
associated with a 4.5-6.8 percentage point increase in graduating from high school. Two of the 
studies control for cognitive ability and find that the coefficient drops to between 1.4 and 1.5. 
However, the measures of cognitive ability (course grades and AFQT score) are partly 
determined by locus of control, as discussed later in this section.  
  Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Notes: The numbers in the “Controls” column indicate the controls used in different specifications. The numbers preceding the estimate reported in the “Results” 
column indicates the model used as defined in the “Controls” column.   
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Several recent studies using methods that address measurement error and reverse 
causality corroborate the evidence that traits related to Neuroticism affect educational attainment. 
For example,  Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] account for the effect of family background 
on test scores.  They correct for the influence of schooling on personality.  They address 
measurement error in test scores.  (Their estimates of the effect of schooling on these traits and 
on cognitive measures are discussed in Section 8.)  Figure 11 shows that better adolescent 
personality traits – as measured by locus of control and self-esteem (traits related to 
Neuroticism)—increases the probability of graduating from high school (and stopping at high 
school) for males at the lowest quantiles of the personality distribution.   However, at higher 
quantiles, the probability of stopping education at high school graduation is decreasing in 
measured personality, because those students continue on to college.  As discussed in Section 3, 
the effects of traits on outcomes need not be monotonic.  As Figure 12 shows, both higher 
cognitive and personality traits have strong effects on graduating from a 4-year college at all 
deciles. Moving from the lowest decile to the highest decile in the measured personality 
distribution increases the probability of graduating from college more than a similar change in 
the cognitive trait distribution. These examples show why considering broad measures of 
education might obscure important relationships between skills and educational attainment and 
why assuming a linear—or  even monotonic—relationship between skills and educational 
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Notes: The data are simulated from the estimates of the model and the NLSY79 sample.  Higher deciles are 
associated with higher values of the variable. The confidence intervals are computed using bootstrapping (200 
draws). Solid lines depict probability, and dashed lines, 2.5%–97.5% confidence intervals.  The upper curve is the 
joint density.  The two marginal curves (ii) and (iii) are evaluated at the mean of the trait not being varied. 
Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006, Figure 19]. 
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Figure 12. Probability of Being a 4-year-college Graduate or Higher at Age 30, Males 
 
  
Notes: The data are simulated from the estimates of the model and the NLSY79 sample. Higher deciles are 
associated with higher values of the variable. The confidence intervals are computed using bootstrapping (200 
draws). Solid lines depict probability, and dashed lines, 2.5%–97.5% confidence intervals.  The upper curve is the 
joint density.  The two marginal curves (ii) and (iii) are evaluated at the mean of the trait not being varied. 
Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006, Figure 21]. 
 
Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] use a dynamic factor model to investigate the 
development of both cognitive skills and personality traits during childhood, allowing for 
endogenous investment in skills and dynamic complementarities.  They find that adolescent 
personality—as measured by a variety of behavior inventories—accounts for 12% of the 
variation in educational attainment, whereas adolescent cognitive ability accounts for 16% of the 
variation. 
A separate, but related literature examines the importance of early attention (a trait 
related to Conscientiousness) and aggression (a trait related to low Agreeableness) in Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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determining graduation from high school. Some studies find that aggression is particularly 
important compared to attention. Duncan and Magnuson [2010a] find that when controlling for 
measures of intelligence and demographic variables, antisocial behavior, but not attention 
measured in childhood, predicts high school completion where antisocial behavior is negatively 
associated with completion.  Likewise, Fergusson and Horwood [1998] find that teacher and 
parent ratings of conduct problems at age 8 are negatively related to predicted high school 
completion at age 18. In contrast, Vitaro, Brendgen, Larose et al. [2005] examine individuals in a 
population-based sample of Quebec children and find that kindergarten teacher ratings of 
hyperactivity-inattention (inversely) predicted completion of high school better than did 
aggressiveness-opposition. Both attention and aggression likely play roles, but there is no 
consensus on their relative importance.   
In sum, traits related to Big Five Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness are 
particularly important in determining how many total years of education individuals complete in 
their lifetimes.  Two traits related to Neuroticism, locus of control and self-esteem, play a 
particularly important role for adolescent schooling decisions.  Their effects differ across 
schooling attainment levels, suggesting that analysts should be wary of using years of schooling 
attained as the outcome variable compared to using the probability of attainment at different 
grades.  Attention and early aggression, traits related to Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, 
are also predictive.  
 
Course Grades 
Conscientiousness is the most robust Big Five predictor of course grades, in terms of raw and 
partial correlations. Poropat [2009] conducted a meta-analysis of Big Five personality traits and Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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course grades in primary, secondary, and post-secondary education, presented in Figure 13. 
Associations between grades and Conscientiousness are almost as large as those between grades 
and cognitive ability. Associations with grades are substantially smaller for other Big Five 
factors, the largest of which is Openness to Experience.   
 
Figure 13. Correlations of the Big Five and Intelligence with Course Grades 
 
Notes: All correlations are significant at the 1% level. The correlations are corrected for scale reliability and come 
from a meta analysis representing a collection of studies representing samples of between N=31,955 to N=70,926, 
depending on the trait. The meta-analysis did not clearly specify when personality was measured relative to course 
grades.  
Source: Poropat [2009]. 
 
A few prospective, longitudinal studies, have estimated the effect of Conscientiousness 
on course grades when controlling for baseline levels of grades. These studies help isolate the 
effects of personality on grades by reducing the potential for omitted variable bias and 
misleading halo effects – the propensity for teachers to favor students based on traits unrelated to 
academic achievement.  In general, these studies support the conclusions of studies that do not 
account for halo effects.  For instance, in a sample of American middle school students, self-
control predicts report card grades, controlling for both general intelligence and baseline grades 
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(Duckworth and Seligman [2005]). Likewise, Duckworth, Tsukayama and May [2010] use 
longitudinal hierarchical linear models to show that changes in self-control predict subsequent 
changes in report card grades. In a sample of Chinese primary school children, effortful control 
predicted report card grades when controlling for baseline grades (Zhou, Main and Wang 
[2010]).  
Figure 14 shows that associations between course grades and personality and cognitive 
ability and grades are generally stronger in the primary grades, a pattern consistent with 
censoring.
186  A notable exception to this trend is Conscientiousness, which has the same 
association with course grades at all levels.
187  If censoring on cognitive and personality traits 
attenuates observed associations with course grades among students at higher grade levels, 
Conscientiousness might be even more predictive of course grades as students progress through 
the education system.
188 Consistent with this possibility, in a prospective study of an entire 
cohort of Belgium’s medical students, the correlation (corrected for censoring) of  
Conscientiousness for GPA increased from  0.18 r   in the first year to  0.45 r   in the seventh 
and final year (Lievens, Dilchert and Ones [2009]).
189   
 
                                                 
186 I.e., that estimated predictive validity diminishes by grade due to censoring. 
187 Censoring was not accounted for in the meta-analysis in Poropat [2009], presumably because norms for variance 
in representative samples are generally unavailable for personality measures (Duckworth [2009]). 
188 Flinn and Heckman [1982].   
189 The values were corrected for truncation. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Figure 14. Correlations with Course Grades by Level of Education 
 
Notes: The reported values for The Big Five are partial correlations, controlled for intelligence. The meta-analysis 
did not address when personality was measured relative to course grades.  
Source: Poropat [2009]. 
 
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that Conscientiousness may be as predictive as 
cognitive ability in predicting and possibly causing higher course grades. Why? Even intelligent 
students might not enjoy the work (Wong and Csikszentmihalyi [1991]).  Indeed, there is 
evidence that the association between Conscientiousness and course grades is mediated by 
positive study habits and attitudes, effort, and prosocial behavior in the classroom.
190   
 
Standardized Achievement Test Scores  
Like course grades, standardized achievement test scores reflect a student’s acquired skills and 
knowledge. Thus, dimensions of personality that influence the acquisition of skills and 
knowledge should predict both outcomes. One might expect, therefore, that traits related to 
Conscientiousness predict achievement test scores. While studies using standardized 
                                                 
190 Credé and Kuncel [2008; Lubbers, Van Der Werf, Kuyper et al. [2010; Noftle and Robins [2007; Valiente, 
Lemery-Chalfant and Castro [2007; Valiente, Lemery-Chalfant, Swanson et al. [2008]. 
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achievement tests are less common than studies using grades, ample empirical evidence shows 
that aspects of personality predict both metrics of performance. As shown in Section 5, two traits 
related to Neuroticism, locus of control and self-esteem, explain much of the variance of the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), an achievement test which is often used as a measure 
of pure intelligence in studies in economics. Similarly, Figure 15 shows that in samples from 
three New York City middle schools, controlling for IQ, Openness to Experience is associated 
with Standardized Achievement Test Scores.   
 
Figure 15.  Associations with Standardized Achievement Test Scores 
 
Notes: The values represent standardized regression coefficients in models including personality, IQ, gender, and 
ethnicity.  The bars represent standard errors around the estimate. IQ is measured using Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices. The achievement tests are based on the Comprehensive Testing Program test in the private school sample 
and the English/Language Arts and Mathematics standardized achievement test in the public school sample.  
Source: Data collected by Authors. Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
Roy Martin and colleagues were among the first to demonstrate that teacher and parent 
ratings of early childhood persistence, (low) distractibility, and (low) activity prospectively 
predict both course grades and standardized achievement test scores (see Martin [1989] for a 
summary). Likewise, in a representative sample of Baltimore first graders, teacher ratings of 
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attention span—restlessness in first grade—predicted both course grades and standardized 
achievement test scores four years later (Alexander, Entwisle and Dauber [1993]). 
More recently, in a sample of preschool children from low-income homes, parent and 
teacher ratings of effortful control, a facet of  Conscientiousness, predicted standardized 
achievement test scores in kindergarten, even after controlling for general intelligence (Blair and 
Razza [2007]). Similarly, in a sample of kindergarteners, teacher and parent ratings of effortful 
control predicted performance on standardized achievement tests six months later when 
controlling for both verbal intelligence and family socioeconomic status (Valiente, Lemery-
Chalfant and Swanson [2010]). Teacher ratings of inattention at the beginning of the school year 
predicted standardized achievement test scores at the end of the school year in a sample of fourth 
graders (Finn, Pannozzo and Voelkl [1995]). 
Task measures of effortful control, a trait related to Conscientiousness, predict 
performance on standardized achievement tests much later in life.  For instance, the number of 
seconds a child waits for a more preferred treat in a preschool test of delay of gratification 
predicts the SAT college admission test more than a decade later, with raw correlations of 
0.42 r   for the verbal section and  0.57 r   for the quantitative section (Mischel, Shoda and 
Rodriguez [1989]).  The Head-to-Toes and Head-Toes-Knees-Shoulders tasks requires young 
children to inhibit automatic responses, pay attention, and keep instructions in working memory 
(e.g., to touch their heads when the experimenter says “touch your toes”) (Ponitz, McClelland, 
Jewkes et al. [2008]; Ponitz, McClelland, Matthews et al. [2009]). Performance on this brief task 
predicts later performance on standardized achievement tests (McClelland, Cameron, Connor et 
al. [2007]).   Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Perhaps most conclusively, Duncan and colleagues [2007] analyzed six large, 
longitudinal datasets and found that school-entry attention skills, measured variously by task and 
questionnaire measures, prospectively predict achievement test scores, even when controlling for 
school-entry academic skills. In contrast, internalizing behavior (e.g. depression, anxiousness, 
withdrawal) and externalizing behaviors (e.g. aggression, hyperactivity, antisocial behavior) at 
school-entry do not reliably predict standardized achievement test scores. Attention skills are 
related to Conscientiousness; externalizing behavior is related to Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness; and internalizing behaviors are related to Neuroticism.   
In sum, traits related to Conscientiousness play an important role in predicting 
achievement tests above and beyond cognitive ability. Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 6, 
time discounting and risk aversion also relate to test score performance, suggesting that both 
personality-related traits and preferences are important determinants of outcomes, consistent 
with the economic model presented in Section 3.  In contrast to educational attainment, traits 
related to Emotional Stability (the opposite of Neuroticism) are less important for test 
performance.  
 
Where Course Grades and Standardized Achievement Test Scores Diverge 
Course grades and standardized test scores are generally highly correlated.  Each form of 
assessment provides reciprocal evidence on the validity of the other. Willingham, Pollack and 
Lewis [2002] estimate a raw correlation of  0.62 r   (0 . 0 1 ) p   between total grade average and 
achievement test scores.
191 This strong association—and the objective of each form of 
assessment to gauge student learning—explains why standardized achievement tests and grades 
                                                 
191 The correlations were even higher when the test and grades were based on similar subject matter.  They use the 
data from the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) data. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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are widely assumed to be “mutual surrogates; that is, measuring much the same thing, even in the 
face of obvious differences.”
192 What are these differences, and how might the contribution of 
personality to performance vary accordingly? 
Standardized achievement tests are designed to enable apples-to-apples comparisons of 
students from diverse contexts. To this end, standardized achievement tests are uniform in 
subject matter, format, administration, and grading procedure across all test takers.  A course 
grade, on the other hand might depend on a particular teacher’s judgment.   
The power of standardized achievement tests to predict later academic and occupational 
outcomes is well-established (Kuncel and Hezlett [2007]; Sackett, Borneman and Connelly 
[2008]; Willingham [1985]). Nevertheless, cumulative high school GPA predicts graduation 
from college dramatically better than SAT/ACT scores do, even without adjusting for differences 
in high school quality (Bowen, Chingos and McPherson [2009b]). Similarly, high school GPA 
more powerfully predicts college rank-in-class (Bowen, Chingos and McPherson [2009b]; Geiser 
and Santelices [2007]). 
Perhaps more important than which measure of academic achievement – course grades or 
standardized achievement test scores – is more predictive of later outcomes is why these 
outcomes are related but not entirely interchangeable. Bowen and colleagues [2009b] speculate 
that aspects of Conscientiousness seem differentially essential to earning strong course grades 
because of what is required of students to earn them. Standardized achievement tests, in contrast 
to teacher-designed quizzes, exams, homework assignments, and long-term projects, challenge 
students to solve relatively novel problems. It is therefore not surprising that Frey and Detterman 
[2004] found a correlation of  0.82 r   (0 . 0 1 ) p   between SAT scores and performance on the 
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ASVAB, an aptitude and achievement test developed for the United States Army. In a separate 
sample, Frey and Detterman found a correlation of  0.72 r   (0 . 0 1 ) p   between SAT scores and 
IQ when accounting for censoring. In contrast, the correlation between GPA and IQ is  0.23 r   
(0 . 0 1 ) p   (Poropat [2009]).  
In three longitudinal, prospective studies of middle school students, Duckworth, Quinn 
and Tsukayama [2010] compare the variance explained in year-end standardized achievement 
test scores and GPA by self-control (a facet of Conscientiousness) and fluid intelligence 
measured at the beginning of the school year. For example, in a national sample of children, 
fourth grade self-control was a stronger predictor of ninth grade GPA ( 0.40, 0.001) p     than 
was fourth grade IQ ( 0.28, 0.001) p   .  In contrast, fourth grade self-control was a weaker 
predictor of ninth grade standardized test scores (0 . 1 1 ,0 . 0 5 ) p     than was fourth grade IQ
( 0.64, 0.001) p  . These findings are consistent with those of Willingham, Pollack, and 
Lewis [2002], who show that conscientious classroom behaviors are more strongly associated 
with GPA than with standardized achievement test scores. Likewise, Oliver, Guerin, and 
Gottfried [2007] found that parent and self-report ratings of distractibility and persistence at age 
16 predicted high school and college GPA, but not SAT test scores.  Table 10 presents results 
showing that Conscientiousness and SAT scores are similarly predictive of college GPA. 
However, in each of the studies below, Conscientiousness was measured in college which 
presents problems for a causal interpretation of this evidence due to the potential for reverse 
causality.   
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Notes: (1) Self-reported SAT scores and those obtained from college records were highly correlated (0 . 9 2 ) r  . 
Self-reported GPA and that obtained from college records were highly correlated (0 . 8 9 ) r  .  
*statistically significant at the10 percent level; **statistically significant at the 5 percent level; ***statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 
In sum, standardized achievement tests and teacher-assigned course grades both reflect 
students’ accumulated knowledge and skill.  However, they differ in important ways. The 
benefits of Conscientiousness, which inclines students to more productive work habits, seem 
greater for course grades than for test scores. This finding might explain why girls, who are 
higher than boys in Conscientiousness, reliably earn higher grades than boys in every subject Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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from primary school through college – but do not reliably outperform boys on either 
standardized achievement or intelligence tests (Duckworth and Seligman [2006]). 
 
7.B.  Labor Market Outcomes 
“Eighty percent of success is showing up.” 
  Woody Allen   
It is intuitive that personality traits affect labor market outcomes.  Showing up is required for 
completing a task.  Precisely quantifying the direct effects of personality, however, is more 
difficult.
193  Recently, social scientists have started to tackle the problem and, in general, find 
that of the Big Five, Conscientiousness and traits associated with Neuroticism (locus of control 
and self-esteem) play a particularly important role in determining job performance and wages.  
The evidence suggests multiple channels of influence, including occupational matching, 
incentive scheme selection, absenteeism, turnover, and job search. 
  Aspects of job performance are related to academic performance. For example, both 
require completing work on a schedule and involve intelligence to varying degrees.  It is 
therefore not surprising, that, as with academic performance, numerous studies and meta-
analyses have found that Conscientiousness is associated with job performance and wages 
(Nyhus and Pons [2005]; Salgado [1997]; Hogan and Holland [2003]; Barrick and Mount 
[1991]).  Figure 16 presents correlations of the Big Five and IQ with job performance. Of the Big 
Five, Conscientiousness is the most associated with job performance but is about half as 
predictive as IQ.  Conscientiousness, however, may play a more pervasive role than IQ. The 
                                                 
193 Even Allen admits that his estimate is partially based on the fact that “eighty” has better cadence than “seventy” 
(Safire [1989]).  Bowles, Gintis and Osborne [2001b] discuss evidence on the association between personality traits 
and labor market outcomes. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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importance of IQ increases with job complexity, defined as the information processing 
requirements of the job: cognitive skills are more important for professors, scientists, and senior 
managers than for semi-skilled or unskilled laborers (Schmidt and Hunter [2004]). In contrast, 
the importance of Conscientiousness does not vary much with job complexity (Barrick and 
Mount [1991]), suggesting that it pertains to a wider spectrum of jobs.  Causality remains an 
open question, as it does in most of the literature in psychology. The raw correlations presented 
in Figure 16 do not account for reverse causality, and the authors do not clearly delineate when 
the measures of personality were taken.   
  
Figure 16. Associations with Job Performance 
 
Notes:  The values for personality are correlations that were corrected for sampling error, censoring, and 
measurement error.  Job performance was based on performance ratings, productivity data and training proficiency.  
The authors do report the timing of the measurements of personality relative to job performance. Of the Big Five, 
the coefficient on Conscientiousness is the only one that is statistically significant with a lower bound on the 90% 
credibility value of 0.10.  The value for IQ is a raw correlation.   
Sources: The correlations reported for personality traits come from a meta-analysis conducted by Barrick and Mount 
[1991]. The correlation reported for IQ and job performance come from Schmidt and Hunter [2004].   
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Facets related to Emotional Stability (the opposite of Neuroticism) are also important for 
labor market success. Accounting for reverse causality, however, is particularly important, 
because strong evidence suggests labor market participation can affect traits related to 
Neuroticism (See the discussion of the research of Gottschalk [2005] in Section 8). Several 
studies have addressed this problem by using measures of personality measured well before 
individuals enter the labor market and find that locus of control and self-esteem, two facets of 
Emotional Stability,  predict wages (Judge and Hurst [2007]; Drago [2008]; Duncan and Dunifon 
[1998]).  Table 11 presents results from the structural model of Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua 
[2006] suggesting that standardized adolescent measures of locus of control and self-esteem 
predict adult earnings to a similar degree as cognitive ability. However, the effects vary across 
educational levels.  In general, noncognitive ability (personality) affects wages to a similar 
degree across all education levels, whereas cognitive ability tends to have little effect for GED 
recipients, high school dropouts, and college dropouts.  
  Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Table 11. Estimated Coefficients of Cognitive and Noncognitive Factors for Log Hourly wages 
 
 Males  Females 
Schooling Level  Cognitive  Noncognitive Cognitive Noncognitive 
High  school  dropout  .113 .424 .322 .208 
  (.076) (.092) (.125) (.103) 
GED .175  .357 .020 .242 
  (.107) (.117) (.137) (.153) 
High  School  Graduate  .259 .360 .341 .564 
  (.041) (.059) (.049) (.056) 
Some  college,  no  degree  .069 .401 .093 .569 
  (.086) (.110) (.084) (.116) 
2-year-college  degree  .039 .368 .206 .279 
  (.138) (.209) (.096) (.145) 
4-year-college degree  .296  -.060  .290  .379 
  (.075) (.175) (.066) (.103) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample from NLSY79 males and females at age 30. The sample 
excludes the oversample of blacks, Hispanics, and poor whites, the military sample, and those currently enrolled in 
college. The cognitive measure represents the standardized average over the raw ASVAB scores (arithmetic 
reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, math knowledge, and coding speed). The noncognitive 
measure is computed as a (standardized) average of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and Rotter Internal-External 
Locus of Control Scale. The model also includes a set of cohort dummies, local labor market conditions 
(unemployment rate), and the region of residence. 
Source:  Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006]. 
 
 
More recent evidence, however, suggests that personality affects wages mostly through 
the channel of educational attainment.  In Section 7.A, we presented evidence that personality 
measures (along with measurements of cognition) are strong predictors of educational 
attainment.  Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010] estimate a model of sequential 
educational choice and find that personality, as measured by participation in adolescent risky 
behaviors, primarily affects age 30 earnings through its effects on education.  They find that 
given educational attainment, the effects of personality variables on outcomes are weak.
194  
Further highlighting the possible role of educational decisions, Figure 17 shows that GED 
                                                 
194 See Heckman, Humphries, Urzua et al. [2010] for a discussion of why their results differ from Heckman, Stixrud 
and Urzua [2006]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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recipients – who have lower levels of non-cognitive skills but comparable levels of cognitive 
skills (see the previous section) – have lower wages, lower total wage income, and work fewer 
hours relative to high school graduates, when controlling for ability.  Other studies by Heckman, 
Stixrud and Urzua [2006] and Cattan [2010], using other measures of personality traits, find that 
the traits affect earnings above and beyond their effects on education and the effects of education 
on earnings.  Resolving these disparate findings is an important topic for future research. 




Figure 17. Ability-adjusted Economic Gaps Relative to Dropouts: GEDs and High School 
Graduates for Males (A) and Females (B) 
 
 
Notes: Regressions control for baseline AFQT scores, age, mother's highest grade completed, and dummies for 
urban residence at age 14, southern residence at age 14, and race. Baseline test scores are estimated using the 
procedure of Hansen, Heckman and Mullen [2004] as implemented in Carneiro, Heckman and Masterov [2005]. The 
regressions use the cross-sectional subsample and minority oversamples of the NLSY79 data. The estimation sample 
is restricted to individuals who never attend college and who have not been incarcerated. Regressions for hourly 
wage and hours worked are restricted to those reporting more than $1/hour and less than $100/hour, and individuals 
working less than 4,000 hours in a given year. Wage income regressions are restricted to individuals reporting wage 
incomes between $1,000/year and $100,000/year. All monetary values are in 2005 dollars. Standard errors are 
clustered by individual. 
Source:  Data come from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) as analyzed by Heckman, 
Humphries and Mader [2010]. 
 
These various studies have shown that personality is associated with wages, but do not 
explain why they are associated other than suggesting that the relationship occurs through the Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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channel of educational attainment.  Other mechanisms might be absenteeism, job turnover and 
unemployment. Indeed, controlling for basic demographics, employment history and health, 
Störmer and Fahr [2010] estimate that a standard deviation increase in Emotional Stability and 
Agreeableness is associated with 12% (0 . 0 1 ) p   and 9%  (0 . 0 5 ) p   fewer absent days for men 
and a standard deviation increase in Openness to Experience is associated with 13% (0 . 0 1 ) p 
more absent days for women.  However, the study uses contemporaneous measures of 
personality and absenteeism.
195 
Personality plays a role outside of formal employer-employee relationships. Self-
employed workers, with either very low or high levels of risk-aversion, a trait related to 
dimensions of personality as discussed in Section 6, tend to remain self-employed for a shorter 
time, suggesting that they are less suited to self employment (Caliendo, Fossen and Kritikos 
[2008]).
196  
Personality could directly affect the duration of unemployment spells. Gallo, Endrass, 
Bradley et al. [2003] finds that an internal locus of control is associated with a higher probability 
of reemployment.  A couple of studies have explicitly incorporated locus of control into standard 
job search models. For example, Caliendo, Cobb-Clark and Uhlendorff [2010] examine whether 
a higher locus of control increases the perceived marginal benefit of exerting search effort, so 
that people with a more internal locus of control will search more intensely and will have a 
higher reservation wage. Supporting their theory, a one standard deviation increase in internal 
locus of control was associated with a 1.9% increase in the reservation wage (0 . 0 1 ) p   and a 
5.3% increase in the number of job applications submitted (0 . 0 1 ) p  , controlling for 
                                                 
195 All other Big Five traits were not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
196 Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos use measures of risk-aversion from 2004 and employment status from 2000-2005, 
assuming that risk-aversion is constant during this period.   Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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demographic characteristics and past employment history.
197 While the measures were 
contemporaneous, the respondents became unemployed near the time that the locus of control 
was measured, potentially limiting the role of reverse causality. Similarly, McGee [2010] 
proposes a model in which people with a higher locus of control believe that search effort has a 
higher return. The theoretical model predicts that those with an internal locus of control search 
more intensely but have higher reservation wages, so that the effect on the hazard rate of leaving 
unemployment is ambiguous. In line with his predictions, he finds that a one standard deviation 
increase in pre-labor market locus of control is associated with a 1.3% increase in the reservation 
wage (0 . 0 1 ) p   and a 20% increase in the time spent searching for a job per week( 0.14) p  .
198  
Those with moderate levels of locus of control have the highest hazard rates for leaving 
unemployment. Consistent with the interpretation that locus of control affects beliefs (not 
productivity), locus of control has no effect on reemployment wages when controlling for 
reservation wages.  
Personality traits also affect occupational choice.  From an economic perspective, some 
personality traits that reflect ability might be valued more highly in some occupations, and, on 
the supply side, people with certain personality traits that relate to preferences might value the 
non-pecuniary benefits associated with particular occupations. Supporting this notion, 
Conscientiousness (Barrick and Mount [1991]; Ham, Junankar and Wells [2009]), locus of 
control and self-esteem (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006]) predict sorting into occupations. 
However, these studies use relatively broad occupational categories that might obfuscate more 
nuanced influences of personality. Analyzing eighteen occupational categories, Cobb-Clark and 
                                                 
197 The associations were partially mediated when controlling for the Big Five, suggesting that locus of control 
overlaps with the Big Five as suggested in Section 5. 
198 The effect on the reservation wage is higher for people looking for first jobs. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Tan [2009] find that for men, a one standard deviation increase in Agreeableness is associated 
with a 2.8% decrease in the probability of being a manager (0 . 0 1 ) p   and a 2.9% decrease in 
being a business professional (0 . 0 1 ) p  .  A standard deviation increase in internal locus of 
control is associated with 2.8% decrease in the probability of being a manager (0 . 0 1 ) p  . In 
contrast, for women, a one standard deviation increase in Openness to Experience is associated 
with a 2.5% increase in being a manager (0 . 0 1 ) p  .
199,200  
Furthermore, the value of cognitive ability and personality differs based on occupation 
just as they do by education. Cattan [2010] estimates a structural model of comparative 
advantage along the lines discussed in Section 3 and finds different skills are valued differently, 
depending on the occupation.  Accounting for selection, a standard deviation increase in 
adolescent sociability (related to Extraversion) leads to a 6% increase in the wages of managers 
(0 . 0 1 ) p  , a 4% increase in the wages of sales workers ( 0.10) p  , a 2% increase in the wages 
of clerical workers(0 . 0 5 ) p  , but leads to a 2% decrease in wages of professionals (0 . 1 0 ) p 
and has no significant impact on the wages of blue-collar workers. Self-esteem and locus of 
control are positively valued in all occupations, but the magnitudes also depend on the 
occupation. The effects of traits need not be uniform on wages across occupations.  
Personality might affect not only the occupational selection, but also the type of 
compensation scheme selected within occupation. Dur, Non and Roelfsema [2010] extend the 
standard principal-agent model by allowing for workers to reciprocate positive attention from 
managers by working harder. Their theoretical model implies that promotions, rather than 
monetary incentives, should be more effective for eliciting effort from reciprocal workers.  
                                                 
199 The data for occupational categories came from 2001-2006, whereas locus of control was measured in 2003-2004 
and The Big Five were measured in 2005.  Thus these concerns about reverse causality are valid. 
200 They find other statistically significant results at the 5% and 10% levels which we omit for brevity. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Workers self-select into different compensation schemes.  Supporting their model, they find that 
a one point increase on a seven point reciprocity scale for workers is associated with a 5 
percentage point increase of having a job with promotion incentives (0 . 0 1 ) p  . They use 
contemporaneous measures of reciprocity and job attributes, which could be problematic if pay-
for-performance schemes affect reciprocity. Similarly, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2009] find 
that in a German sample self-reported positive reciprocity is associated with income, and 
employment, and working over time.  Negative reciprocity tends to work in the opposite 
direction. As discussed in Section 6, these measures of social preference relate to personality.
201  
In sum, there are good theoretical reasons as well as some empirical evidence that 
personality affects labor market outcomes through channels other than education.  
Conscientiousness and Neuroticism are associated with job performance and wages to a similar 
but lesser degree than cognitive ability. The personality traits are more important for people with 
lower levels of job complexity or education level, whereas cognitive ability is more important at 
higher levels of job complexity. Nevertheless, some research suggests that facets related to 
Neuroticism might affect labor outcomes primarily through the channel of educational 
attainment. Other traits, such as Openness to Experience and Agreeableness affect more specific 
outcomes, such as selection into particular careers or type of compensation.  Table A10 in Web 
Appendix A7 summarizes a variety of studies that associate personality with labor market 
outcomes. 
                                                 
201 Agreeableness and Conscientiousness are associated with more positive reciprocity and less negative reciprocity, 
whereas Neuroticism is associated with more negative reciprocity (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman et al. [2008]).    Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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7.C.  Personality and Health
202 
A link between personality and health has been noted for thousands of years.  Hippocrates 
argued that an imbalance of the four temperaments would affect both personality and physical 
health.
203  Consistent with Hippocrates’ ideas, recent evidence suggests that personality predicts 
health. The mechanisms are relatively unexplored but some empirical evidence suggests that 
personality affects health-related behavior, psychological responses, and social relationships 
(Kern and Friedman [2010a]). 
A growing body of work shows that personality measures predict longevity.  Roberts, 
Kuncel, Shiner et al. [2007] review evidence from 34 different studies on the predictive validity 
of Big Five personality traits, relative to that of cognitive ability and socioeconomic status, for 
longevity. Most studies in their meta-analysis control for relevant background factors, including 
gender and severity of disease. Roberts and colleagues convert the results of each study into 
correlation coefficients that can be compared across studies. As shown in Figure 18, 
Conscientiousness was a stronger predictor of longevity than any other Big Five trait and a 
stronger predictor than either IQ or socioeconomic status.
204 In general, traits related to 
Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience, and Agreeableness are associated with longer lives, 
whereas those related to Neuroticism are associated with shorter life spans.
205  The magnitudes 
of the relationships, however, vary across studies and not all results are replicable.  While the 
specific channels through which personality affects longevity and health are largely unknown, 
several studies provide some clues.  
                                                 
202 This section is a summary of Pietro Biroli’s extensive discussion of personality and health that is presented in 
Web Appendix A7.A. 
203 See Hampson and Friedman [2008] and Friedman [2007] for a brief historic review. 
204 The timing of the measurements of personality relative to the outcomes varies by study.   
205 See Martin, Friedman and Schwartz [2007]; Kern and Friedman [2008]; Mroczek and Spiro [2007]; Boyle, 




Figure 18. Correlations of Mortality with Personality, IQ, and Socioeconomic Status (SES) 
 
Notes: The figure represents results from a meta-analysis of 34 studies. Average effects (in the correlation metric) of 
low socioeconomic status (SES), low IQ, low Conscientiousness (C), low Extraversion/Positive Emotion (E/PE), 
Neuroticism (N), and low Agreeableness (A) on mortality. Error bars represent standard error. The lengths of the 
studies represented vary from 1 year to 71 years.  
Source:  Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner et al. [2007] 
  Personality may affect health-related behavior, such as smoking, diet, and exercise. For 
example, Hampson, Goldberg, Vogt et al. [2007] find that high scores of teacher-assessments of 
Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness during elementary school predict overall 
health status during midlife (less smoking, more exercise, better self-rated health) and indirectly 
affect health through educational attainment. The correlations that were statistically significant at 
the 5% level or less ranged from 0.06 for the effect of Extraversion on physical activity to 0.12 
for the effect of Conscientiousness on self-reported health status.   Both the initial level and the 
growth in hostility (a facet of Neuroticism) throughout elementary school predict cigarette, 
alcohol, and marijuana use in high school, and sociability (a trait related to Extraversion) predicts 
drinking but not smoking (Hampson, Tildesley, Andrews et al. [2010]). As Figure 19 illustrates,  
Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] find that their personality factor affects the probability of Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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daily smoking for males. The gradient is steepest at the high and low quantiles of the 
distribution.   
 
Figure 19. Probability of Daily Smoking by Age 18 for Males 
 
Notes: The data are simulated from the estimates of the model of Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] and their 
NLSY79 sample. They use the standard convention that higher deciles are associated with higher values of the 
variable. The confidence intervals are computed using bootstrapping (200 draws). Solid lines depict probability, and 
dashed lines, 2.5%–97.5% confidence intervals.  The upper curve is the joint density.  The two marginal curves (ii) 
and (iii) are evaluated at the mean of the trait not being varied. 
Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006, Figure 22] 
 
Although many studies control for socioeconomic and health factors associated with 
mortality, most do not explore how personality affects health throughout the life-cycle (Kern and 
Friedman [2010b]). The relationship between health and personality is complicated because Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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health can affect personality.
206  Some studies investigate the mechanisms by which personality 
affects health by considering how initial endowment of traits and health affect mid-life 
outcomes, such as healthy behavior and education, which in turn can influence health and 
longevity.  For example, Gale, Batty and Deary [2008] find that a one standard deviation 
increase in age-10 locus of control decreases the risk of adult obesity by 8% ( 0.05 p  ).  
Similarly, Friedman, Kern and Reynolds [2010] find that in a cohort of gifted children, 
Conscientiousness better predicted longevity and social interactions at age 70. They find that 
Neuroticism is associated with worse health for women but better health for men. These studies 
do not account for the possibility that health and personality exhibit dynamic complementarities 
over the life cycle.  
  Several studies have controlled for reverse-causality by using structural models to 
estimate the life-cycle evolution of health. Using a structural model of skill expression, Conti and 
Heckman [2010] estimate the causal relationship between personality traits, initial health 
endowments and endogenous choices about schooling and post-schooling outcomes. They find 
that women sort into higher education based on cognitive ability, personality traits and initial 
health endowment. Furthermore, personality and health status measured during youth explain 
more than half of the difference in poor health, depression and obesity at age 30.  Figure 20 
shows that for males, personality and health endowments are more predictive than the cognitive 
ones, whereas for females all three are similarly predictive.  Using similar methods, Savelyev 
[2010] finds that both child Conscientiousness and higher education increase survival through 
age 80, but these traits serve as substitutes for each other so that effects of education are only 
strong at low levels of Conscientiousness. 
                                                 
206 Pesonen, Räikkönen, Heinonen et al. [2008], Ryden, Sullivan, Torgerson et al. [2003], Sell, Tooby and Cosmides 





Figure 20. Effects of Cognitive, Noncognitive, and Health Endowments on Self-rated Health  
(A Lower Number Corresponds to a Better Outcome) 
 
 
Notes: Effects of endowments on fair or poor health outcomes for males (A) and females (B). The endowments and 
the outcomes are simulated from the estimates of the model in each panel; when the authors compute the effect of 
each endowment on the outcome, they integrate out the observable characteristics and fix the other two endowments 
at their overall means. 
Source: Conti and Heckman [2010]. 
 
 
In sum, Conscientiousness seems to be the most important Big Five trait in predicting 
health outcomes. Personality likely affects health through behaviors such as smoking, eating, and 
exercising.  Studies that model the dynamic evolution of health over the life cycle find that 
personality affects health outcomes as much as cognitive measures or even more so in some 





Few studies have examined the relationship between the Big Five and criminal behavior.  The 
available evidence suggests that Big Five Conscientiousness and Agreeableness are important 
protective factors against criminal activity.  Figure 21 illustrates that in a sample of at-risk youth, 
boys who had committed severe delinquent behaviors were more than three quarters of a 
standard deviation lower in Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, as measured by mother’s 
reports at age 12 or 13, than boys who had committed minor or no delinquent behaviors up to 
that age (John, Caspi, Robins et al. [1994]). 
 
Figure 21. Juvenile Delinquency and the Big Five 
 
Notes: Delinquents are those who have committed at least one of the following: breaking and entering, strong-
arming, or selling drugs. Non-delinquents have committed at most one of the following stealing at home, vandalism 
at home, or theft of something less than $5. The y-axis reports mean differences in standardized scores of the Big 
Five measures based on mother’s reports. The measures were taken at ages 12-13 and reflect cumulative delinquent 
behavior.  
Source: John, Caspi, Robins et al. [1994]. 
Much of the literature in criminology focuses on the effects of self-control on crime. 
People with low self-control are “impulsive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-
                                                 
207 This section summarizes the more comprehensive survey of the literature on personality and crime prepared by 
Amanda Agan.  See Web Appendix Section A7.B for her survey. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
168 
 
taking, short-sighted, and non-verbal” (Gottfredson and Hirschi [1990], p. 90).  Measures of self-
control are associated with Big Five Conscientiousness (O’Gorman and Baxter [2002]). Several 
studies have confirmed that self-control is associated with criminal activity. In an international 
sample, controlling for basic demographics, a measure of self-control explained between 10% 
and 16% of the variance in contemporaneously measured theft, assault, drug use, and vandalism 
(Vazsonyi, Pickering, Junger et al. [2001]).  Self-control relates to controlling impulsive 
behavior so it is not surprising that sensation-seeking and impulsivity are also positively 
associated with crime. In a sample of college students, partial correlations between a crime 
factor
208 and sensation-seeking and impulsive behavior were of 0.27 and 0.13 respectively, when 
controlling for peer behavior and measures of risk appraisal  (Horvath and Zuckerman [1993]).  
Self-control might not be the entire story. Negative emotionality—a tendency towards 
depression likely related Neuroticism—is associated with contemporaneously measured 
delinquency.  Raw correlation coefficients range from  0.13 r   for whites (0 . 0 5 ) p   and 
0.20 r   for black (0 . 0 5 ) p   in one sample (Caspi, Moffit, Silva et al. [1994]) to  0.22 r   
(0 . 0 1 ) p   in another sample (Agnew, Brezina, Wright et al. [2002]).  None of these studies 
control for cognitive ability nor do they address causality.  
Further, an emerging literature investigates causal effects of education on crime.  
Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006] estimate a causal model of personality and education 
accounting for reverse causality.  They find that both cognitive traits and noncognitive traits, as 
captured by locus of control and self esteem are affected by schooling.
209  These traits in turn are 
                                                 
208  The crime factor is based on arrest for selling or buying drugs, shoplifting, driving while drunk, perjury, forging 
checks, and vandalizing. 
209 We discuss this work in Section 8. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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equally predictive of criminal activity.
210  Using changes in compulsory schooling laws as an 
instrument, Lochner and Moretti [2004] and Machin, Marie and Vujić [2010] find that years of 
education are negatively associated with criminal activities in the US and UK, respectively.  In a 
structural model of skill production, Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] show that 




                                                 
210 Their measure of prediction is the effect of decile improvements of cognition and personality traits on the 




8.  Stability and Change in Personality Traits and Preferences 
In this section, we review empirical evidence that shows that personality and IQ change over the 
life cycle.  We explore three channels through which personality can change.  First, we discuss 
the contribution of ontogeny (programmed developmental processes common to all persons) as 
well as sociogeny (shared socialization processes) and show how aspects of personality, such as 
sensation-seeking, evolve as the brain develops. Second, we show how personality changes 
through external forces that operate through alterations in normal biology, such as brain lesions 
and chemical interventions. Third, and most relevant for policy, we show that education, 
interventions, and parental investment can affect personality throughout the lifecycle.  We also 
discuss the less abundant evidence on the malleability of preferences. 
8.A.  Broad Evidence on Changes in Traits over the Life Cycle 
The malleability of personality can be defined and measured in several ways: Mean-level change 
refers to change over time in absolute levels of a trait and is measured by changes in measures of 
a trait over time.  Rank-order change, in contrast, refers to changes in the ordinal ranking of a 
trait in a population and is measured by rank correlations among longitudinal measures.  One 
commonly held view is that rank-order or mean-level change in personality is nearly impossible 
after early adulthood. The speculation of James [1890] that “in most of us, by the age of thirty, 
the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again” (pp. 125-126) is widely touted (see 
Costa and McCrae [1994], McCrae and Costa [1990; 1994; 1996; 2003], Costa, McCrae and 
Siegler [1999]).  However, mounting evidence suggests that the personality-as-plaster view is not 
correct (Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer [2006], Roberts and Mroczek [2008]). 
During the early years of life, mean-level changes in measured traits are obvious and 
dramatic. For example, children become much more capable of self-control as they move from Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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infancy into toddler and preschool years (McCabe, Cunnington and Brooks-Gunn [2004], 
Mischel and Metzner [1962], Posner and Rothbart [2000], Vaughn, Kopp and Krakow [1984]). 
But mean-level changes in measured personality are also apparent, albeit less extreme, later in 
life. In a 2006 meta-analysis of longitudinal studies, Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer [2006] 
examine cumulative lifetime change in Big Five Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, and Agreeableness.  They disaggregate Big Five “Extraversion” into social 
dominance (assertiveness, dominance) and social vitality (talkativeness, gregariousness, and 
sociability). Figure 22 shows that people typically become more socially dominant, 
conscientious, and emotionally stable (non-neurotic) across the life cycle, whereas social vitality 
and Openness to Experience rise early in life and then fall in old age.
211  Surprisingly, after 
childhood, the greatest mean-level change in most measured personality traits takes place not 
during adolescence, but rather in young adulthood.   
                                                 
211 Figure A3 in Section A9 of the Web Appendix presents results for a variety of cognitive, personality and 
preference parameters from a cross-sectional study based on the GSOEP data.  Samples are small and standard 
errors are large. Many preference parameters show a surprising stability over the life cycle.  Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Figure 22. Cumulative Mean-Level Changes in Personality Across the Life Cycle 
 
Note: Social vitality and social dominance are aspects of Big Five Extraversion. Cumulative d values represent total 
lifetime change in units of standard deviations (“effect sizes”). 
Source: Figure taken from Roberts, Walton and Viechtbauer [2006] and Roberts and Mroczek [2008]. Reprinted 
with permission of the authors. 
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Figure 23. Longitudinal Analysis (top panel) and Cross-Sectional Analysis (bottom panel) of 




Notes: T-scores on the y-axis are standardized scores with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of ten. 
Source: Figures taken from Schaie [1994]. Used with permission of the publisher. 
 
In contrast, a longitudinal study of adult intellectual development shows mean-level 
declines in cognitive skills, particularly cognitive processing speed, after age 55 or so (Schaie 
[1994]). The top panel of   Figure 23 shows mean-level changes in cognitive skills using a 





























































212 As schematically illustrated in Figure 24, fluid intelligence decreases 
and crystallized intelligence rises over the life cycle (Horn [1970]). Accumulated skills and 
knowledge are important: most of us would rather use an experienced cardiac surgeon who has 
seen hundreds of cases just like ours to perform our surgery, rather than an exceptionally bright 
young surgeon with minimal experience. 
 




Source: Figure from Horn [1970]. Used with permission of Elsevier. 
                                                 
212 Cross-sectional estimates of mean-level change are biased by cohort effects (for example, the Flynn effect) 
whereas longitudinal estimates are biased by test-retest learning (when the same IQ tests are administered repeatedly 
to the same subjects) and by selective attrition. Thus, both estimates must be considered in conjunction as evidence 
for mean-level change. 




















Rank-order stability in measured personality increases steadily over the lifespan.   Figure 
25 shows that seven-year test-retest stability estimates for personality plateau far from unity, at 
0.74 r  , about the same level as terminal stability estimates for IQ (Roberts and DelVecchio 
[2000]). However, measured personality does not reach this plateau until at least age 50; whereas 
IQ reaches this plateau by age six or eight (Hopkins and Bracht [1975], Schuerger and Witt 
[1989]). Figure 26 shows rank order stability of IQ over broad age ranges. 
 
Figure 25. Rank-Order Stability of Personality over the Life Cycle 
 
Notes: The meta-analysis and reflects test-retest correlations over, on average, 6.7-year periods. 
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Figure 26. Rank-Order Stability of IQ Across the Life Span 
 
Notes: The points represent ten-year, test-retest correlations over ten-year intervals. Grade level, not age, is on the x-
axis.  
Source: Figure reproduced from Hopkins and Bracht [1975]. Used with permission of the publisher. 
 
8.B.  Evidence on Ontogenic and Sociogenic Change  
A useful dichotomy contrasts normative change, defined as changes that are caused either by 
biological programming (ontogenic) or by predictable changes in social roles (sociogenic), with 
non-normative change, encompassing both intentional change, caused by deliberate, self-directed 
efforts, deliberately chosen changes in social roles and atypical life events (trauma, for 
example).
213   
If, as McCrae and colleagues have claimed, normative changes reflect genetically 
programmed processes then investment should not affect change. The current literature in 
psychology claims that genetic factors are largely responsible for stability in personality in 
                                                 
213 Normative here refers to what most people or the average person experiences. If most people deliberately do 
something that causes change, it would be normative. But that seems unlikely. Therefore, most deliberative change 
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adulthood whereas environmental factors are mostly responsible for change (Blonigen, Hicks, 
Krueger et al. [2006]; Plomin and Nesselroade [1990]).
214,215   
In a longitudinal study of twins surveyed at age 20 and then again at age 30, about 80 
percent of the variance of the stable component of personality was attributed to genetic factors 
(McGue, Bacon and Lykken [1993]). In the same study, change in measured personality was 
mostly attributed to environmental factors.  Helson, Kwan, John et al. [2002], for example, 
document the substantial influence that social roles and cultural milieu can have on personality 
development.  Their analysis is consistent with an economic model of investment and the 
response of measured traits to incentives. However, recent evidence suggests that environmental 
factors, and in particular stable social roles, also contribute to stability in personality and that 
genetic factors can contribute to change (see Roberts, Wood and Caspi [2008] for a review). 
Research on IQ also points to the enduring effects of genes, in contrast to more transient 
effects of environmental influences, which depend on a multitude of unstable variables, 
including social roles, levels of physical maturity and decline, and historical and cultural 
milieu.
216  Increases in the heritability of IQ from childhood (about 40 percent) to adulthood 
(estimates range from 60 percent to 80 percent) are well-documented in studies of behavioral 
genetics and possibly reflect increasing control of the individual (vs. parents) over environment 
(Bergen, Gardner and Kendler [2007]; McGue, Bouchard, Iacono et al. [1993]; Plomin, DeFries, 
                                                 
214 Plomin and the essays in the December issue of Monographs for the Society for Research in Child Development 
(Kovas, Haworth, Philip et al. [2007]) extend this analysis to childhood. 
215 We note that there is controversy in the literature about the validity of conventional estimates of heritability.  It 
centers on the linearity and additivity assumptions, the assumed absence of interactions between genes and 
environment, and the assumption that genes do not select environments. 
216 We note here that while genes remain constant through the life cycle, the expression of genes is determined, in 
part, by experience. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Craig et al. [2002]).
217 Heritability estimates for Big Five traits are relatively stable across the 
life cycle at about 40 to 60 percent (Bouchard and Loehlin [2001]).
218  Behavioral genetics 
studies typically estimate the effect of common parental environments on adult measures of 
outcomes to be near zero, but Turkheimer, Haley, Waldron et al. [2003] find estimates from such 
studies to be biased downward by the over-representation of middle- and upper-class families. 
Among poor families, Turkheimer et al. find that 60 percent of the variance in IQ is accounted 
for by shared environment and heritability estimates are much smaller than they are for affluent 
families, whereas among affluent families, the contribution of heritability is much larger. 
Krueger and colleagues have recently demonstrated that other moderators also influence the 
heritability of traits (see Krueger, South, Johnson et al. [2008]).
219  
Genes exert their influence in part through the selection and evocation of environments 
that are compatible with one’s genotype—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as “gene-
environment correlation” or “nature via nurture” (see Rutter [2006a]). As individuals move from 
childhood to adulthood, they have more control over their environments, and thus gene-
environment correlation becomes more important because shared environments become less 
common.
220  
Substantial but temporary influence of environment is a basic assumption of the Dickens-
Flynn model reconciling the high heritability of IQ and massive gains of IQ between generations 
                                                 
217 Devlin, Daniels and Roeder [1997] suggest that traditional estimates of the heritability of IQ may be inflated 
because they fail to take into account the effect of the environment of the maternal womb.  See also Rutter [2006b] 
and an emerging literature on epigenetics. 
218 Lykken [2007] suggests that heritability estimates for personality are substantially higher when situational 
influence and measurement error are minimized by taking multiple measures at least a few months apart.  
219 It is important to note that shared environment is not the same as environment.  Children may be treated 
individually by parents. 
220 Gene-environment interactions are another means by which genes and environment jointly influence traits.  The 
effects of the environment depend on the genes and vice versa (see Caspi, Sugden, Moffitt et al. [2003]; Moffitt, 
Caspi and Rutter [2005]; and Caspi, McClay, Moffitt et al. [2002]). Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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(Dickens and Flynn [2001]).
221 The relatively short half-life of common environmental 
influences may also explain why adopted children resemble their biological parents more and 
more and their adopted parents less and less as they grow older (Scarr, Weinberg and Waldman 
[1993]).
222 
It is important to note that the family studies of genetic influence measure only the effects 
of shared environments, which become less similar as children age.  Thus even identical twins 
may be motivated to seek out different environments over time (Rutter [2006a]).  Recent 
evidence that first born children grow up, on average, to have three points higher IQ than their 
younger siblings reinforces the point that parents do not necessarily provide identical 
environments in childhood (Kristensen and Bjerkedal [2007]).  Conti, Heckman, Yi et al. [2010] 
demonstrate how parents differentially respond to health shocks of identical twins.  Lizzeri and 
Siniscalchi [2008] develop an economic model of differential parenting of siblings.  
  As mentioned earlier, genes could affect not only the base level of personality but also 
how personality changes over the life cycle. Just as people grow taller throughout childhood, 
people’s personalities might naturally develop, even without investment. Steinberg [2008] 
speculates that typical biological (ontogenic) development explains the surge of risk-taking in 
adolescence followed by the decline in adulthood. Figure 27 illustrates his conjecture about how 
basic intellectual ability and psychosocial maturity (related, e.g., to impulsivity, risk perception, 
                                                 
221 A second crucial assumption is that environmental influence can be amplified by a “social multiplier” effect: 
smarter individuals create for one another an enriched environment, which in turn increases intelligence, and so on.  
Some caution must be taken in relying on the claims in this literature.  Blair, Gamson, Thorne et al. [2005] attribute 
the Flynn effect to increasing access to formal schooling early in the twentieth century and, from the mid-century 
onward, to increasing fluid cognitive demand of mathematics curricula.  Flynn [2007] concurs about the former but 
believes that the latter had negligible impact.  
222 The literature establishes that shared environments become less important as children age.  This literature does 
not say that environments do not matter. This effect can arise because genetically similar children (or their parents) 
choose different environments to distinguish themselves or because of parental investment (Lizzeri and Siniscalchi 
[2008]). Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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sensation-seeking, future orientation) evolve over the life cycle.
223  He argues that intellectual 
ability peaks around age 16, whereas psychosocial maturity develops during late adulthood. In 
his model, the increase in adolescent risk taking is due to a restructuring of the brain’s 
dopaminergic system (responsible for the brain’s reward processing) in such a way that 
immediate or novel experiences yield higher rewards, especially in the presence of peers. He 
attributes declines in risk-taking due to development of the brain’s cognitive control system, 
specifically improvements in the prefrontal cortex which promote aspects of executive function 
such as response inhibition, planning ahead, weighing risks and rewards, and the simultaneous 
consideration of multiple information sources. Interestingly, even in his model, sensation-
seeking partly depends on the presence of peers, which corresponds to aspects of the situation 
() h  in the framework of Section 3. This example highlights the difficulty in disentangling 
situational and biological changes in personality.    
                                                 




Figure 27. Proportion of Individuals in Each Age Group Scoring at or Above the Mean for 26- to 
30-Year-Olds on Indices of Intellectual and Psychosocial Maturity.  
 




What factors other than preprogrammed genetic influences might account for mean-level 
changes in personality? Personality change in adulthood may be precipitated by major shifts in 
social roles (for example, getting a job for the first time or becoming a parent). If social role 
changes are experienced by most people in a population at the same time, we will observe the 
effects as mean-level changes in measured personality. If, on the other hand, these social roles 
are not assumed synchronously, we will observe rank-order changes.  
One difficulty with many of the studies that address this question is the problem of 
reverse causality. Changes in personality may drive social role changes rather than the other way 
around.   Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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8.C.  External Changes to Biology 
The previous subsection discusses the difficulty in disentangling biological changes in 
personality from environmental or situational effects. In this subsection we provide some 
evidence on causal changes in personality due to external forces that either damage parts of the 
brain or abruptly alter the chemistry of the brain.  
 
Brain Lesion Studies 
Brain lesion studies provide the most dramatic and convincing evidence that personality can 
change. The most famous example is Phineas Gage, a construction foreman whose head was 
impaled by a metal spike and who subsequently changed from being polite and dependable to 
rude and unreliable (Damasio, Grabowski, Frank et al. [2005]). Since then, there have been many 
more case studies of patients with brain damage. For example, Mataró, Jurado, García-Sánchez 
et al. [2001] describe the behavior of a Spanish patient whose head was impaled by an iron spike, 
injuring both frontal lobes. Like Phineas Gage, his behavior changed. After the accident, he had 
difficulty planning, became more irritable, and had problems regulating emotions. Unlike 
Phineas, he was cheerful and did not display anti-social behavior, suggesting the personality is 
malleable in different dimensions, even through brain damage.   
The effects of brain damage are persistent. After five years,  patients who suffered 
traumatic head injuries have social impairments, such as anger control, even when their 
performance on cognitive tasks returns to the normal range (Lezak [1987]).   
Using more advanced methods, neuroscientists have delved deeper into the inner 
workings of the brain. Some recent studies have investigated how two parts of the brain, the 
amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), affect personality by regulating emotion. 
Bechara [2005] discusses how emotion might allow people to assign and store value to particular Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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outcomes in a way that is useful for decision-making. The amygdala is thought to signal 
“impulsive” emotional responses to immediate environmental stimuli, such as reacting quickly to 
a snake.   In contrast, the VMPC is thought to signal “reflective” emotional responses to 
memories and knowledge. These two parts of the brain conflict with each other when people 
make decisions: signals from the amygdala induce behavior that implicitly values immediate 
outcomes, whereas signals from the VMPC reflect long-run considerations.  The stronger signal 
dictates the resultant behavior. People with damage to these parts of the brain, exhibit changes in 
personality. For example, people with damage to the VMPC, the part that regulates reflective 
emotion, tend to act impulsively and seem to overvalue short-term outcomes in a way that leads 
to long-term financial loss and loss of friendships, despite having relatively normal levels of 
intellectual capacity. These findings are consistent with McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and 
Cohen’s    system that describes hyperbolic discounting (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein et 
al. [2004]). However, some recent research in neuroscience challenges this theory and presents 
empirical evidence that contradicts     theory (Monterosso and Luo [2010]).   
  Further experiments involving these parts of the brain highlight why attempts to separate 
cognitive and noncognitive traits might be futile. For example, Bechara and Damasio [2005] 
study the performance of patients with lesions in the VMPC in a seemingly cognitive task. The 
participants were given the Iowa Gambling Task, in which they repeatedly chose between four 
decks of cards that represented lotteries of different value, unknown to the participant at the 
onset. Throughout the experiment, the authors also measured skin conductance responses 
(SCRs), a known physiological reflection of emotion.  By trial and error, participants without 
lesions learned to choose the “better” decks of cards with lower short-term payoffs but higher 
average payoffs. The normal participants also showed emotional activity both when picking their Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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card and when receiving the rewards or penalties. In contrast, people with lesions never learned 
to pick the better decks, seemingly because they could not develop emotional responses. Patients 
with damage to the amygdala never showed emotional response to rewards or penalties, 
suggesting they never learned to value the outcomes at all. Patients with damage to the VMPC 
showed emotional response only when receiving the reward or penalty but not when selecting 
decks, suggesting that they might not have reflective emotional responses crucial in considering 
future consequences. The findings suggest that emotion helps to guide decision-making. 
Numerous other studies show the role of the amygdala in signaling emotions and its relationship 
to cognition and behavior (Phelps [2006]).  
 
Chemical and Laboratory Interventions 
A few recent studies show that it is possible to alter preferences and personality through 
experiments that change the brain’s chemistry. For example, magnetic disruption of the left 
lateral prefrontal cortex can increase experimentally elicited discount rates (Figner, Knoch, 
Johnson et al. [2010]). Similarly, nasal sprays of oxytocin increase trust (distinct from altruism 
or ability to assess probabilities) in a game-theoretic experiment (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak et al. 
[2005]). As discussed in Section 5, the Big Five traits are linked to personality disorders. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that administering paroxetine, a drug for treating depression, 
decreases Neuroticism and increases Extraversion. More surprising is that the drug affects 
personality above and beyond its direct effects on depression. Furthermore, patients who become 
less neurotic are also less likely to relapse even after treatment, suggesting that paroxetine might 
have a long-lasting impact through a bio-chemical change in the brain (Tang, DeRubeis, Hollon 
et al. [2009]). Similarly, Knutson, Wolkowitz, Cole et al. [1998] find evidence that paroxetine 




8.D.  The Evidence on the Causal Effects of Parental Investment, Education, and 
Interventions   
Even though brain lesion studies and laboratory experiments provide convincing causal evidence 
that personality can be changed, they are not viable mechanisms for large scale policy 
interventions.  A growing body of evidence suggests that education, parental investment, and 
interventions can causally affect personality traits. More than just ontogenic and sociogenic 
processes are at work.  A major contribution of economics to the literature in psychology is to 
develop and apply a framework to investigate how investment, including education, work 
experience, and self help, changes traits.  We discuss the evidence on trait changes through these 
mechanisms, using the theoretical framework introduced in Section 3.H as a guide.  In all of the 
models considered in this subsection, the development of traits arises from purposive actions of 
agents and not just from exogenous biological processes. 
  The empirical literature has not estimated investment model (16) in Section 3.H in its full 
generality.  It focuses on estimating productivity functions (1) specified in terms of traits  .  
Due to data limitations, there is no empirical work yet to report that standardizes for effort or for 
situation.   To simplify the notation, we keep h  implicit.  
  Denote the productivity traits at age v by 
v  .  Substituting for actions in terms of their 
determinants, the performance on task  j  at age v is 
(22)      ,,    1 , ,,  
vv v v
jj j Pe j J v       
where 
v
j e  is effort devoted to task  j  at time v.  For simplicity, break 
v   into cognitive,  , and 
personality,  , components: Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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    ,,
vv v
     
using the notation of Section 3.
224  
v
j e  depends on preferences, rewards and information. 
  The vector of productivity traits evolves via a simplified version of (16): 
(23)   
1 ,,,  1 , , .
vv v v v INh v V  
    
v IN  is interpreted very broadly to include investment by parents, schools, work experience and 
interventions.  
0   is the vector of initial endowments.  Some components of effort may be 
included in investment. 
The productivity of investment can depend on the age at which it is made. A crucial 
feature of the technology that helps to explain many findings in the literature on skill formation 















Technology (23) is characterized by static complementarity between period v traits and 
period v investment.  The higher 
v  , the higher the productivity of the investment.  There is also 
dynamic complementarity if the technology determines period  1  v  traits  
1 v 
 .  This generates 
complementarity between investment in period  1  v  and investment in period s ,  1 sv .  
Higher investment in period v raises 
1 v 
  because technology  is increasing in 
v IN , which in 
turn raises 
s   because the technology is increasing in 








s   and 
s IN  are complements, as a consequence of (24). 
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Dynamic complementarity explains the evidence that early nurturing environments affect 
the ability of animals and humans to learn.  It explains why investments in disadvantaged young 
children are so productive.  (See Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron et al. [2006].)  Early investments 
enhance the productivity of later investments.  Dynamic complementarity also explains why 
investment in low ability adults often has such low returns—because the stock of 
v   is low.
225    









  , v












 for all 
vv
  , v is a sensitive period.
226  The technology of skill formation is consistent with a body of 
evidence that shows critical and sensitive periods in human development for a variety of traits.
227 
Figure 28 shows how adult outcomes are shaped by sequences of investments over the 
life cycle.  The importance of the early years depends on how easy it is to reverse adverse early 
effects with later investment.  The literature shows that resilience and remediation are possible, 
but are more costly later on.
228  The accumulation of investments over the life cycle of the child 
determines adult outcomes and the choices people will make when they become adults.  To 
capture these interactive effects requires nonlinear models. 
For the purposes of policy analysis, it is important to know at which stage of the life 
cycle interventions are the most effective and to move beyond the correlations between early life 
and later life events to understand the mechanisms of skill formation.  Cunha and Heckman 
[2008] and Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] estimate technologies of skill formation to 
                                                 
225 See the evidence in Cunha and Heckman [2007], Heckman [2007], Heckman [2008b] and in Cunha, Heckman, 
Lochner et al. [2006]. 
226 This expression is evaluated at common levels of the inputs on both sides of the expression. 
227 See the evidence summarized in Heckman [2008b], Cunha and Heckman [2009], and Cunha, Heckman, Lochner 
et al. [2006]. 
228 See Cunha and Heckman [2007; 2009], Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010], and Heckman [2008b]. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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understand how the skills of children evolve in response to the stock of skills children have 
already accumulated, the investments made by their parents and the stock of skills accumulated 
by the parents. 
 
Figure 28.  A Life Cycle Framework for Organizing Studies and Integrating Evidence:  1 V   
Period Life Cycle
 
v   capacities at v 
v IN : investment at v 
v h  environments at time v 
 
1 ,,
vv v v v INh  


















  The most general empirical specification of the technology to date is that of Cunha, 
Heckman and Schennach [2010].  They allow for Q different developmental stages in the life of 
the child:  {1, , } qQ  .  Developmental stages may be defined over specific ranges of ages, Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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{1, , } vV  , so QV  .  They assume that each component of 
v   and 
v IN  can be represented by 
a scalar, as can environment 
v h .
229  Letting 
v
k IN  be investment in trait k  at age v, they estimate 
a CES, stage-specific, version of (23) for trait k  at stage q : 
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      
  A main finding of Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] is that the elasticity of 
substitution 
q
   governing the acquisition of cognitive traits decreases with q.  This is consistent 
with other evidence that shows the declining malleability of cognition with age, i.e., that 
cognitive deficits are easier to remedy at early ages than at later ages.  At the same time, 
q
  , 
associated with personality, stays roughly constant over q.  This is consistent with evidence on 
the emergence of psychological maturity, as shown in Figure 27.
230   
  Adjoined with measurement systems for productivity on tasks in period v (equation 
(22)), the econometric model is a “state space” model that accounts for errors in measurements 
and endogeneity of inputs.  Cunha and Heckman [2008] and Cunha, Heckman and Schennach 
[2010] estimate these models on panel data on the growth dynamics of individuals and show that 
accounting for measurement error and endogeneity is empirically important. 
  Cunha, Heckman and Schennach [2010] estimate technology (25) using longitudinal data 
on the development of children with rich measures of parental investment and of child traits.  
They focus on the substitution parameters to examine the issue of the cost of remediating early 
                                                 
229 For them, environment is parental environment. 
230 Cunha and Heckman [2008] estimate a linear version of the technology.  Their specification rules out interaction 
and assumes that, over the feasible range, investment can substitute for skill deficits. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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disadvantage at later ages.  Their findings shed light on the dynamic process of capability 
formation in a way that raw correlations do not. They find that self-productivity becomes 
stronger as children become older, for both cognitive and noncognitive capability formation. The 
elasticity of substitution for cognitive inputs is smaller in second stage production, so that it is 
more difficult to compensate for the effects of adverse environments on cognitive endowments at 
later ages than it is at earlier ages.   
  This finding helps to explain the evidence on ineffective cognitive remediation strategies 
for disadvantaged adolescents documented in Cunha, Heckman, Lochner et al. [2006], Knudsen, 
Heckman, Cameron et al. [2006] and Cunha and Heckman [2007]. Personality traits foster the 
development of cognition but not vice versa.  It is equally easy to substitute at both stages for 
socioemotional skills over the life cycle. Overall, 16% of the variation in educational attainment 
is explained by adolescent cognitive traits, 12% is due to adolescent personality (socioemotional 
traits), and 15% is due to measured parental investments. 
8.D.1.  Evidence of Change in Traits from Other Studies of Parental Investment 
Cunha, Heckman, Lochner et al. [2006] summarize a large literature on child development.  
Evidence from a substantial literature suggests that for intelligence, the enduring effects of 
environment are greater earlier in life. Duyme, Dumaret and Tomkiewicz [1999] studied children 
with IQs below 86 who were adopted between the ages of four and six into stable homes.  As 
measured in their adolescent years, children adopted into high-SES homes gained an average of 
19.5 IQ points; children adopted into low-SES homes showed an average gain of 7.7 IQ points. 
In studies of Romanian children taken from impoverished orphanages and placed into middle-
class British homes, the long-term salutary effects of adoption on cognitive ability were dramatic 
when infants were placed before they reached six months, and markedly less so when adoption Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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was delayed until later ages (Beckett, Maughan, Rutter et al. [2006]). Notably, children adopted 
at different ages between six to 42 months did not differ at age 11 from each other in the terms of 
cognitive ability, with all children demonstrating an average deficit of 15 IQ points relative to 
children who had been adopted earlier in life. The effects of low nutrition had no effect on 
cognitive outcomes at age 11, suggesting a prominent role for psychological deprivation. As 
Beckett and colleagues point out, these findings are consistent with the existence of a very early 
critical or sensitive period for intellectual development in which particular environmental stimuli 
are necessary for normative axonal rewiring (see Uylings [2006] and Rutter [2006b] for 
reviews).
231  
8.D.2.  The Effects of Schooling on Cognitive and Personality Traits 
Despite a large literature on the effects of schooling on shaping preferences (see Bowles and 
Gintis [1976] and the literature it spawned), there is surprisingly little direct evidence on the 
effect of schooling on cognitive and personality traits.  An exception is the analysis of Heckman, 
Stixrud and Urzua [2006].  The authors formulate and estimate an economic model that identifies 
the effect of cognitive and personality traits on schooling and a variety of other outcomes.  The 
model controls for the effect of schooling in boosting both cognitive and personality measures 
and thus controls for reverse causality.  They estimate their model on the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), which has measures on the components of the Armed Services 
Vocational Battery (ASVAB) that are used to create the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), 
a widely used measure of cognition.  In addition, the NLSY79 has two measures of personality.  
The Rotter Locus of Control Scale, discussed in Section 5, is designed to capture the extent to 
                                                 
231 However, the data are also consistent with alternative explanations such as extreme stress permanently damaging 
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which individuals believe that they have control over their lives through self-motivation or self-
determination as opposed to the extent that the environment controls their lives (Rotter [1966]).  
The NLSY79 data also contain the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, which attempts to assess the 
degree of approval or disapproval of one’s self (Rosenberg [1965]).  The relationship between 
these measures and the Big Five traits of Neuroticism is discussed in Section 5.  
Different traits might be more responsive to investment at different ages. Figure 29  
shows the causal effects of years of schooling attained on five components of the Armed Forces 
Qualifying Test (AFQT). Schooling in the high school years has moderate but positive effects on 
the measures of cognition, consistent with previous research by Hansen, Heckman and Mullen 
[2004], Neal and Johnson [1996], and Winship and Korenman [1997].  The most dramatic causal 
effects on cognition arise from college attendance.  In contrast, locus of control is primarily 
affected by high school attendance but not college attendance. On measures of self-esteem, an 
additional year of high school and college play powerful roles.
232 
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Figure 29. Causal Effect of Schooling on ASVAB Measures of Cognition 








Notes: Effect of schooling on components of the ASVAB.  The first four components are averaged to create male’s 
with average ability. We standardize the test scores to have within-sample mean zero, variance one. The model is 
estimated using the NLSY79 sample. Solid lines depict average test scores, and dashed lines, 2.5%–97.5% 
confidence intervals. 
Source: Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua [2006, Figure 4]. 




Figure 30.Causal Effect of Schooling on Two Measures of Personality 




Notes: Effect of schooling on socioemotional scales for males with average ability, with 95% confidence bands. The 
locus of control scale is based on the four-item abbreviated version of the Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control 
Scale. This scale is designed to measure the extent to which individuals believe that they have control over their 
lives through self-motivation or self-determination (internal control) as opposed to the extent to which individuals 
believe that the environment controls their lives (external control). The self-esteem scale is based on the 10-item 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. This scale describes a degree of approval or disapproval toward oneself. In both 
cases, we standardize the test scores to have within-sample mean zero and variance one, after taking averages over 
the respective sets of scales. The model is estimated using the NLSY79 sample. Solid lines depict average test 
scores, and dashed lines, 2.5%–97.5% confidence intervals. 




Some other evidence supports the possibility that school can affect measures of 
intelligence.  Cahan and Cohen [1989] use a quasi-experimental paradigm comparing children 
who differ in both age and schooling to show that schooling increases intelligence test scores 
independently of age.  Schooler and colleagues show that complex (that is, cognitively 
demanding) work increases intellectual functioning among adults and vice versa (Schooler, 
Mulatu and Oates [1999]; Kohn and Schooler [1978]).  
 
8.D.3.  Evidence from Interventions 
As noted in the introduction, the Perry Preschool Program, did not have a lasting improvement 
on cognitive ability, but did improve important later-life outcomes through personality 
(Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010]). The Perry preschool program enriched the lives of 
low-income black children with initial IQs below 85 at age 3.  In addition, there were home visits 
to promote parent-child interactions.  The program stopped after two years.  Participants were 
taught social skills in a “plan-do-review” sequence where students planned a task, executed it 
and then reviewed it with teachers and fellow students.  They learned to work with others when 
problems arose.
233  The program was evaluated by the method of random assignment. 
The program had strong effects for both boys and girls, although the effects differ by age 
and outcomes.  The program had a statistically significant rate of return of around 6-10% per 
annum for both boys and girls.  These returns are above the post-World War II, pre-2008 
meltdown, stock market returns to equity in U.S. labor market that are estimated to be 5.8% per 
                                                 




234  The Perry Preschool Program worked primarily through socioemotional channels.  
Figure 31 shows that the program improved scores on the California Achievement Test (CAT). 
The program, however, did not have a lasting effect on IQ scores.  This evidence is consistent 
with the discussions in Sections 5 and 7 that show that achievement test results are strongly 
dependent on personality traits (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman et al. [2008]; Borghans, 
Golsteyn, Heckman et al. [2009]). Indeed the personalities of participants improved.  Participants 
had better direct measures of personal behavior (a weighted average of “absences and truancies,” 
“lying and cheating,” “stealing,” and “swears or uses obscene words” measured by teachers in 
the elementary school years).  Participants improved their internalizing behavior, which, as noted 
in Section 5, is related to Neuroticism. Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010] decompose the 
treatment effects of the Perry Program into components due to experientially-induced changes of 
cognition (IQ) and the measures of personality at their disposal, and to residual factors.  
Personality played a more important role in outcomes, particularly in later life. 
 
  
                                                 




Figure 31. Perry Age 14 Total CAT Scores, by Treatment Group 
 
CAT = California Achievement Test 
Treatment: N = 49; Control: N = 46 
Statistically Significant Effect for Males and Females (p-values 0.009, 0.021 respectively) 
Source: Heckman, Malofeeva, Pinto et al. [2010]. 
 
Analyses of data from Project STAR, a program that randomly assigned kindergarteners 
and teachers to classes of different sizes, yields similar results to the Perry Program.  Using data 
from Project STAR, Dee and West [2008] find that assignment to a small class is associated with 
positive changes in personality. In a follow-up reanalysis, Chetty, Friedman, Hilger et al. [2010] 
examine the Project STAR program and find that students placed in higher quality kindergarten 
classes—as measured by their peer’s average performance on a Stanford Achievement Test—
tend to have higher test scores at the end of kindergarten. The effect fades out over time; by 
eighth grade, students in better kindergarten classes perform no differently on tests.  However, as 
with the Perry Program, the benefits reemerge later in life. People in better kindergarten 
classrooms had significantly higher earnings in early adulthood. Furthermore, kindergarten 
classroom quality also predicted better fourth and eighth grade behavior as measured by teacher-Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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assessed effort, initiative, interest in the class, and disruptive behavior.
235  In turn, behavior 
predicted earnings in adulthood, suggesting that personality is the channel through which better 
kindergarten classrooms improve earnings. 
The Perry Program and Project STAR did not primarily focus on improving personality 
traits, but a few programs have. The Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS) 
curriculum teaches self-control, emotional awareness, and social problem-solving skills and is 
aimed at elementary school children (see Bierman, Coie, Dodge et al. [2010]). A recent random-
assignment, longitudinal study demonstrates that the PATHS curriculum reduces teacher and 
peer ratings of aggression, improves teacher and peer ratings of prosocial behavior, and improves 
teacher ratings of academic engagement.
236 PATHS is an exemplar of school-based social and 
emotional learning (SEL) programs, whose impact on both course grades ( 0.33 d  ), where d is 
measured in units of standard deviations (“effect sizes”), and standardized achievement tests 
scores ( 0.27 d  ), was recently documented in a meta-analysis of controlled studies involving 
over 270,000 children in kindergarten through college (Durlak and Weissberg [in press]).
237  
Likewise, a random assignment evaluation of Tools of the Mind, a preschool and early primary 
school curriculum, shows that in short-term follow-ups it improves classroom behavior as well as 
executive function, defined as higher-level cognitive skills including inhibitory control, working 
memory, and cognitive flexibility (Barnett, Jung, Yarosz et al. [2008]; Barnett, Yarosz, Thomas 
et al. [2006]; Bodrova and Leong [2001]; Bodrova and Leong [2007]; Diamond, Barnett, 
                                                 
235 These scales are based on more detailed questionnaires.  Only a subset of the sample has their behavioral 
measures. 
236 Bierman, Coie, Dodge et al. [2010] 
237 Note however that the largest federal study to date on character education programs, including PATHS, failed to 
find evidence for improvements in behavior or academic performance (see Social and Character Development 
Research Consortium [2010]). Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Thomas et al. [2007]).  Similar findings are reported for the Montessori preschool curriculum 
(Lillard and Else-Quest [2006]). 
There is also evidence that targeted intervention efforts delivered to individual children 
can improve aspects of Conscientiousness. These studies are typically more short-term and, in 
contrast to the multi-faceted curricula described above, are designed to isolate a particular 
mechanism for behavior change. For instance, Rueda and colleagues [2005] designed a set of 
computer exercises to train attention in children between four and six years of age. Children in 
the intervention group improved in performance on computer tasks of attention relative to 
children who instead watched interactive videos for a comparable amount of time. Similarly, 
Stevens and colleagues [2008] designed a six-week computerized intervention and showed that it 
can improve selective auditory attention (i.e., the ability to attend to a target auditory signal in 
the face of an irrelevant, distracting auditory signal).  Again, all of these programs have short-
term follow-ups. 
Several studies suggest that personality can be remediated in adolescence. Martins [2010] 
analyzes data from EPSIS, a program developed to improve student achievement of 13-15 year-
olds in Portugal by increasing motivation, self-esteem, and study skills.  The program consists of 
one-on-one meetings with a trained staff member or meetings in small groups. The intervention 
was tailored to each participant’s individual skill deficit.  Overall, the program was successful, 
cost-effectively decreasing grade retention by 10 percentage points. Bloom, Gardenhire-Crooks 
and Mandsager [2009] analyze the data from the National Guard Youth Challenge program, a 
17-month intervention for youth who have dropped out of high school. While the program does 
not require military enrollment, it stresses aspects of military discipline. The program features a 
two-week assessment period, a 20-week residential program often conducted at a military base, Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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and a one-year mentoring program.  Nine months after entry, participants in the program were 
12% more likely to obtain a high school diploma or GED, were 9% more likely to be working 
full time, and were less likely to be arrested. Furthermore, participants had higher levels of self-
efficacy (a trait related to Emotional Stability), suggesting that personality change might have 
helped with the improvements. However, the 9-month follow-up period is too short to know if 
the program has long-lasting effects. While these studies show that personality can be improved 
through intervention, a couple of other studies show less promising results when the 
interventions were targeted at adolescents  (Rodríguez-Planas [2010], Holmlund and Silva 
[2009]).  
Behncke [2009] provides some experimental evidence that short-term exogenous shocks 
to non-cognitive skills affect test performance. She finds giving words of encouragement, an 
intervention that might boost short-term self-efficacy or self-esteem, before a diagnostic math 
test was associated with 2.5% higher scores amongst all students (0 . 0 5 ) p   and 8% higher 
scores amongst those with self-reported difficulties with math(0 . 0 1 ) p  . The result suggests that 
non-cognitive skills can be shaped, even in the very short-term. 
The evidence for adults corroborates the finding of Cunha, Heckman and Schennach 
[2010] for children.  Personality is malleable throughout the life cycle. For example, Gottschalk 
[2005] shows evidence from a randomized control trial that working at a job can improve locus 
of control. He uses data from the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) in which some welfare 
recipients were randomly offered substantial subsidies to work. The subsidy more than doubled 
the earnings of a minimum wage worker, and people in the experiment group worked about 1/3 
more hours than those in the control group. After 36 months, those who received the subsidy 
were more likely to have an improved locus of control. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Several other studies find similar results. Clausen and Gilens [1990] claim that female 
labor force participation increases self-confidence.  Roberts [1997] reports an increase of social 
dominance and Roberts and Chapman [2000] a decrease in Neuroticism for working women. 
Others show that marital and family experiences shape personality (Helson and Picano [1990], 
Roberts, Helson and Klohnen [2002]).  However, these studies are all correlational in nature.  
None of these studies have the random assignment features of the Gottschalk study. 
  Personality may even be malleable at the end of life. Jackson, Hill, Payne et al. [2010] 
investigate causal mechanisms behind the association between Openness to Experience and IQ, 
using data from a 16-week intervention designed to boost inductive reasoning for elderly people. 
The intervention consisted of lab training for how to recognize novel patterns and around 10 
hours a week of solving crossword, Sudoku, and logic puzzles. Controlling for inductive 
reasoning, self-reported Openness to Experience increased for participants during the training 
program relative to those in a waitlisted control group. However, the elderly people were not 
followed after the program to determine whether the change was long-lasting nor were other 
important outcomes, like life expectancy, tracked. 
  Table 12 summarizes the evidence on the effects of interventions that is discussed in this 
subsection.  The evidence is consistent with effects of interventions but there are woefully few 




Table 12. The Effect of Interventions on Personality 
Author(s)  Main Variable(s)  Data and Methods  Causal Evidence  Main Result(s) 
Barnett, 
Jung, Yarosz 
et al. [2008] 
Outcome(s): internalizing and 
externalizing behavior –  teacher-
assessed Problem Behaviors Scale of 
the Social Skills Rating System 
(SSRS) 
 
Intervention: participation in a year-
long Tools of the Mind preschool 
program compared to a generic 
curriculum 
Data: collected by authors; 
210 children aged 3 and 4  
 
Methods: Students were 
randomly assigned to 
classrooms within the same 
school after parental consent 
was obtained. Teachers were 
randomly assigned to control 
and treatment classrooms. 
Control Variables: n/a 
 
Timing of Measurements:   
Baseline – Behavior measures were taken 
prior to the program in October-
November of 2002.  
 
Post-treatment – Behavioral measures 
taken immediately after the program in 
May-June of 2003.  
 
Participants in the program had a 0.47 
standard deviation lower score for the 
behavioral problems index (p<0.05). 
Behncke 
[2009] 
Outcome(s): cognitive ability – 
performance on a diagnostic math 
test for a college economics class 
 
Intervention: verbal encouragement 
before the test 
Data: Collected by author; 
440 students from a Swiss 
University 
 
Methods: The treatment was 
randomly assigned to 
already-established 
classroom sections. Students 
were unaware they were in 
an experiment. 
Control Variables: n/a  
 
Timing of Measurements:  
Post treatment – The diagnostic test was 
given immediately after the treatment.   
Verbal encouragement raised test scores by 
2.5% amongst all students (p<0.05) and by 
8.0% amongst students who reported 
difficulties with math (p<0.01). 
Bierman, 
Coie, Dodge 
et al. [2010] 
Outcome(s): teacher-assessed 
behavior –Social Health Profile 
(SHP) including authority 
acceptance, cognitive concentration, 
and social competence; peer-
assessed behavior – survey questions 
about behavior labeled as aggressive, 
prosocial, and hyperactive 
 
Intervention: – participation in a 3-
year-long Fast Track PATHS 
program focused on improving self-
control and positive social behavior 




administrators were offered 
participation in the 
experiment, knowing the 
school would receive 





Control Variables: time, time squared,  
individual baseline, school baseline, city 
fixed effects, poverty level, interactions 
of intervention with time, time squared, 
individual baseline, poverty, and poverty 
and time 
 
Timing of Measurements:  
Baseline – Behavioral measures were 




Post treatment – Behavioral measures 
were taken again in the spring of 3
rd 
grade around the end of the program. 
Immediately after the 3-year program, 
participation was associated with a 0.24 
standard deviation increase in authority 
acceptance (p<0.001), a 0.12 standard 
deviation increase in cognitive concentration 
(p<0.001), and a 0.34 standard deviation 
increase in social competence (p<0.0001) 
compared to the control group. The effects 
were stronger in more disadvantaged schools. 
Similar but weaker results apply for the peer-
assessed measures. 
  Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
206 
 
(Table 12. The Effect of Interventions on Personality Continued …) 






Outcome(s): educational attainment 
– high school diploma, labor force 
participation – whether working at a 
job, personality – self-efficacy and 
social adjustment 
 
Intervention: participation in the 
ChalleNGe program consisting of a 
2-week assessment period, 20-week 
residential program often conducted 
at a military base, and a 1-year 
mentoring program. 
Data: 1,018 young people 
between the ages 16 and 18 
who have dropped out of 
school 
 
Methods: The control group 
was constructed out of 
applicants who qualified for 
the program but were not 
taken due to lack of space. 
Control Variables: sample member 
characteristics 
 
Timing of Measurements:  
During treatment – Outcomes were 
measured approximately 9 months after 
entering the study. 
 
 
Participants in the program were 12.0 
percentage points more likely to earn a high 
school diploma (p<0.01), 9.1 percentage 
points more likely to be working (p<0.01), 
and 9.6 percentage points less likely to report 
a self-efficacy and social adjustment score 
one standard deviation below the mean 
(p<0.01). The program also improved 
measures of criminality and health. 
Chetty, 
Friedman, 
Hilger et al. 
[2010] 
Outcome(s): non-cognitive skills – 
an index based on the teacher’s 
observations of the students 
 
Intervention: randomly assigned 
kindergarten class quality as 
measured by difference in 
percentiles of the mean  end-of-year 
test scores of the students’ 
classmates and the scores of the 
other kindergarteners at the same 
school  
Data: Project STAR; 1,671 
4
th grade students and 1,780 
8
th grade students 
 
Methods: Students and 
teachers were randomly 
assigned in kindergarten to 
classrooms of different 
sizes. The students were 
assigned to the same size 
classroom through 3
rd grade.  
Control Variables: wave fixed effects, 
student gender, free-lunch status, age, 
race, a quartic in the claiming parent's 
household income interacted with 
parent's marital status, mother's age at 
child's birth, whether the parents own a 
home, and whether the parents made a 
401 (k) contribution between 1996 and 
2008 
 
Timing of Measurements:  
During treatment – Age-relevant SAT 
tests were administered in kindergarten 
and grades 1-3. 
 
Post treatment – Age-relevant SAT test 
were and behavioral surveys were given 
in 4
th and 8
th grade. College quality and 
attendance was at age 19. Earnings were 
at age 27. 
A 1 percentile improvement in kindergarten 
class quality increases an index of non-
cognitive skills by 0.15 percentiles in 4
th 
grade (p<0.05) and 0.13 percentiles in 8
th 
grade (p<0.05). Better classrooms were also 
associated with better life outcomes. 
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(Table 12. The Effect of Interventions on Personality Continued …) 
Author(s)  Main Variable(s)  Data and Methods  Causal Evidence  Main Result(s) 
Diamond, 
Barnett, 
Thomas et al. 
[2007] 
Outcome(s): Executive Function – 
Dots-Mixed task, Reverse-Flanker 
task 
 
Intervention: participation in a Tools 
of the Mind program instead of the 
regular school district’s balanced 
literacy program 
Data: 147 preschoolers  
 
Methods: Teachers and 
students were randomly 
assigned to classrooms 
within the same school.   
Control Variables: age, gender, years in 
program 
 
Timing of Measurements:  
Post-treatment – The tasks were given at 
the end of the program 2
nd year of the 
program. 
 
84% of students in Tools were successful in 
the Reverse Flanker task compared to 65% in 
the control group. Almost twice as many 
students in the Tools program achieved 
greater than 75% accuracy on the Dots-
Mixed task compared to the control group. 
Durlak, 
Weissberg, 
Dymnicki et al. 
[in press] 
Outcome(s): social and emotional 
learning skills, attitudes, positive 
social behavior, conduct problems, 
emotional distress, academic 
performance 
 
Intervention: Meta-analysis of 
school-based, universal social and 
emotional learning program. 
Data: 270,034 kindergarten 
through high school students 
 
Methods: All studies include 
a control group.  
Control Variables: n/a 
 
Timing of Measurements: All studies 
contained follow-up data at least 6 
months after the intervention. 
 
 
The mean difference in standard deviations 
between the treatment and control groups are 
as follows: social and emotional learning 
skills = 0.57 (p<0.05); attitudes = 0.23 
(p<0.05); positive social behavior = 0.24 
(p<0.05); conduct problems = 0.22 (p<0.05); 
emotional distress = 0.24 (p<0.05); academic 
performance = 0.27 (p<0.05).  All variables 




Outcome(s): Personality –four 
measures of locus of control based 
on whether the respondent agrees 
strongly, agrees, disagrees, or 
strongly disagrees with statements 
 
Intervention: A subsidy for full-time 
work during a 36-month period 
Data: Self-Sufficiency 
Project; 4,958 single parents 
over the age of 19 in New 
Brunswick and British 
Columbia 
 
Methods: The subsidy was 
randomly offered to a 
population of people 
receiving Income Assistance 
(IA)  
Control Variables: age, age squared, 
region, gender, speaks French, number 
of children 
 
Timing of Measurements:  
Baseline – Locus of control was 
measured before the program. 
 
During treatment – Locus of control was 
measured again 18
 and 36 months after 
the baseline. 
Using whether the participant received the 
subsidy as an instrument for hours worked, 
the authors find that working tends to 
improve locus of control by the 36 month re-
interview. 
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(Table 12. The Effect of Interventions on Personality Continued …) 
Author(s)  Main Variable(s)  Data and Methods  Causal Evidence  Main Result(s) 
Heckman, 
Malofeeva, 
Pinto et al. 
[2010] 
Outcome(s):externalizing behavior, 
internalizing behavior –  measured  
using Pupil Behavior Inventory 
(PBI) of teacher reports 
 
Intervention: participation in the 
Perry Preschool Program, an 
intervention that lasted 2 years and 
enriched the lives of low income 
black children  
Data: Perry Preschool 
Program; 123 preschool 
students 
 
Methods: The students were 
randomly assigned to 
treatment through a complex 
procedure. 
Control Variables: n/a 
 
Timing of Measurements:  
Post treatment – The measure of 
externalizing and internalizing behavior 
are taken ages 7-9 (2-4 years after 
treatment). Other life outcomes were 
measured at ages 19, 27, and 40. 
 
 
The intervention improved mean 
externalizing behavior for both males and 
females (p<0.05). It had a borderline 
statistically significant impact on 
internalizing behavior. The program also 
benefited a wide range of later life outcomes 
primarily through non-cognitive skills.  
Holmlund and 
Silva [2009] 
Outcome(s): academic performance 
– average of standardized test scores 
in English, Math, and Science 
 
Intervention: participation in the “xl 
programme” targeting the non-
cognitive skills of secondary school 
students aged 14 
Data: “xl club programme,” 
National Pupil Database 
(NPD), Pupil Level Annual 
Schools Census (PLASC) ; 
2,333 and 259,189 treated 
and control students aged 14 
in England (2004) 
 
Methods: logit, propensity 




Control Variables: sex, language, 
eligibility for school meals, special 
needs status, and race 
 
Timing of Measurements:  
Baseline – Standardized exams were 
taken at age 11 and age 14 before the 
start of the program. 
 
Post treatment – Standardized national 
exams were taken again at age 16 at the 
end of the program (2 years after the 
beginning of the program). 
 
Unconditional on observables, the 
performance of the students in the xl club is 
1.2 to 1.4 standard deviations lower than the 
control subjects (p<0.01). Using OLS , the 
effect is -0.17. The propensity score 
estimates are -0.13 and -0.15. For the 
difference-in-difference models estimated 
using OLS and propensity score matching, 
there is no longer a significant effect of the 
program in either direction. Overall the 
program had little effect. 
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Outcome(s): Social and Emotional 
Competence – self-efficacy for peer 
interaction, normative beliefs about 
aggression, empathy; Behavior – 
altruistic behavior, positive social 
behavior, problem behavior, ADHD-
related behavior; Academics – 
engagement with learning, academic 
competence and motivation; 
Perceptions of School Climate – 
positive school orientation, negative 
school orientation, student afraid at 
school, victimization at school, 
feelings of safety, student support 
for teachers    
  
Intervention: 7 different programs 
(ABC, CSP, LBW, PA, PATHS, 
4Rs, SS) aimed to build Social and 
Character Development (SACD) 
compared to the “standard practice” 
programs at non-treated schools 
Data: Social and Character 
Development (SACD) 
Research Program; around 
6,000 elementary school 
students 
 
Methods: Schools were first 
asked to participate in the 
program and were then 
randomly assigned one of 
the 7 SACD programs or left 
with their traditional 
curriculum. The data were 
analyzed using HLM. 
Control Variables: gender, race, parental 
education, family structure, household 
income, measures of poverty, parental 
labor force participation, teacher race, 
teacher experience. (Note: the specific 
set depended on the outcome of interest.) 
 
Timing of Measurements:  
Baseline – Initial measures were 
collected near the start of the program in 
the fall of 2004. 
 
During treatment – Data were collected 
in the spring of 2005, the fall of 2005, 
and the spring of 2006.  
 
Post treatment – Data were collected 
near the end of the program in the spring 
of 2007. 
Fall 2003 to Spring 2005: Of the 20 
outcomes, the only significant effects were 
that participation in any program was 
associated with a 0.07 standard deviation 
higher primary caregiver-reported altruistic 
behavior (p<0.10), a 0.06 standard deviation 
lower child-reported altruistic behavior 
(p<0.10), and a 0.12 standard deviation 
higher teacher-reported student support for 
teachers (p<0.05). 
 
Fall 2003 to Spring 2006: Of the 20 
outcomes, the only significant effects were 
that participation in any program was 
associated with a 0.07 standard deviation 
lower child-reported self-efficacy for peer 
interactions (p<0.10) and 0.16 standard 
deviation higher  teacher-reported student 
support for teachers (p<0.05).                          
 
Fall 2003 to Spring 2007: There were no 
statistically different effects of participating 
in any program. 
 
Other Analyses: The results were similar 
when analyzing each of the programs 
separately and when using growth curves. 
There is some evidence that programs were 
beneficial for high-risk students.   
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(Table 12. The Effect of Interventions on Personality Continued …) 
Author(s)  Main Variable(s)  Data and Methods  Causal Evidence  Main Result(s) 
Jackson, Hill, 
Payne et al. 
[2010] 
Outcome(s): Personality – Openness 
to Experience 
 
Intervention: participation in a 16-
week inductive reasoning training 
program coupled with 10 hours of 
puzzle solving per week 
Data: collected by the 
authors; 183 adults aged 60 
to 94 
 
Methods: Participants were 
randomly assigned to 
treatment and control groups 
after deciding to participate 
in the experiment. 
 
Control Variables: n/a 
 
Timing of Measurements:  
Baseline – Openness to Experience was 
measured pre-treatment. 
 
During treatment – Openness to 
Experience was measured at week 5and 
at week 10. 
 
Post treatment – Openness to 
Experience was measured at the end of 
the program in week 16. 
On average, participants in the program were 
0.39 standard deviations higher in Openness 
to Experience after the program relative to 
people in the control group (p<0.05). 
Martins [2010]  Outcome(s): Educational attainment 
– grade retention 
 
Intervention: participation in the 
EPIS program that boosts non-
cognitive skills including  
motivation, self-esteem, and study 
skills 
Data: EPIS database; 15,307 
students in 7
th -9
th grade in 
Portugal 
 
Methods: linear probability 
model, quasi-randomization 
Control Variables: student fixed effects, 
time fixed effects 
 
Timing of Measurements:  
Baseline – Measures of academic 





During treatment – Measures were taken 
each quarter that the students participate 
in the program through 7 academic 
quarters after the beginning of the 
program (students entered the program 
at different times and remained in 
treatment for different lengths of time 
but were followed if they left treatment). 
The program reduced annual grade retention 
by at least 10.1 percentage points (p<0.001). 
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(Table 12. The Effect of Interventions on Personality Continued …) 
Author(s)  Main Variable(s)  Data and Methods  Causal Evidence  Main Result(s) 
Rodríguez-
Planas [2010] 
Outcome(s): educational attainment 
– high-school completion and post-
secondary education; academic 
achievement – math test score 
percentile, reading test score 
percentile , GPA; labor market 
success – earnings during the last 
year of the program, 3 years after the 
program, and five years after the 
program  
 
Intervention: – participation in the 
Quantum Opportunity Program 
(QOP) that was available for 5 years, 
centered around mentoring, 
developing social skills, community 
service, and providing incentives for 
academic success for 9
th graders  
Data: Quantum Opportunity 
Program (QOP); 1,069 
students from seven large 
US cities  
 
Methods: Students in 
schools participating in the 
program were randomly 
assigned to treatment or 
control groups. 
Control Variables: n/a  
 
Timing of Measurements:  
Post treatment – Interviews were 
conducted during the last year of the 
program, 3 years after the program, and 
5 years after the program.  
 
 
During last year of the program: 
Participation in the program was associated 
with a 7 percentage point increase in the 
probability of graduating high school 
(p<0.10) and 6 percentage point increase in 
the probability of attending college (p<0.10). 
There were no differences in academic 
achievement. 
 
3 years after the program: Participation in the 
program was associated with a 7 percentage 
point increase in the probability of ever 
attending college (p<0.10), 9 percentage 
point increase in the probability of attending 
college (p<0.05), and a 7 percentage point 
decrease in the probability of having a job 
(p<0.10). 
 
5 years after the program: There are no 
significant differences 5 years after the 
program. 
 
Findings for sub-populations: The program 
benefited people who were 14 or less upon 
entering high school significantly more than 
older students. It also tended to benefit girls 
more than boys. 
Stevens, 
Fanning, Coch 
et al. [2008] 
Outcome(s): attention –  ERP index 
of selective auditory attention; 
language skills – Clinical Evaluation 
of Language Fundamentals-3 
 
Intervention: Participation in a six-
week (100 min/day) computerized 
training program for boosting 
language skills (Fast ForWord 
program) 
Data: collected by the 
authors; 33 children aged 7 
on average 
 
Methods: The students who 
received treatment were 
compared to a control group 
who did not. 
Control Variables: Test scores were 
normalized by age 
 
Timing of Measurements:  
Baseline – Measures were taken right 
before the start of the program. 
 
Post treatment – Measures were taken 
again at the end of the program (6 weeks 
after the start). 
The increase in the attention was 0.81 
standard deviations higher for the 
participants than for the non-participants 
(p<0.01). 
 
The increase in the receptive language scores 
was 0.91 standard deviations higher in the 
participants than for the control group 
(p<0.01). There was no significant effect on 
expressive language scores between the 
participants and the control group. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Evidence from Psychotherapy 
The accomplishments of psychotherapy also support the possibility of intentional, mean-level, 
and rank-order change. In a 1980 meta-analysis, Smith, Glass and Miller summarized 475 
controlled studies, concluding that individuals who undergo psychotherapy are about 0.85 
standard deviations better on outcome measures than those who do not. The large benefits of 
therapy are not permanent, however: the effect of psychotherapy over control conditions falls to 
about half a standard deviation two years after therapy is concluded. Moreover, it is not clear that 
the effects of psychotherapy on individuals who seek change generalize to individuals who are 
not actively seeking treatment for a condition that causes them distress.
238 
More evidence on the possibility of intentional change comes from the psychological 
literature on expertise. Ericsson, Krampe and Tesch-Römer [1993] demonstrate across domains 
as diverse as chess, musical performance, and digit span memory, that thousands of hours of 
sustained, deliberate practice lead to dramatic improvements in skill.  Ericsson points out that the 




8.E.  Stability of Economic Preference Parameters 
Less is known about the stability of economic preferences.  To our knowledge, no longitudinal 
study has measured the mean-level or rank-order stability of time preference over the life cycle 
(Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue [2002]). A handful of cross-sectional studies using 
relatively small samples have examined mean-level stability, and their findings are mixed. 
                                                 
238 Some evidence that further intervention can produce enduring change in non-clinical populations comes from 
Gillham and Reivich [1999] who show that children taught to make more optimistic causal attributions about 
negative events maintain this optimistic outlook two years post-intervention. 
239 See Ericsson and Ward [2007] for a recent review of the evidence. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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Green, Fry and Myerson [1994] and Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] find that discount rates 
are lower among older individuals. On the other hand, Chesson and Viscusi [2000] claim to find 
that older adults have higher discount rates than younger adults.  Chao, Szrek, Sousa Pereira et 
al. [2007], de Wit, Flory, Acheson et al. [2007], and Coller and Williams [1999] find no 
relationship between age and discount rate. Finally, Read and Read [2004] find a curvilinear 
relationship in which older people discount more than younger people, and middle-aged people 
discount less than either group. Sahm [2007] shows that risk aversion increases with age.  Table 
13 below summarizes the findings for a variety of recent economic studies on the heritability, 
malleability and stability of preferences and personality. 
Summary of Section 8 
We have reviewed the evidence on change in personality over the life cycle.  The evidence is 
strong that personality changes over the life cycle, both in terms of mean-level and rank-order 
change.  The evidence on the source of the change is less clear cut.  Three competing visions of 
the source of change are discussed: (a) The ontogenic and sociogenic model that describes how 
biology and socialization produce changes in average traits.  This approach does not explain why 
individuals develop with different trajectories; (b) The biological and pharmacological model 
that describes how alterations in the biology of the person can explain variations in personality 
and its evolution; and (c) The intervention/family influence model that describes how investment 
and environments influence changes.  No study considers all three sources of development at the 
same time, largely due to data limitations.  The evidence from the intervention and family 
influence studies suggests that interventions that target personality may be effective but much 
further evidence is required to specify the exact mechanisms through which the interventions 




Table 13. The Heritability, Malleability, and Stability of Preferences and Personality 




Outcome(s): risk aversion – 
choice whether to accept a real-




term gender environment – 
whether the student was assigned 
to a coed or single-sex group 
during the experiment; long-term 
gender environment – whether 
the student attends a coed or 
single-sex school 
Data: Collected by the 
authors; 260 students in 
grades 10 and 11 from 
eight publicly funded 
schools in England 
(2007) 
 





Timing of Measurements: The 
measures are contemporaneous.  
 
Theory: Growing up in an 
environment with males might cause 
girls to act more “feminine” and take 
fewer risks. Similarly, boys in coed 
environments might exhibit more 
risk-taking in coed environments to 
try to impress girls. 
Girls from coed high schools in England were 36% 
(p<0.01) less likely to accept a real-stakes lottery. Girls 
assigned to experimental group with all girls were 12% 
(p<0.10) more likely to accept the lottery than girls in 
coed experimental groups. 
Burks, 
Carpenter, 
Goette et al. 
[2010] 
Outcome(s): demand for 
information – whether people 
request the results of their IQ 
and numeracy tests; 
overconfidence – the difference 
between ex-ante estimate of 
quintile in the IQ distribution 




assessment – before and after 
test assessments of the quintile 
of performance on the tests; 
personality – a self-reported 
measure of harm avoidance, 
social closeness, social potency, 
and stress reaction 
Data: Collected by 
authors, administrative 
data from a human 
resources department; 
1,063 trainee truckers 




ordered probit, linear 
spline 
Controls: actual test performance, 
harm avoidance,  education levels, 
ethnicity, sex, age, age squared, 
household income, before test belief, 
and post-test belief  
 
Timing of Measurements: People are 
asked about their expected 
performance on the IQ and numeracy 
tests before and after they take the 
test. Later, they are given the option 
to receive the results of their tests.  
 
Theory: People misjudge their own 
ability due to systematically biased 
noisy signals; value their self-
assessed ability and avoid updating 
when the assessment is positive; or 
sub-consciously misrepresent their 
own ability for strategic advantage. 
Demand for information: A one quintile increase in a 
person's post-test belief about their test performance is 
positively associated with 3.0 percentage point higher 
probability of demanding information about the IQ test 
(p<0.01) and a 3.9 percentage point higher probability 
of demanding information about the numeracy test 
(p<0.01).  
 
Overconfidence: Harm avoidance and stress reaction 
are negatively correlated with overconfidence on the 
IQ test (p<0.01,p<0.05). Social potency is positively 
linked to overconfidence on the IQ test (p<0.01). Stress 
reaction is negatively associated with overconfidence 
on the numeracy test (p<0.01). Social potency is 
positively associated with overconfidence on the 
numeracy test (p<0.05). 
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Outcome(s): risk preference – 
survey responses on an 11 point 
scale, relating to general risk 
preference and risk preference 
relating to car driving, financial 
matters, leisure and sports, 
career and health.  
 
Explanatory Variable(s): (see 
controls) 
Data: Collected by the 
authors/ German Socio-
Economic Panel 
(SOEP); 450 adults 
from Germany/22,019 





Controls: (1) sex, age, height, 
parental education , 2002 household 
wealth, 2003 household income  
 
Timing of Measurements: The 
measures are contemporaneous. 
 
Theory: People might have a stable, 
underlying preference for risk cross 
contexts. 
Determinants of risk attitude: being female and age are 
negatively associated with willingness to take risks 
(p<0.01). Height is positively associated with a general 
willingness to take risks (p<0.01). Mother and father's 
education is positively associated with willingness to 
take risks (p<0.01).  
 
Stability of risk: The 6 measures of contextualized risk 
aversion are correlated with each, other ranging from 
0.456 – 0.609. 
Einav, 
Finkelstein, 
Pascu et al. 
[2010] 
Outcome(s): risk preference – 
order rankings of observed 
decisions to purchase different 
purchase insurance for health, 
prescription drugs, dental, short-
term and long-term disability 
and 401(k) plans 
 
Explanatory Variable(s): 
predictable risk – predictions 
from modeling risk based on 
observables; idiosyncratic risk – 
realization of risk in the net 
period 
Data: Administrative 
data; 12,752 employees 




Controls: the menu of benefits the 
employee faced, predictable and 
idiosyncratic risk 
 
Timing of Measurements: Most of 
the financial decisions were made in 
the same year.  
 
Theory: There is an underlying 
preference for risk that applies across 
many contexts. 
The average correlations between the various domains 
are 0.164. results withstand several robustness checks. 
Kosfeld, 
Heinrichs, 
Zak et al. 
[2005] 
Outcome(s): trust – willingness 
to “invest” in a real-stakes two-
player trust game; risk 
preference – real stakes trust 
game played against a computer 
that randomly gave payoffs; 
altruism – the amount 
transferred back by the investee 
in the trust game (there are no 
monetary incentives to do so) 
 
Explanatory Variable(s): 
biological determinant of trust – 
nasal spray of oxytocin 
Data: Experiment 
conducted by the 
authors; 194 male 




Whitney U-test, RCT 
Controls: n/a (RCT) 
 
Timing of Measurements: The 
measure were contemporaneous.  
 
Theory: There is a notion of “trust” 
distinct from altruism and risk 
preference. 
People who receive the oxytocin nasal spray invest on 
average 17% more than those who do not (p<0.05). 
Risk behavior does not differ between the two groups. 
Trustees do not show more altruistic behavior when 
given oxytocin. 
  Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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(Table 13. The Heritability, Malleability, and Stability of Preferences and Personality Continuted …) 




Outcome(s): risk preference – 
response to a 10-point survey 
question about willingness to 
take risks in general, response to 
a 10-point survey questions 
about how conservative the 
subject is in making decisions to 
spend money 
 
Explanatory Variable(s): genetic 
makeup – differences in 
outcomes between monozygotic 
and dyzygotic twins 
Data: Australian Twin 
Study of Gambling; 




Controls:  none (2) gender, age, 
education, and marital status  
 
Timing of Measurements: The 
measures are contemporaneous.  
 
 
Heritability of the risk measure is 0.192  (p<0.01). 





Outcome(s): social preferences 
(selfish – the agent maximizes 
their own payoff; regardless of 
the other person's, efficient – 
maximizing the sum of the allow 
payoffs; maximin – maximizes 
the minimum of the two payoffs; 
FS inequality – values own 
payoff plus a weighted average 
of the difference between own 
payoff to the others payoffs; 
ERC inequality – people get 
disutility if their payoff deviates 
from the group average) – 
choices of allocating resources 
between peers in a real-stakes 
experiment 
 
Explanatory Variable(s): n/a 
Data: Collected by the 
authors; 883 students 








Timing of Measurements: The 
measures are contemporaneous.  
 
Theory: Social preferences might 
change with age and maturity. 
20% of girls and boys behave selfishly. An increase in 
one year of age is associated with a 0.044 increase in 
the probability of have efficiency preferences for males 
(p<0.01), but has not effect for females. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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9.  Summary and Conclusions 
We summarize this chapter by providing provisional answers to the eight questions posed in 
Section 1. 
(1) How can we fit psychological constructs of personality into an economic framework? 
Can conventional models of preferences in economics characterize the main theories in 
personality psychology? 
We have defined personality as a response function of agents that depends on situations 
(including incentives), endowments of traits, information, and resources within a 
conventional economic model.  Psychologists analyze a richer class of actions than 
economists normally consider.  We show how to integrate these actions into economic 
theory.  The leading models of personality psychology are special cases of our model.
240 
(2) What are the main measurement systems used in psychology for representing personality 
and personality traits, and how are they validated?  How are different systems related to 
each other?  What is the relationship between standard measures of personality and 
measures of psychopathology and child temperament? 
In Section 5, we exposit the main systems for measuring personality, focusing primarily, 
but not exclusively, on the Big Five model.  We consider the strengths and limitations of 
the systems and the relationships among competing systems.  We show how measures of 
psychopathology are extreme manifestations of personality traits and how child 
temperament is related to adult traits.  We link specific diagnoses of pathology with 
conventional measures of psychological traits. 
                                                 
240 Freudian models of the unconscious would make the traits that govern behavior, and especially  , unknown to 
agents but nonetheless governing choices.  A pure model of behaviorism would feature the effects of constraints on 
choices.  Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman et al. [2008] develop such a model.  We review it in the Web Appendix. Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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(3) What is the relationship between economic preference parameters and psychological 
measurements? 
We review an emerging body of research that relates economic preference parameters 
(risk aversion, time preference, ambiguity aversion, social preferences) to the Big Five 
traits and to measures of self-esteem and personal control that are linked to the Big Five 
traits.  Time preference is negatively correlated with IQ and the ability to control 
attention.  Risk preference is negatively correlated with IQ and other measures of 
cognition.  Higher IQ people are more consistent in their choices under uncertainty.  
While risk aversion is related to personality traits, the available evidence suggests that 
marginal ambiguity aversion is not.  Social preferences are predicted by measured 
personality traits, but the evidence on this question is not strong. 
(4) How stable across situations and over the life cycle are preference parameters and 
personality traits?  
We review the history of the person-situation debate between the social psychologists 
who maintain the primacy of the situation in determining behavior and the traits theorists 
who maintain the primacy of traits in explaining behavior.  Behavioral economists, as a 
group, have adopted the situationist point of view.  Extreme advocates of the situationist 
point of view claim that there is no personality construct.  The issue hinges on the 
nonlinearity of action, effort, and productivity functions.  In the presence of such 
nonlinearities, measured traits (e.g., actions) depend on situations and tasks. 
A large body of evidence suggests that nonlinearity is an empirically important 
phenomenon.  Nonetheless, a large body of evidence suggests that there are stable 
personality traits that predict a variety of behaviors in different situations.  Personality is Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
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not an ephemeral creation of situations, nor is its manifestation invariant across 
situations.  Moreover, personality traits are not set in stone.  They change over the life 
cycle.  The evidence on the stability of preference parameters across situations and over 
life cycle is less ample.  There is evidence that standard separable models of preferences 
are inadequate descriptions of choice behavior.  There is little evidence on the stability or 
instability of preference parameters over the life cycle. 
(5) What is the evidence on the predictive power of cognitive and personality traits? 
We present a large body of evidence that shows strong associations between personality 
traits and educational, labor market, health, and criminal outcomes. 
(6) What is the evidence on the causal power of personality on behavioral outcomes? 
Few of the correlational studies relating personality to outcomes have a firm causal basis.  
Personality psychologists do not yet attempt to establish the causal status of personality.  
There are, however, a few experimental manipulations that establish the causal effect of 
personality.  Recent studies in economics establish causal status of certain personality 
traits on outcomes for observational studies invoking assumptions that are inevitably 
subject to debate.  Research in this area is likely to flourish in the coming years. 
(7) Can personality be altered across the life cycle? Are interventions that change 
personality traits likely fruitful avenues for policy? 
There is a small but growing body of intervention studies that establish that personality 
traits can be altered over long periods of time in response to interventions.  Some of the 
major effects of early childhood intervention programs appear to operate through their 
lasting effects on personality.  Family investment decisions also change personality.  The Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz 2/4/2011 
220 
 
evidence to date suggests that interventions that boost personality traits can be effective 
in promoting adult success. 
(8) Do the findings from psychology suggest that conventional economic theory should be 
enriched? 
The evidence from psychology enriches economics by providing a more nuanced 
interpretation of human choice and actions.  It promises to provide a deeper 
understanding of conventional economic preference parameters and how they arise.  
Unfortunately, at the time of this writing, this promise remains unfulfilled.  Given the 
current state of evidence against conventional economic preference specifications (see, 
e.g., Starmer [2000] and the evidence in Section 6), this line of research is very 
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